Dr. Jordan B. Peterson sits down with Alex O’Connor and Richard Dawkins to discuss their differences of view on the Abrahamic biblical texts, truth claims in science and fiction, the extension of memes through Jungian archetypes, and the memetical reality of dragons.

This episode was filmed on September 30th, 2024

Richard Dawkins is a British evolutionary biologist, zoologist, science communicator, and bestselling author of books such as “The Selfish Gene,” and “The Genetic Book of the Dead.”

Alex O'Connor is a philosophy-oriented YouTuber, podcaster, and public speaker. He graduated in 2021 from St. John's College, Oxford University, with a BA in philosophy and theology. In 2023, he launched the “Within Reason” podcast, which has featured guests including Sam Harris, Richard Dawkins, Slavoj Žižek, Neil deGrasse Tyson, and Rory Stewart, amongst others.

Speakers:
Jordan B. Peterson = [JBP]
Alex O’Connor = [AO]
Richard Dawkins = [RD]

Intro

0:00 [JBP] [Music] I had the opportunity today to engage in a long awaited discussion Dr Richard
0:06 Dawkins and Alex o coner and we took the opportunity to explore things we agree
0:12 about and things we disagree about in a manner that I think was very productive join us for
0:18 [Music] that [JBP] you said that you were a cultural Christian but what did you mean by that
0:24 [RD] virtually nothing Dr Peterson you're drunk on symbols what I care about is the truth value I see no no truth value
0:31 in the claims of Christianity the Virgin birth the resurrection do you believe in any of those [JBP] from a metaphorical
0:37 perspective any culture that doesn't hold the image of the woman and infant
0:43 sacred dies [RD] well let's go back to what you said earlier which I was very interested in you implied there's no
0:48 difference between whether the text is divinely inspired or whether it evolved [JBP] well it's the same thing if it's
0:54 fundamentally reflective of the logos or order and I think it is [RD] I think that
1:00 Jordan prioritizes myth and I prioritize fact I'm not interested in Dragons I'm
1:05 interested in real in reality [JBP] but my sense is that those two Pathways have to unify now it's not like I know how to
1:12 rectify that [AO] do you think that that is something that is is worth exploring further is that is [RD] that's very interesting
1:18 [Music] yes [AO] I think our first point of contact

Memes vs. archetypes: what creates depth and fundamentality

1:23 in the spirit of finding those overlapping Circles of interests between you two will be the similarities if
1:29 there are any between the concept of a meme and the concept of an archetype so Professor Dawkins perhaps you can begin
1:35 by telling us what is a meme [RD] a meme is a virus of the mind so it's something that
1:41 spreads because it spreads because it spreads it's something that spreads by imitation as I understand it an
1:47 archetype is quite different from that because an archetype is something which all humans have um as a virtue of Being
1:53 Human something that's built in so it's not something that spreads as an epidemic it's something that we all have
1:59 any way now I suppose that it could turn into a meme but I I would think it would

Aaand we are off to a terrible start already. I am a bit surprised that [RD] is using a different definition of meme than he has historically, in a way that seems to mostly be referring to the use on social media. Same with archetype, which I wonder if the purpose here is to make a point right out of the gate. But IMHO historically memes have been:
meme, unit of cultural information spread by imitation.
and then mashing that together with his definition of mind virus

Maybe he was testing [JBP] to see if he actually read any of [RD]s' work. I also disagree with the mind virus concept. Religion is much more complicated than that, being more like a social contract which is actually written down, rather than the informal "social contract" that corporations claim to have, then habitually ignore and exploit, with quips about "being worth the paper it's written on" as if that is clever.

Archetypes are sort of like, advanced or well developed memes. In that, they are both cultural artifacts which are unique to cultures. But I think this also could be foreshadowing that they may not mention the word 'stereotype' in this conversation, but that is mostly what they are talking about. With memes being the smallest unit of information which can be deemed 'cultural' and Archetypes being well developed(with a back story) stereotypical set of behaviors, which is unique to a specific culture.
That is the most common mistake in psychology and is exemplified in "WEIRD"-ness that has made so much of psychology research unreplicable or not generalizable.
https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/non-weird-science/202004/psychologys-weird-problem

Get ready for a whole lot of incorrect psychology/philosophy!

2:04 be mudding the waters to even say that there's something very much in common between an archetype and a meme [AO]memes
2:11 are not embedded into the psychology of people as [RD] no they arise they're things
2:17 like the backwards baseball hat which is not an archetype I mean it's it's something that that becomes fashionable
2:23 and spreads as an epidemic around the population which is very different from
2:28 an archetype which is sort of built in [AO] yes I've heard you in the past Dr Peterson say that a meme is very similar

I don't know what he means by "built-in" other than being parts of foundational myths of societies. Trying to associate very complex culturally unique behaviors, like chivalry, to genes, is like expecting dogs to be chivalrous, without any of the conceptual knowledge.

[RD]s’ choice to describe an archetype as “built-in” hints at an implicit analogy between archetypes and genetic traits, almost suggesting they carry an intrinsic, heritable element. If taken literally, this could imply that archetypes are somehow coded within us, akin to genes. While this analogy may serve as a clever tactic to distinguish archetypes from memes, it falters on logical grounds. Attempting to explain complex, culturally specific behaviors—such as chivalry or honor—as intrinsic traits suggests that they exist independently of historical or societal context, which oversimplifies the role of culture in shaping human behavior. For example, expecting non-human animals to understand concepts like chivalry highlights the absurdity of equating culturally constructed behaviors with genetic inheritance.

2:35 if not almost identical to an archetype almost as if you kept pushing the idea of what a meme is you might end up with
2:40 an archetype that [JBP ]well I think maybe the the appropriate way of tying the two I
2:46 ideas together given what Dr Dawkins just said is the is to notice the fact
2:52 that something spreads because it catches right and so things catch
2:58 because they have an emotional resonance and so they attract people's interest

Only sometimes, propaganda does not work that way, things catch because people are often dumb and just imitating eachother as part of group dynamics or signalling they share the culture of the group, as part of a group identity. Which can be incorrectly be described as "emotional resonance" because "virtue signalling" is a dirty word, and most of the time what they are signalling has nothing to do with virtue in the classical sense. Because virtue in the classical sense is about excellence, while virtue signalling is just about signalling an identity or group affiliation.

[JBP]’s simplification that ideas spread because of “emotional resonance” overlooks the significant influence of social dynamics, imitation, and conformity within groups. Many ideas proliferate not out of intrinsic appeal but rather because of social mimicry or signaling affiliation. In this sense, people often adopt behaviors not because they “resonate” emotionally but to maintain in-group status, especially within communities where shared behaviors signal group identity.

This process, commonly known as “virtue signaling,” is an essential factor here. [JBP]’s framing of “emotional resonance” can be seen as an attempt to avoid the term “virtue signaling,” which would complicate his point by introducing questions about authenticity versus performative alignment. Classical virtue, understood as excellence in thought or action, has little in common with modern virtue signaling, which often sacrifices genuine excellence for mere appearances of alignment with social norms.

This distinction is crucial, as it challenges [JBP]’s portrayal of all cultural transmission as deeply felt or emotionally resonant. While some ideas genuinely resonate on an emotional level, many simply function as social markers, adopted to reflect in-group alignment rather than authentic engagement.

3:03 and so they attract them in an exploratory manner that'd be one way of thinking about it that would be attraction on the positive emotion side
3:10 or they attract them on the negative emotion side and so that would Loop the idea of the catchiness of a idea a meme
3:19 let's say with the more underlying motivational structures and as the idea is more related to the action of
3:26 underlying biological motivational structures it it becomes more and more expression of something that's
3:31 instinctual and archetypal like Yung defined an archetype essentially as something like the the manifestation of

By instinctual, he is referring to the social nature of some humans for belonging, which is also not an archetype, but a measure of extroversion vs introversion. This is just the beginning of a long series of steorotypes where both [RD] and [JBP] will make the cardinal sin of psychology, which is making broad claims that suggest that all humans are the same.
It's the W in WEIRD that people typically associate with Entitlement or Privileged. Maybe even the "archetype" of entitlement or privileged. I suspect that neither of them would consider WEIRD (Western, Educated, Industrial, Rich, and Democratic) to be an archetype, but it is. Notice how each of those aspects, ARE ASPECTS OF CULTURE. The "white" part is more an aspect of how embedded racism is structurally, and lacking those experiences, since "white" is not a race, it's a social construct. People from many eastern european or asian cultures, despite having white skin, would not be a part of this group, for lack of any of "Industrial, Rich, and Democratic" aspects. Asia has tons of people with white skin that do not express these archetypes.
So we can use stereotype and archetype interchangeably here.

I suspect that [JBP] uses the word archetype to pretend it's something other than a collection of stereotypical behaviors.
Because why not, if everything is narratives, it can be whatever he wants right? That is post-modern "philosophy" or Nihilism, in a nutshell.

[JBP]’s attempt to correlate the “catchiness” of an idea with biological motivation risks reducing complex social and psychological phenomena to instinctual drives. He conflates motivations—rich, multifaceted psychological phenomena—with instinct, a far narrower concept associated with automatic behaviors. While ideas can certainly appeal to underlying needs for belonging or meaning, these needs do not qualify as “instincts.” Rather, they reflect varying degrees of psychological development, often influenced by individual traits like introversion and extroversion, as you noted.

[JBP]’s framing risks essentializing the need for belonging as an instinct, whereas it aligns more closely with personality dimensions like extroversion and individual psychological development. This oversimplification is part of a broader tendency to universalize human behaviors, creating a “Monohumanist Man” model that dismisses diversity in personal experience and personality. This oversimplification is particularly common within WEIRD cultural paradigms, where researchers often project local traits and behaviors as universal without acknowledging their cultural specificity. More obviously put, all known historical figures, did not behave similarly or have the same beliefs or even have similar personalities.

3:38 an instinct in image and then also in Behavior so the deepest level is
3:44 something like the Instinct and that would be motivational or emotional drive and then there's a manifestation of that

[JBP]’s equating of instinct with motivational and emotional drives overlooks a fundamental distinction: instinct is an automatic, unlearned behavior that requires no conscious engagement. Motivation and emotional drives, by contrast, are dynamic processes, often shaped by complex cognitive and social factors, which guide a person’s choices and actions. Mimicry, a behavior [JBP] might view as instinctual, is not automatic but typically a developmental behavior more commonly seen in immature social contexts or in those aligning with in-group norms.

This distinction is critical because mimicry in children and certain social groups is often part of identity formation rather than an innate instinct. Mimicry, while common on social media, particularly among adolescents and impressionable adults, does not indicate an automatic instinct but rather a behavior reinforced by social dynamics. This tendency to simplify complex human behaviors as instinctual weakens the argument, reducing nuanced psychological processes to crude, biologically deterministic models.

3:49 in imagination and behavior and it's more culturally constructed there and you could also imagine that there are

Here [JBP] switches abruptly from “instinctual” to “culturally constructed,” without addressing that instinctual and culturally constructed behaviors are, by definition, mutually exclusive. Instincts are biological and universal, while culturally constructed behaviors are learned, contextual, and subject to change. His rhetorical shift blurs the line between inherited behaviors and those learned through socialization, creating confusion about which human behaviors fall into each category. For instance, culturally specific behaviors like “chivalry” or certain religious rituals cannot be instinctual since they require a social context to develop and be understood.

[JBP]’s blending of instinctual and cultural explanations reflects a postmodern conflation, allowing him to redefine terms fluidly to support his narrative. By treating archetypes as inherently “catchy” and “motivational,” he suggests they embody both universal appeal and cultural specificity—a contradiction that serves rhetorical flexibility but undermines intellectual rigor. Archetypes, in Jung’s original conception, are complex symbols subject to diverse cultural expressions, not inherent “instincts” present from birth.

3:56 depths of these ideas the the baseball hat idea for example that would be something
4:02 that's manifesting itself at a fairly shallow level but there's a reason that the backwards baseball hat caught on you
4:08 know it speaks of the moment for whatever reason and and it's linked to the
4:14 biology through the fact that it captures interest for some reason [AO] so perhaps something like uh the archetype

I think [JBP] just suggested that anything that captures attention is linked to biology?
Instead of being a result of culture, that a cultural icon (musicians) started wearing a backwards baseball cap, so kids thought it was cool and signifies of preference for a genre of music, is somehow biologically instinctual?

I think it's ironic that he is making these claims to [RD], because in the past I have claimed many times that [RD] associates way too many complex behaviors to genetics and is my primary criticism of his book "the selfish gene"
Which is to say, my complaint about [RD] was that he associates too many things with genes and ignores culture which is a reductionist mistake as part of a fallacy of composition around humans.

[JBP]’s assertion that anything capturing attention is inherently “linked to biology” reflects an overgeneralization that conflates cultural phenomena with biological imperatives. By his reasoning, even a culturally specific trend like a backwards baseball cap signifies an instinctual, biologically motivated behavior simply because it garners attention. This framing ignores the obvious influence of cultural signaling, where the popularity of certain styles is a learned social behavior that signifies identity, affiliation, or group belonging rather than an innate, instinctual attraction, and it does not effect all fans equally, which one would expect if it was genetic.

Donald Symons also finds it inappropriate to use anthropomorphism in conveying scientific meaning in general, and particularly in this instance. He writes in The Evolution of Human Sexuality (1979):[13]
"In summary, the rhetoric of The Selfish Gene exactly reverses the real situation: through metaphor genes are endowed with properties only sentient beings can possess, such as selfishness, while sentient beings are stripped of these properties and called machines…The anthropomorphism of genes…obscures the deepest mystery in the life sciences: the origin and nature of mind."

It’s particularly ironic that [JBP] is making these claims in [RD]s’ presence, given [RD]s’ own history of associating various complex behaviors with genetic influence in “The Selfish Gene”—a reductionist view critiqued as a form of the fallacy of composition.

4:22 being a more fundamental psychological concept that memes can then play upon the backwards cap hatches on [RD] well that
4:29 seems implausible to me but the but the idea that the archetype could be a reason why some memes spread that that
4:35 seems to me to be plausible if you believe in archetypes at all yeah [AO] but you prefer to think of memes or you do think of memes as you refer to them as a
4:42 virus [RD] yes [AO] doesn't have to have a negative [RD] it's spreadability which is which is a Salient point and if chiming in with an
4:50 archetype is something is some a reason why they might spread then I could go with that [AO] yeah and presumably archetypes
4:56 don't act in the same way they don't spread through cultures they don't sort of grow up and die in individual
5:03 Generations they're much more foundational than that [JBP] I think you have to think about it

But in fact they do grow up and die in individual Generations, it's just harder to track because elements of one archetype can adapted to another over time, become revived after being abandoned, thanks to the technology of written language.
But it's because that some elements are adopted into new archtypes, while [JBP] would claim they are the same archtype. That would be like suggesting that because almost all mammals have 5 digits on their hands and feet, that a dog and a human are the same.

[AO]’s suggestion that “archetypes don’t act in the same way, don’t spread through cultures” misunderstands the fluid and evolving nature of archetypes. While archetypes may serve as persistent cultural symbols, they do, in fact, shift, adapt, and even “die” over time. Archetypes are not fixed entities but complex narratives and images that are constantly reshaped by social, historical, and cultural forces. By suggesting that archetypes are static, [AO] overlooks how elements of one archetype can transform into another, often in response to generational or cultural shifts. For instance, what was once considered a “warrior” archetype in one era might evolve into a more nuanced “protector” archetype in another, shedding certain characteristics and gaining others.

[JBP]’s response that these shifts imply continuity rather than transformation is a reductionist view, as it ignores the profound cultural reinterpretation each archetype undergoes over time. His analogy equates archetypes to biological structures, akin to assuming that all mammals with five digits are fundamentally the same, despite their differences. Archetypes, in reality, are more akin to cultural languages that change syntax, vocabulary, and connotation across generations and contexts.

5:09 hierarchically know that there are there's something in in in the structure
5:14 that that would make it self manifest as an archetype there's something that's foundational and deep that wouldn't
5:19 change over wouldn't change any faster in a sense than the species itself changes
5:25 but then there would be efflorescences of that idea that would be less permanent as they as they were more
5:32 attuned to the specifics of the time so and that's not saying anything
5:39 different really than saying that there are ideas that make themselves manifest at different levels of depth which is
5:45 also a complex thing like it's not a it's not that easy to specify what makes an idea deep which makes it more
5:52 archetypal and what makes it transient and trivial there's a relationship between such ideas there's no idea so
5:58 trivial that it doesn't touch the depths because no one would care about it right so but but but archetypal ideas do have

No, there are ideas "which are so trivial that it doesn't touch the depths." Most of this section is a narrative that, conflates genetic evolution and cultural evolution, if it makes any sense at all.

I will take this time to remind people about how glad I am that I didn't let a bunch of right wing charlatans that were imitating me over this past year, to use my mannerisms and sayings, to pretend they were in my cultural group (neoBuddhism)
and then use their bullshit marketing and hand waving "symbols" to then wait till the election and do a bait and switch to tell people to vote for trump.

In other words, a bunch of people who are unaffiliated with neoBuddhism and the OpenSource Temple, started imitating me, and I both challenged them directly as seen in my previous sermon about Johnathan Pageau, as well as entirely avoiding engaging with their communities, which is why I wanted so much to not write this sermon. As I don't want to develop his narratives.

Paul VanderKlay, I ONLY DID THIS FOR YOU! and it's annoying and frustrating and I dislike every part of writing this.
It's mostly about ensuring that people don't associate me with this crypto-fascist patriarchal BS masquerading as philosophy. Which is not unlike what happened in Germany after they imported Brahmanism and the caste system because it was exotic at the time. Or did you think the Germans invented the swastika ?

I am glad my refusal to participate in this right wing farce has resulted in them not having anything reasonable to imitate or talking points for this election season.

So much for imitation being "instinctual". Psudo-intellectual and pseudo-scientific frauds who are mostly just trying to create the justifications for a caste system. While trying to parasitise the credibility of neoBuddhism because that is how bereft of intellect they are.

The mormons should feel bad for falling for that shit.
https://www.pdcnet.org/pga/content/pga_2021_0999_9_10_8

[JBP]’s attempt to describe ideas as hierarchical and “foundational” mistakenly merges biological evolution and cultural evolution, treating them as interchangeable processes. By his logic, foundational ideas, akin to biological traits, evolve at the pace of the species—yet this is a deeply flawed comparison. Biological evolution, which unfolds over millennia, relies on genetic adaptation, while cultural evolution is malleable, shaped within generational timespans. This conflation erodes the meaningful distinction between the two processes and obfuscates the nuances of cultural transmission and adaptation.

There are indeed trivial ideas that have no depth or permanence and serve no role in cultural evolution or identity. Not every idea that spreads reflects “something deep,” nor does every passing trend possess the symbolic weight of an archetype. A fleeting trend or stylistic choice can captivate public attention without touching any meaningful “depth” or archetypal foundation.

Foundational ideas are culturally constructed and can transform rapidly in response to social, historical, and technological changes. Viewing all ideas as hierarchically deep or “archetypal” dilutes the meaning of archetypes and trivializes the substance of cultural evolution.

6:06 that capacity to spread virally and to rise and fall you see that I think you
6:12 see that in the history of religious ideas know that religious ideas are very
6:18 can be very catching because otherwise they wouldn't spread now they do there's
6:23 variation in them like there is in languages but they also there's also something that's core that makes them
6:29 ident if iable let's say as religious ideas rather than as any other sort of idea I mean one of the things I was

I am not sure if [JBP] is trying to say that all religions are the same or that religion is genetic.
What he is totally failing to note, is that religious ideas are PHILOSOPHICAL so they are identifiable as philosophical ideas rather than "any sort of idea" though I suppose it's not surprising that [JBP] doesn't know what philosophy is. I am pretty sure this is why most modern philosophers avoid him.

[JBP]’s reduction of religious ideas to “catching” or “spreadable” concepts fundamentally misunderstands the nature of religious and philosophical ideas, which are rooted in rigorous exploration of meaning, ethics, and existence. Religious philosophies persist not because they are virally catchy, but because they tackle existential questions that resonate deeply with human nature, society, and the pursuit of truth. Religion, unlike language or culture, is not merely a transmissible idea but a structured, often internally consistent worldview built upon centuries of philosophical reflection.

In reducing religious ideas to a kind of “viral” phenomenon, [JBP] dismisses their intellectual foundations. Philosophical ideas—religious or secular—persist precisely because they engage with fundamental questions that endure beyond generational fads or social trends. Religion has resilience not because it is easily imitated or “spreadable,” but because it appeals to the philosophical and moral dimensions of human life.

His reluctance to define religion as a philosophical system rather than a mere “idea” reflects a lack of engagement with the rigorous discourse that defines philosophical inquiry. It’s no wonder, then, that most contemporary philosophers avoid [JBP]’s work—he reduces nuanced philosophical ideas to shallow, generic tropes that fail to acknowledge their profound intellectual origins.

“The battle between the gods” is portrayed across cultures

6:34 really interested about I sent you an email at one time asking you if you had read Mirsea eliade especially the sacred
6:42 and the profane but he also has a three book series called a history of religious ideas and I really like a
6:47 history of religious ideas it's a great book and one of the things it does is analyze a particular widespread
6:55 religious Motif which is the battle between the Gods in heaven you see this

We are supposed to be surprised at how often humans pretend to be gods even though such a thing is typically referred to as a mental disorder? I suppose that makes it genetic? (it isn't)
[JBP] is obviously wrong in applying this stereotype to all religions, especially Buddhism.

[JBP]’s reference to Eliade’s A History of Religious Ideas and the motif of “the battle between gods” reflects a common yet limited interpretation of religion that frames divinity as competitive and anthropomorphized. His mention of a recurring “battle” among gods, while recognizable in some mythological traditions, overlooks the diversity within religious narratives. By implying that all religions reflect this “battle” motif, he creates a sweeping generalization that fails to encompass religions—such as Buddhism—that lack a pantheon of gods or a concept of divine conflict. The god-like figures [JBP] refers to, if they are indeed cultural archetypes, often serve more as projections of human psychology and cultural ideals than as literal battles between supernatural entities.

The “god complex” highlights this point astutely: many mythologies and religions use deities as reflections of human traits, emotions, and ethical dilemmas, rather than as literal beings waging celestial wars. The idea of gods as expressions of human psychological modes is not inherently religious or universal, as [JBP] suggests, but is often a narrative technique that varies widely across cultures and belief systems.

7:00 idea in many many cultures and each God is the expression of a mode of perception
7:06 or a mode of being and what you see happening in multitude of cultures is that there are many many ways of seeing

[JBP]’s claim here that each god represents a “mode of perception or being” marks a stark shift from his earlier archetypal framing. Suddenly, gods are not universal archetypes but culturally specific modes of perception—an interesting shift, though it dilutes his previous argument about the universality of archetypes. If gods are modes of perception, then they are culturally contingent, each reflecting the specific worldview of the society that created them, rather than timeless archetypes rooted in human nature.

The Greek pantheon, for example, often embodies psychological archetypes, with each god representing human traits or flaws. However, these are not universally applicable archetypes but rather reflections of Greek cultural ideals and moral lessons, created to help Greek society understand itself through metaphor. This variation across cultures, where one society’s “archetype” may be unrecognizable in another, points to the fluid, culturally constructed nature of these figures, rather than their role as fixed archetypes in the Jungian sense.

Divine figures in polytheistic cultures serve more as cultural expressions and social narratives than as universal psychological structures. This approach aligns more with Eliade’s work, which examines how cultures imbue divine figures with cultural meanings rather than presenting them as inherent aspects of human psychology.

7:13 the world and acting in it that are metamorphous metamorphosed into
7:19 something Divine and as cultures mingle and mix their their gods compete in the
7:26 space of the imagination and something like a hierarchy forms that's the emergence of something like monotheism

The rise of monotheism was the abolishment of the pantheism that he just described. And Buddhism predates Christianity.
Many monotheistic religions existed before pantheistic religions, so the monotheistic religions did not emerge from pantheistic religions.
He is conflating the divine right of kings with religion here.

Here [JBP] suggests that monotheism emerges as a result of the “competition” among pantheons—a claim that oversimplifies the complex and varied histories of monotheistic development across cultures. Historically, monotheistic traditions didn’t evolve from a competition of gods within pantheons but often arose from distinct theological, political, and philosophical developments. For example, the rise of Judaism, one of the earliest enduring monotheistic religions, did not evolve from a blending of divine figures but emerged independently, influenced by unique historical, social, and spiritual factors. Similarly, Zoroastrianism, another ancient monotheistic religion, developed with its own unique theological principles, focused on the duality of good and evil rather than a pantheon of competing gods.

[JBP]’s mischaracterization of monotheism as emerging from an imagined “hierarchical sorting” of pantheons suggests an understanding rooted more in creative metaphor than historical accuracy. The shift from polytheism to monotheism, when it did occur, was less a case of gods “competing” than a cultural, philosophical, or political reimagining of divinity, often driven by factors such as societal unification, philosophical inquiry, and theological reform.

Monotheism’s rise often came from ideological shifts rather than cultural amalgamation could reinforce the need for historical specificity in [JBP]’s arguments. This distinction also challenges the idea of “archetypes” as universal; monotheistic religions tend to resist archetypal thinking, focusing instead on singular, all-encompassing deities whose characteristics are more philosophical and abstract than psychological.

7:32 and the associate [AO] so we've been talking a little bit about the concept of a meme I think it's it would be strange to be
7:38 suspicious of the idea that memes are a thing that do exist and transmit but there might be more room for suspicion
7:44 about this concept of the archetype I was wondering Professor Dawkins what you think about the concept of archetypes in general [RD] well for example if we take the
7:51 idea of the of the Gods competing with each other um that I take it is a is a is a proper archetype because it's it's
7:57 it's present in all in all cultures I presume you mean is something that's built in genetically ultimately I
8:04 suppose that that there something about our brains makes different cultures
8:10 invent the same kinds of religious uh symbols and things like a battle between
8:16 Gods is one that's one it it's and um there might be others it's not that convincing I mean such an obvious thing
8:22 because we have human battles and therefore an idea of battles between Gods would not be that implausible so it
8:28 it doesn't strike me as a very penetrating observation [JBP] well I think the thing that's interesting about it the
8:34 thing that's been interesting to me about it is to is to start to understand the nature of the universal themes and

[JBP] once again demonstrates his total lack of knowledge of history, if he can't figure out the "battles between gods"
was the battles between literal men posing as gods, (see "divine right of kings) and doing literal battles, using peasant armies, to fight for resources.

I am going to have to also call out [RD] here, as this is not an aspect of all cultures. Many of them are honest about their battles for resources, or for respect and control, without invoking godhood. [JBP] completely fails to note or notice that the emergence of monotheism was specifically about preventing people with the mental illnesses of god complexes, from leading them, as they are often bad leaders and that usually has catastrophic consequences for the populace.

Way to go on understanding the dynamics of psychology JBP

[RD]s’ response here exposes a critical misconception: he accepts the idea of a “battle between gods” as a universal archetype without considering how cultural, historical, and political influences shape mythologies. While the motif of divine conflict appears in many cultures, it does not signify a universal archetype embedded in human nature. Rather, it often serves as a narrative tool, a metaphor for power struggles among rulers who may present themselves as god-like. This distinction is essential because archetypes, if they exist, would ideally reflect universal human experiences or existential truths—not socio-political dynamics unique to certain historical contexts.

Your observation that the “battle between gods” is often a literal depiction of rulers or elites presenting themselves as divinely sanctioned is crucial. Historical leaders frequently invoked divine symbolism to legitimize their rule, equating their political power with divine right. This phenomenon doesn’t represent an innate archetype but rather a culturally specific practice of consolidating power. Moreover, societies without organized hierarchies often lack such god-like figures, further undermining the claim of universality.

The world of facts is seen through a story

8:41 how they're expressed in stories I mean one of the things I wanted to explore with you because I think this is an idea
8:47 that's at the core of the cultural conflict is the postmodern types seem to have stumbled onto something which I
8:53 actually think is true and they're not the only discipline that's come to this realization because you can see it
8:59 emerging in neuroscience and in in uh in Ai and in robotics as well that we see
9:06 the world of facts through something that when described is a story because we have to prioritize our perceptions we
9:13 have to prioritize facts and as far as I can tell a story is a verbal account of
9:18 how of how our perceptions and the facts that we encounter are prioritized so for

wow, this is wrong on so many levels. Though first I would point out, that [JBP] is bascially identifying himself as a post-modernist here.

Second, his claims that this is "emerging in neuroscience and in in uh in Ai and in robotics as well" is total bullshit that he literally just made up to try and stick as many keywords, for SEO.

Third, narratives do not "prioritize our perceptions" and his claim of "we have to prioritize facts" while simultaneously, being a post-modernist, means a belief that facts don't exist, only narratives exist. This would be called "paying lip service to science" because anyone who has actually taken a science class would know, they are not teaching narratives.

The model of an atom is not a narrative. It's not a "verbal account of how of how our perceptions and the facts that we encounter are prioritized" BECAUSE YOU CANNOT PERCEIVE INDIVIDUAL ATOMS WITH YOUR EYES.

The look on [RD] face, a subtle frown, says it all. It's because [JBP] is in the middle of a gish gallop which seems to be his primary rhetorical method.

During a typical Gish gallop, the galloper confronts an opponent with a rapid series of specious arguments, half-truths, misrepresentations and outright lies, making it impossible for the opponent to refute all of them within the format of the debate.[3] Each point raised by the Gish galloper takes considerably longer to refute than to assert.

Which is also why this sermon is so long and frustrating for me to write.

[JBP]’s assertion that “we see the world of facts through a story” conflates narrative interpretation with objective scientific inquiry, presenting a postmodern view that aligns more with relativism than with scientific realism. His suggestion that facts are inherently filtered through narratives is problematic, as it implies that objective facts can only be understood through subjective storytelling, dismissing the possibility of objective knowledge. Scientific models, however, are not “stories” but representations built from observable data and empirically validated theories—clear departures from the flexible, subjective interpretations associated with narrative storytelling.

[JBP]’s claim that this narrative-based view is emerging in fields like neuroscience, AI, and robotics is misleading and unsupported. These fields rely on rigorous, data-driven methodologies that prioritize empirical accuracy over narrative interpretation. While aspects of human cognition, such as memory, may incorporate narrative constructs to make sense of complex data, these constructs are not inherent to scientific or technological processes. For instance, models in AI, from neural networks to probabilistic algorithms, function based on mathematical principles, not narrative frameworks. This misrepresentation serves as a rhetorical tactic, using popular fields as SEO “buzzwords” to lend credibility to an otherwise unsubstantiated claim.

[JBP]’s comparison of scientific models to “stories” reveals a fundamental misunderstanding of science. Models of atoms, for instance, do not function as stories; they are constructed to explain observable phenomena, such as atomic interactions, that lie outside the realm of direct perception. These models are not shaped by narrative needs but by the limitations and advancements of scientific instrumentation and theory. Reducing them to “stories” risks undermining the objective rigor of scientific inquiry, a tactic often used in postmodernist discourse to question the validity of empirical facts.

By quickly shifting from neuroscience to AI to robotics and then to narratives, [JBP] overwhelms his audience with loosely connected ideas, leaving little time for [RD] or [AO] to address each claim substantively. This tactic obscures the weaknesses in his argument, creating an illusion of depth that collapses under closer scrutiny.

9:24 example when you go see a movie movie has a hero and what the writers do is they show you how the hero prioritizes
9:31 his perceptions what he attends to and how he acts and you derive from that the story of his life and his ethic and the

Most of the time, movies are not about the story of someones life. Often times, they are about how someone fails to live up to their own ethics, or how their actions are in contradiction to their proclaimed ethics.

[JBP]’s reduction of storytelling to a protagonist’s prioritization of “perceptions” oversimplifies both narrative structure and the variety of stories told in cinema. Movies are often more complex than simple journeys that reveal a hero’s ethic; they frequently delve into moral ambiguities, conflicts, and personal failings that challenge the hero’s proclaimed ethics. In many cases, characters serve as cautionary figures, their stories revealing the consequences of ethical compromise or moral contradiction rather than merely illustrating a clear hierarchy of prioritized perceptions.

By framing the hero’s journey solely as an alignment of perceptions and actions, [JBP] overlooks the purpose of narrative tension, which is often to expose the disparity between a character’s stated values and their actions. This tension not only enhances the depth of storytelling but also engages the viewer’s own ethical reasoning, inviting them to reflect on what it means to live ethically. His interpretation flattens the complexity of storytelling, bypassing the broader narrative techniques that reveal not just prioritized perceptions but also inner conflicts and ethical dilemmas.

9:39 the the idea that we have a story that we have to organize our Perceptions in priority and that the
9:47 description of that organization is a story that's a very revolutionary idea
9:52 and I think the postmodernists got that right and I think that's why we have a culture war going on at least in part is
9:58 because the idea that we see the world through a story or that a story is a description
10:03 of the structure through which we see the world I think that's accurate because we have to prioritize our perceptions so that's a tricky problem

[JBP] tripped over the incoherence of his gish gallop here. He is also conflating perception with conceptions. The "prioritize our perceptions" which is how the attention system attends to input from the sense organs, is an automatic mechanism which is not something people do consciously.

Salience realization, is not a "prioritize of our perceptions" its a prioritization our conceptions, ideas. Purely mental objects that do not have parallels to sensory information. He is also wrong about the culture war, which just means he is a useful idiot in the new cold war, of which he is mostly ignorant of.

His ignorance of the rest of the world, and the entitlement that represents, is mostly what is responsible for the culture war. In so far as it's considered architypically "American" despite obviously not being a trait that I share with him.

Carl Sagan pointed to this when he said "This is a prescription for disaster. We might get away with it for a while, but sooner or later this combustible mixture of ignorance and power is going to blow up in our faces."

[JBP] seems to be emblematic of this.

[JBP]’s argument here relies on an imprecise conflation of perception (sensory input) with conception (the mental processing of ideas). Perception, as an automatic, neurologically-driven process, determines which sensory inputs reach conscious awareness, guided largely by salience, not conscious prioritization. Conception, however, is the mental structuring of ideas, beliefs, and narratives, a process that allows us to interpret information within a broader cognitive framework. [JBP]’s choice to collapse these two distinct cognitive functions into a single narrative model oversimplifies the neurological basis of perception, presenting it as if it were actively filtered through a narrative lens.

In truth, salience—our brain’s automatic prioritization of sensory data—operates independently of conscious storytelling. For instance, sudden loud noises or bright lights attract attention not because of any narrative prioritization but due to automatic, evolutionarily rooted mechanisms. The cognitive act of interpretation, by contrast, occurs at a later stage and is far more complex, as it involves layering subjective experience, prior knowledge, and culturally influenced frameworks onto the raw data of perception. [JBP]’s oversimplification here blurs this essential distinction, presenting an inaccurate view of how perception and interpretation truly function.

[JBP]’s claim that the postmodern “realization” of narratives underlies the current culture war displays a misunderstanding of the complex socio-political forces at play. His statement reflects an inward-looking, almost parochial worldview that assumes cultural issues stem from narrative disagreements rather than acknowledging global forces, historical power dynamics, or economic factors. By framing the culture war as a battle over interpretive narratives, [JBP] overlooks how nationalistic entitlement and ignorance of broader geopolitical realities contribute to cultural division. His rhetoric here resonates more as a form of confirmation bias, reflecting his personal grievances rather than a nuanced understanding of the true cultural and political landscape.

[JBP]’s selective focus on narratives, devoid of context or deeper geopolitical awareness, risks embodying the very danger Sagan warned about—a prescriptive mix of influence and misunderstanding that can harmfully shape cultural perceptions.

[JBP]’s rapid assertion that neuroscience, AI, and robotics support his narrative argument illustrates a classic Gish gallop, injecting a series of complex, unverified claims too quickly for thorough analysis. By invoking these disciplines, he implies widespread scientific endorsement without evidence, a common rhetorical tactic to bolster weak arguments. This technique overwhelms his interlocutors, giving an impression of credibility that dissolves under scrutiny.

10:11 [RD] well I would prioritize my perceptions like this the fact that I care about are the fact that are true and have evidence
10:19 going for them and I'm not that interested in symbols um I think Dr

“Drunk on symbols,” the spirit of Cain

10:24 Peterson you're drunk on symbols [JBP] yes you mentioned i' i' I've heard your I've heard that comment yeah [RD] yes um I mean
10:32 for example I've I've um I I counted up in your book um we who wrestle with God
10:38 the number of references to Cain um there are 356 references to Cain
10:46 in the in the book and 20 references to the descendants of Cain um you're obsessed with Cain um because Cain is
10:53 symbolic of uh evil um all the evil in the world you you more or less blame
10:59 Cain for and um this is Cain I mean you you don't
11:05 believe Cain actually existed I presume
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12:10 today [JBP] well I think of Cain as [RD] well do you believe Cain existed [JBP] I think
12:16 the pattern that Cain represents is an eternal pattern and so it's a higher
12:22 level of existence [RD] that's different I I I realize that [JBP] there are Cain types who exist and they're well [RD] yeah they are

A higher level of existence? I am pretty sure he is trying to equate Cain to Satan or evil, doesn't that make it a lower level?
Or maybe [JBP] is so low, that comparatively it's higher. But that is the problem with the sloppy use of metaphors isn't it?

[RD]s’ critique here—[JBP]’s symbolic obsession with Cain—highlights a core tension between symbolic and factual thinking. [RD] prioritizes empirical evidence and observable truths, while [JBP], by contrast, grounds his arguments in symbolic narratives, giving metaphors a kind of ontological status. This tension between evidence-based and symbol-laden frameworks illustrates a fundamental difference in how each thinker interprets human history, morality, and meaning. While symbols indeed offer psychological insight, [JBP]’s extensive use of Cain as an embodiment of all evil presents a reductive view, ascribing moral failings to a single symbolic “type” without exploring the broader socio-cultural, environmental, or personal factors that contribute to ethical behavior.

[JBP]’s intense focus on Cain, whom he invokes many times, reflects a narrative strategy that elevates Cain from a literary figure to a near-cosmic archetype, assigning symbolic culpability for human evil to a singular mythic figure. This essentializing approach oversimplifies the complex roots of human behavior, creating a kind of “Cain complex” that conflates diverse forms of wrongdoing under a single, unified narrative of “evil.” By giving Cain an archetypal weight, [JBP] bypasses more nuanced explanations of ethical variation, leaving us with a somewhat deterministic view of human morality.

[JBP]’s symbolism detracts from an evidence-based understanding of human behavior. Rather than exploring complex moral systems or psychological nuances, he reduces ethical failures to a recurring “Cain type,” oversimplifying the diversity of human experiences and motivations.

[JBP]’s claim that the “pattern of Cain” has a “higher level of existence” raises significant questions about what he means by “existence.” If Cain is symbolic of a certain moral or existential “type,” referring to him as having a higher existence muddies the distinction between fictional symbols and real-life individuals. In philosophical terms, this is a form of reification, where an abstract concept is treated as if it possesses an independent, quasi-ontological status. The notion that Cain “exists” on a higher level, despite being a mythic character, seems to borrow from Platonic ideals where forms or archetypes are more “real” than material representations.

Furthermore, by claiming Cain represents an “eternal pattern,” [JBP] risks romanticizing a symbol of violence and resentment, effectively granting it legitimacy as an intrinsic, unavoidable part of human nature. Rather than viewing Cain’s story as a reflection of specific, context-bound human challenges, [JBP] elevates it to a universal archetype. This essentialist perspective downplays the role of individual agency, social influence, and environmental conditions that also shape behavior, reducing human ethical struggles to an abstract, unchangeable “type.”

[JBP]’s use of “higher level of existence” is ambiguous and, in the context of Cain, contradictory. Symbolically associating Cain with a “higher” existential plane ignores the typical moral interpretation of Cain’s actions, where violence, envy, and resentment are considered base or destructive qualities.

12:28 cane types Kan himself I mean you you give the game away where you say in your book Cain and Abel were the first humans
12:35 to be born in the natural way now that that betrays you as as as it were
12:41 pretending you think they really existed because you wouldn't have said they were born in a natural way unless you were
12:48 muddling up facts with symbols there because you don't think that that Cain and abble existed [JBP] well I don't what do I

[RD] makes a good point about [JBP] mixing everything up incoherently in his narratives, sorry "perceptual organization" (as if he perceived it happening rather than reading or being told about it), because believing that Cain and Abel were "the first people born in a natural way" also would negate evolution of humans and evolution in general.

[RD]’ point here—that [JBP]’s language implies he sees Cain and Abel as historical rather than symbolic figures—calls attention to [JBP]’s tendency to obscure the boundary between fiction and reality. By stating that Cain and Abel were “born in the natural way,” [JBP] implies a quasi-historical narrative that conflicts with evolutionary biology. This ambiguous language suggests a symbolic framework that masquerades as factual, thus conflating symbolic lessons with empirical knowledge.

[JBP]’s approach here borders on the mythopoetic, blending symbolic interpretations with pseudo-historical assertions in a way that can be misleading. By treating symbolic figures as if they possess historical weight, he risks erasing the line between myth and evidence, presenting religious narratives as quasi-historical fact. This method not only challenges the scientific basis of human evolution but also underscores the inconsistencies in his approach.

12:54 think about Cain and Abel I I said I think the pattern that they represent
13:00 always exists always exists different matter [RD] a pattern that

Humans have not always existed, but seemingly [JBP] is claiming these "patterns" always have.
Because you know like, how in the modern day, everyone is making sacrifices to god. /s
Especially how often god rejects peoples offerings. /s

[JBP]’s claim that the “pattern” of Cain and Abel “always exists” reflects an attempt to universalize a culturally specific narrative by granting it timeless relevance. The story of Cain and Abel, while significant in certain religious and cultural contexts, is not an inherent or universal aspect of human psychology. Rather, it is a mythological construct that speaks to particular views on conflict, morality, and divine justice within specific cultural frameworks. Humanity, has not “always existed,” nor has the story of Cain and Abel or even the notion of divine judgment.

These “patterns” do not inherently exist within all human societies. Many cultures have alternate myths about conflict that lack any trace of Cain and Abel’s symbolic meanings. Universalizing this story erases these diverse perspectives, reducing human experience to a narrow, christian-centric framework.

13:05 they represent the the conflict between Brothers the Rivalry Between Brothers this is a fundamental pattern which
13:12 which yes it's something that that's there but I care about facts I mean did
13:17 they exist or did they not exist [JBP] well I can imagine a situation where when the story was originated that it referred to
13:25 two actual Brothers but as the stories propagated across time as they mutate as
13:31 they adapt let's say to the to the structure of human memory they deepen

Adapt to the structure of human memory? Wow does this guy really not know what culture is?
Because that is definitely not how human memory works. People do not have genetic memory of the story of cain.

[JBP]’s explanation here—that the story of Cain and Abel “adapts to the structure of human memory” and “deepens” over time—reflects a significant misunderstanding of cultural evolution and memory. Human memory does not “adapt” stories in a genetic or inherent manner; rather, stories evolve through cultural transmission, deliberate reinterpretation, and shifts in collective values. Memory does not shape myths, but myths are actively reshaped to reflect current social, religious, and moral concerns. This process is less about memory “structures” and more about cultural dynamics, with storytellers, scholars, and communities reworking narratives to meet the needs of changing times and perspectives.

Moreover, [JBP]’s suggestion that the story’s “deepening” is a natural evolution of memory avoids acknowledging the role of intentional reinterpretation within cultural discourse. The story of Cain and Abel gains new meanings precisely because it is recontextualized by successive generations, not because it evolves on its own within human memory. By reframing this as a “memory adaptation,” [JBP] sidesteps the fact that cultural stories are tools actively reimagined to explore complex moral and ethical issues.

Rather than reflecting a biological memory structure, cultural stories like Cain and Abel persist through deliberate preservation and reinterpretation. [JBP]’s phrasing thus serves as a rhetorical sleight of hand, granting quasi-biological legitimacy to stories that persist purely by cultural choice.

13:36 and they become broader and so then they become emblematic not only of the pattern of conflict that might
13:42 characterize the original two brothers that the story was about but about the conflict between Brothers as such and
13:49 then the more fundamental levels of conflict that exist within human beings which is what you see in more
13:55 sophisticated literature it's like the biblical accounts speak of fact in a
14:00 factual manner upon occasion but the biblical accounts also speak poetically and metaphorically and allegorically and
14:07 people who are sophisticated in biblical analysis have known this for centuries the bibl biblical liter interests
14:13 generally suffer from the problem that they don't even know what it means to be literalist there's lots of unsophisticated ways of approaching a

[JBP] seems to be trying to masquerade as a fundamentalist here. This ignores that he claims that cain is a pattern of evil, which is also "the more fundamental levels of conflict that exist within human beings" so I guess he is trying to say that all humans are either Cain, or evil?

A bit of an extreme take on original sin but ok.

[JBP]’s portrayal of Cain and Abel as representing “more fundamental levels of conflict within human beings” borders on an extreme view of original sin, suggesting that internal human conflict is innately Cain-like or, in essence, a manifestation of evil. This interpretation not only casts a deterministic shadow on human nature but also aligns with an overly essentialist reading of moral struggles as inherently “Cainian” or symbolically evil. By interpreting conflict as an eternal “pattern,” [JBP] risks positioning internal or social conflict as something nearly unchangeable, sidestepping individual moral agency and reducing ethical growth to a rigid archetypal script.

This binary framing is particularly reductive, casting human beings as bound to a moral spectrum that equates conflict with evil. In reality, internal conflict and interpersonal struggles are complex phenomena influenced by context, individual psychology, and external conditions, none of which require the archetypal baggage of Cain’s narrative. By ascribing this story’s symbolism to all human conflict, [JBP] erases these subtleties, forcing ethical diversity into a narrow archetypal mold.

Elevating Cain to an archetype of all internal conflict creates a deterministic view where moral struggle is nearly synonymous with inherent evil. This deterministic narrative can diminish individual responsibility, as it implies that ethical failings are inevitable manifestations of an eternal “type.” In this light, [JBP]’s approach can be seen as a form of moral fatalism that oversimplifies human ethical challenges.

14:20 text [AO] okay let's see what Professor Dawkin thinks about that [RD] well I I I suppose I'm a
literalist I mean and and
14:26 you give the game away when you when you say Caine and Abel the first humans to be born in a natural way [JBP] well I'm speaking
14:32 allegorically there within the confines of the text I mean what I meant by that was that the way the story lays itself
14:39 out is that Adam and Eve are created by God and so they're they're they're not
14:44 they're not they don't they're not emblematic of the pattern of human beings that exist in Fallen history
14:50 within the confines of the text the first two people who are genuine who aren't creations of the Divine are caine and able
14:57 and so for me they emblematic of the patterns of conflict that rip people
15:02 apart in the world of history in the world of normal history [AO] Professor Dawkins I know you take particular
15:08 umbrage with that statement that cain and able were the first normally born uh
15:14 human beings but I think if I understand Dr Peterson correctly there are things that can be sort of true within a story
15:20 it's true that Sherlock Holmes lives at 221B Baker Street and as far as I understand that's maybe what you mean by
15:28 uh the the truth in the matter of of Cain and Abel being the first naturally born internal [JBP] well in the context of the
15:34 story they're the first two Spirits or patterns you could think of patterns of perception and action yes that that
15:42 characterize human existence in the Fallen World right so they're emblematic of what happens in history outside of
15:49 the whatever is meant by the pre-existent paradise [AO] at the same time you must know I know this comes up all
15:55 of the time when somebody says but did can and able really exist and I know that want to say that the the story
16:01 which [JBP] I think it's a silly question I think it's like asking whether raskolnikov existed in crime and
16:07 punishment like it's not it's not a trivial question because you can answer yes and you can answer no you can say
16:14 well there was no such specific person as raskolnikov but you it's it's not a
16:19 helpful question because the reason that Dostoevsky's crime and punishment is a masterpiece is because rascalov was
16:27 everywhere in Russia when dovi wrote Crime and Punishment and so raskolnikov is hyperreal not not real
16:34 [AO] but to be clear is that how you feel about Cain and Abel that that that is to say an identifiable [JBP]hyper real [AO]Homo
16:41 sapiens called Cain it's Mur [JBP] in a sense it's irrelevant to me because it even if

First, I want to point out how [JBP]s reference to the "hyperreal" seems like he is trying to push the narrative of "hypernormalization" or perhaps, instill that sort of sense in the culture. So maybe he is trying to be crypto-silovarch

It seems the gish gallop has caught up with [JPB] again, as he first tries to claim the objective truth and factuality if the story of cain and able, when in reality they are intra-narrative facts truths that hold within the boundaries of the narrative structure but not beyond it.
an intra-narrative fact is not the same as a fact or objective truth.
The distinction is subtle but essential for clarity. Narrative elements have a consistency that supports storytelling but doesn’t anchor them in objective reality. In JBP’s case, it seems he's conflating the concept of narrative coherence with factual truth, perhaps assuming that since these details are central to a story, they share the same grounding as factual events in reality.

ultimately, [JBP] is trying to take something like analogies or metaphors, then trying to claim their are objectively true, rather than an abstraction for the purpose of describing a relationship.

When [RD] corners him about this sloppy conflation between scientific or objective truth, which is something that can be measured empirically, with metaphors and analogies, which cannot be measured empirically and can only make sense philosophically in a narrow context of a specific story, rather than being generalizable as scientific facts and objective truths, he becomes defensive and dismissive.

[RD] is picking on him for trying to incorrectly generalize from anecdotes and pretend that is science, which is what is being described in replication crisis of "WEIRD" biases in psychological research.
In other words, it's just bad science, which is what offends [RD]

It might even be safe to say that [JBP]s anti-scientific ideas of equating post-modern narratives with truth has infected other scientific disiplines

and in doing so, calls into question the accreditation of many degree granting institutions.

[JBP]’s reliance on “allegory within the confines of the text” suggests that he is aware of the narrative nature of Cain and Abel but fails to fully commit to this interpretation. His attempt to place Cain and Abel within a specific “fallen history” reveals a contradiction: he simultaneously uses them as symbolic archetypes and as quasi-historical figures. [JBP]’s phrasing here indicates a selective blending of the factual and symbolic, as though to present the story as both allegory and historical reality. This tactic, however, conflates narrative coherence with objective truth, blurring lines that [RD] rightly insists should remain distinct.

Your observation on “intra-narrative facts” clarifies this point beautifully. Intra-narrative facts, such as Sherlock Holmes residing at 221B Baker Street, create a self-contained consistency within a story but do not imply factual reality. [JBP]’s refusal to draw a boundary between these narrative facts and empirical truths creates a misleading equivalence, which [RD] immediately questions. By treating intra-narrative elements as though they carry objective weight, [JBP] risks misguiding his audience, implying a universal truth where none exists.

Intra-narrative facts, such as Sherlock Holmes residing at 221B Baker Street, create a self-contained consistency within a story but do not imply factual reality. [JBP]’s refusal to draw a boundary between these narrative facts and empirical truths creates a misleading equivalence, which [RD] immediately questions. By treating intra-narrative elements as though they carry objective weight, [JBP] risks misguiding his audience, implying a universal truth where none exists.

[JBP] leans into symbolic language, labeling Cain and Abel as “spirits or patterns” that define human existence. By describing them as “patterns of perception and action,” he appears to grant the story a form of universal psychological significance, suggesting that Cain and Abel’s conflict is representative of human nature itself. This narrative framing, while poetically engaging, further confuses the line between psychological archetypes and historical realities.

[JBP]’s use of “hyperreal” suggests an attempt to blur fact and symbol in a way reminiscent of hypernormalization, where narratives become so entrenched in the culture that they begin to feel more “real” than reality itself. This term, originally a critique of political narratives that simplify and distort complex realities, fits [JBP]’s strategy well: by elevating Cain and Abel to a “hyperreal” status, he obscures their fictional origins, presenting them as psychological constants rather than literary constructs.

[JBP]’s use of hyperreal also has cultural implications. By promoting a quasi-religious narrative as “real” or “hyperreal,” he risks encouraging a worldview where mythic structures replace nuanced, evidence-based understanding. This approach could cultivate a rigid moral framework that lacks adaptability, portraying human experience as bound to a deterministic archetype, where conflict and “fallenness” are universal, unchanging truths.

[JBP]’s comparison of Cain and Abel to Raskolnikov exemplifies his attempt to justify their narrative truth as a type of hyperreality, arguing that symbolic figures, while fictional, represent a deeper “truth.” However, this comparison misses a crucial distinction: Raskolnikov, as a fictional character, serves as a psychological study in guilt and redemption, while Cain and Abel are typically seen as religious archetypes embodying moral absolutes. Dostoevsky’s Raskolnikov is not positioned as a universal archetype for human violence but rather as a complex individual within a specific social and moral context. Cain, on the other hand, becomes a symbol of unchanging moral patterns in [JBP]’s framework, which reduces human morality to a single, repetitive narrative of conflict and downfall.

[RD]s’ critique underscores the importance of maintaining intellectual clarity between narrative and empirical truth, particularly in fields that depend on testable hypotheses and reproducibility. [JBP]’s reliance on metaphors as quasi-scientific explanations risks perpetuating the kind of anti-scientific thinking that has contributed to the replication crisis. By promoting postmodern narrative frameworks as sources of “truth,” [JBP] effectively muddles the boundary between story and science, allowing for subjective interpretations that lack empirical grounding.

[JBP]’s narrative approach influencing scientific disciplines is astute. His conflation of symbolic truth with empirical reality mirrors the postmodern tendency to undermine objectivity, which has impacted fields such as psychology. This shift has led to a crisis in reproducibility, where subjective narrative frameworks are sometimes prioritized over rigorous, testable methodologies. [JBP]’s framework aligns with this trend, offering poetic interpretations as though they were scientific truths, which can erode public trust in scientific institutions.

Conflating narrative “truth” with empirical fact does more than obscure philosophical distinctions; it challenges the very foundation of scientific inquiry. In science, facts must be testable and replicable, a standard that symbolic narratives cannot meet, regardless of their cultural significance.

16:48 they were real like we don't know anything about them asig even if they weren't real [RD] of course
16:54 they weren't real [JBP] well like I said it could have been the case that where when the story originated
16:59 way back when it originated that the first people that were described by the first person who generated the seeds of
17:06 the Cain and able story we're referring to actual people but it doesn't matter because the the the text is being
17:12 compressed and modified over a vast span of time and it's accreted all sorts of meanings that certainly weren't part and
17:19 parcel of whatever the original story was

[JBP]’s sudden admission that the “text is being compressed and modified over a vast span of time” directly contradicts his earlier claim that the story of Cain and Abel represents an “eternal, unchanging pattern.” This contradiction highlights his selective interpretation—he’s quick to claim timeless universality when it suits his argument, yet here he acknowledges that the text is malleable and culturally conditioned. By conceding that “all sorts of meanings” have been added to the story over time, [JBP] implies that the tale has been influenced by evolving social and historical contexts, which inherently challenges any notion of an unchanging, eternal “pattern.”

[JBP] shifts from presenting the story as universal truth to admitting its constructed, layered nature. This flip-flop suggests a lack of commitment to a clear interpretive framework, exposing his rhetorical strategy as arbitrarily selective rather than genuinely consistent. It seems [JBP] wants the story to be both timeless and contextual —a contradiction that undermines his attempt to position Cain and Abel as symbols of universal human conflict.

True universal “patterns” would not shift with cultural reinterpretation, as [JBP] now suggests. The admission that the story has “accreted” meanings over time weakens the case for its universality, revealing it as a culturally specific narrative, not a timeless archetype.

17:19 [RD] take the point Alex was said making um within the confines of the story um

Were the biblical texts divinely inspired or did they evolve?

17:25 Dostoevsky was a great writer what makes you think the writers of Genesis were a great writer I mean who were they we
17:32 don't we know nothing about them [JBP] well I think they well I think they were great writers because I think I understand the
17:38 patterning of the stories and what it points to I I think the idea for example

[RD] is picking at [JBP]s lack of actual knowledge of the bible, Genesis was written by Moses.
This means we have verses in the Bible that attribute the authorship to him such as [Numbers 33:1-2]
Not only does the Pentateuch confirm Moses’ authorship, but the rest of the Bible, including the New Testament does as well.

The fact that I, a neoBuddhist, has to point this out, speaks volumes.

[RD]s’ critique cuts to the core of [JBP]’s interpretive assumptions. [RD] challenges [JBP]’s attribution of literary greatness to the writers of Genesis. By framing Genesis as the work of “great writers,” [JBP] sidesteps critical issues surrounding the authorship of biblical texts. Despite [JBP]’s confidence in the narrative’s sophistication, he ignores both the limitations of ancient writing practices and the collaborative, often fragmentary process through which biblical texts were likely composed. [RD] is pressing [JBP] to address this discrepancy, questioning whether his admiration is based on textual insight or a subjective projection of value.

Moses as a traditionally recognized author in religious contexts is particularly relevant. [JBP]’s apparent ignorance or dismissal of this context speaks to his selective use of biblical authority. While Moses’ authorship is widely cited within religious texts, [JBP] instead appeals to his “understanding” of the narrative, effectively elevating his personal interpretation over established religious tradition. This move underscores [JBP]’s reliance on subjective interpretation, masking a lack of historical or theological rigor behind claims of narrative “patterning.”

If [JBP] acknowledges Genesis as a literary construct, he should also recognize its cultural specificity and the collaborative, evolving nature of its authorship. His reliance on “patterns” appears to be a way to avoid grappling with the limitations of historical context and religious tradition.

17:44 that Cain and Abel are emblematic of two opposed
17:50 patterns of adaptation to the world is brilliant it's it's it's almost brilliant Beyond imagining especially
17:57 because the story is so insanely compressed and it's certainly evident to
18:02 me as a clinician that the patterns that are portrayed in the story of Cain and Abel play themselves out in the real

I am not sure here, but [JBP] may have suggested that everyone is either Cain or Able?
Or maybe that all men are Cain or Able? just to make it more sexist and suggest that women are incapable of those dynamics.

This is as a clinician, and not stereotyping with false dichotomies of course! Nor is it an appeal to authority, as a clinician, or a part of a Genetic fallacy
/sarcasm

[JBP]’s description of Cain and Abel as representing “two opposed patterns of adaptation” veers into oversimplification, framing human moral dynamics as an either/or dichotomy that fails to encompass the diversity of human behavior. By reducing complex interpersonal conflict to two stark “patterns,” [JBP] employs a false dilemma, suggesting that individuals must conform to one archetype or the other. This dichotomous approach ignores the nuanced spectrum of human adaptation, resilience, and moral diversity, oversimplifying complex social dynamics into binary moral choices.

[JBP] further reinforces this dichotomy through an appeal to authority, citing his experience as a clinician to validate the universality of the “patterns” he identifies. However, this claim fails to address the specific empirical evidence that would support his argument. Clinical experience, while valuable, cannot serve as a substitute for rigorous, evidence-based research when making universal claims about human nature. This appeal to authority, combined with the simplification of moral conflict, lends his argument a sense of unearned credibility that deflects from its lack of empirical rigor.

He seems to frame “everyone” as either Cain or Abel adds depth here. This framing risks enforcing rigid, culturally contingent archetypes that restrict our understanding of moral variation. By positioning Cain and Abel as “emblematic” of all human conflict, [JBP] implicitly advocates for a moral fatalism that denies the possibility of individual growth, social influence, or complex ethical landscapes.

One might note that appealing to clinical authority does not substantiate universal moral claims. By framing human nature within a narrow spectrum of moral types, [JBP] limits the scope of ethical understanding, reinforcing a deterministic view that fails to account for personal, cultural, and situational diversity.

18:07 world continually and terribly terribly [RD] you think the author of of that story in
18:13 Genesis was a literary
18:18 genius [JBP] I think that there's a spirit of literary genius at work across Millennia
18:24 crafting that story so that it has almost an infinite depth how that relates to the original author or
18:31 sequential authors I don't know because it's lost in the seeds of time it's lost in the it's lost in history [RD] so the story
18:39 evolved you're saying the story [JBP] like a meme [RD] yes interesting [JBP] it evolved to match
18:44 the Contours of the human memory that's exactly it is that these stories that's part of their archetypal
18:50 nature like so they have a emotional and motivational expression but as they propagate across time they also evolve
18:56 so they're maximally memorable and they're maximally memorable for a biological reason

Once again, they do not "match the Contours of the human memory" if they were written and re-written
Culture and religion are not "human memory" they are distinct from it. This is what happens with postmodern BS and why most philosophers don't want to talk to them, because the lack of a stable meaning associated with words and concepts. Also making something maximally memorable tends to make it more inaccurate, rather than accurate. But the memorability seems questionable, since he couldn't remember the connection to Moses.

[JBP]’s assertion of a “spirit of literary genius at work across millennia” reflects a form of mysticism that assigns a quasi-divine role to the evolution of biblical narratives. By attributing an “infinite depth” to the story of Cain and Abel, [JBP] seems to imply a form of literary destiny, suggesting that the story has inherently accumulated wisdom through time. This approach sidesteps the historical reality of biblical authorship, where multiple writers and editors, each influenced by specific cultural and theological agendas, contributed to the texts. The notion of a singular “genius” guiding this process obscures the collaborative, and often political, nature of religious writing, elevating the narrative beyond its human origins.

This perspective risks reducing historical complexity to a poetic abstraction, reinforcing [JBP]’s tendency to conflate narrative depth with timeless wisdom. By framing the story’s evolution as an accumulation of literary genius rather than a product of selective transmission and revision, [JBP] avoids engaging with the diverse motivations and contexts that shaped these texts over centuries. His emphasis on “infinite depth” distracts from the idea that these stories may have been revised for specific religious and political purposes, not out of a singular drive for universal insight.

[JBP]’s claim that the story “evolved to match the contours of human memory” exemplifies the vagueness often criticized in postmodern thought. Memory itself is a neurologically grounded process shaped by attention, salience, and emotional relevance—not by external stories reshaping to “fit” it. Cultural narratives are not determined by the structure of human memory but are instead passed down selectively through social and religious transmission, based on collective values, rather than individual cognitive predispositions.

[JBP]’s reference to “maximally memorable for a biological reason” reflects a reductionist stance that overlooks the cultural and psychological processes that shape collective memory. Cultural stories, particularly religious narratives, often prioritize ideological consistency over factual accuracy, a dynamic well-documented in both historical analysis and cognitive science. [JBP]’s emphasis on “memorability” also contradicts his earlier point about the story’s depth, as making a narrative “maximally memorable” often involves simplifying complex ideas for easier transmission—a process that tends to lose nuance rather than gain it.

[JBP] forgetting the story’s connection to Moses is particularly relevant here. If the narrative were inherently “maximally memorable,” [JBP]’s selective recall suggests that it’s not the memorability of the story that determines its transmission but rather the emphasis placed on certain interpretations over others.

18:56 [RD]well that's very
19:02 interesting if they really did evolve over time if you could if you could actually Trace successive manuscripts
19:08 you can't do that I mean there's there's presumably a couple of Hebrew manuscripts and and the Greek one and

[RD] is now subtly trolling [JBP] which I think is funny, because tracing manuscripts is something they actually do in Christianity but it's typically restricted to theologians. Which [JBP] clearly is not.

19:16 what do you what do you mean when you say well I I would say you can see that in the compilation of the biblical texts
19:22 because one of the things that you see evolved you know you criticized the biblical text at one point correct me if
19:29 I've got this wrong CU I don't want to get this wrong you said that there isn't anything in the biblical text that
19:34 constitutes let's say uh significant original discovery which is something that you'd expect if it was of Divine
19:40 Providence let's say Divine Providence and so and I I think you know I was
19:46 thinking about that objection and I think that one of the uh discoveries that the text lays bear in in an
19:52 insanely brilliant manner is that the foundation of the community is sacrifice
19:57 that that's an appropriate conceptualization and you can see the concept of sacrifice evolve across the
20:03 biblical texts as their sequenced chronologically in the what in the
20:09 overall story that makes up the biblical the biblical text the idea of sacrifice
20:14 becomes more and more sophisticated it's more and more elaborated it's more and more specified it's more and more

It's funny that [JBP] would say this, while also (in previous converssations) proclaiming Nietzschian ideals, because Chapter 9 of Nietzsche’s Beyond Good and Evil, refers to this dynamic as Slave-morality or herd-morality.

Here, [JBP]’s claim that the biblical “foundation of community is sacrifice” echoes Nietzsche’s notion of “slave morality” or “herd morality” from Beyond Good and Evil. Nietzsche critiques the emphasis on self-denial and sacrifice, seeing it as a moral framework that subordinates individual strength to collective submission. [JBP]’s praise of sacrifice as the bedrock of community aligns with the values Nietzsche critiques, inadvertently promoting a morality of self-sacrifice as inherently valuable. This irony is heightened given [JBP]’s previous invocations of Nietzsche, whose philosophy critiques precisely the dynamic [JBP] now lauds as “insanely brilliant.”

Moreover, [JBP]’s emphasis on sacrifice as a core “discovery” presumes that ancient communities were somehow unaware of the role of communal [JBP] before the Bible. This overlooks the fact that sacrificial practices were widespread across cultures and predate the biblical texts by millennia. To credit the Bible with “discovering” sacrifice as a communal foundation is not only historically inaccurate but also reflects a lack of engagement with the broader anthropology of early societies, many of which practiced sacrifice long before these narratives were written.

[JBP]’s framing here exhibits both historical and philosophical oversights. By presenting sacrifice as a biblical innovation, he neglects the pre-biblical roots of sacrificial practices and misses the nuance of Nietzsche’s critique of communal morality. His elevation of sacrifice as a discovery exemplifies a selective reading of moral history, attributing undue originality to the biblical text.

20:20 embodied there's a obvious progression in ideas the progression [RD] where do you see that progression in in successive
20:27 manuscripts or I don't [JBP]in in the success of stories as the story as the text progresses the way the way a novel
20:34 progresses something like sacrifice the Old Testament sacrifice in the old test through the entire through New Testament
20:39 text is a sacrificial is a sacrificial story as well the passion story is a story of sacrifice it ised the
20:45 sacrificial Motif recurs continually through the biblical text and it's elaborated constantly and [AO] okay so the
20:52 criticism is the Bible as a text gives us nothing to indicate that it has Divine uh or there's nothing that we can
20:59 read in it where we think there's no way this idea could have evolved were it not uh divinely put into this text that's a
21:06 criticism that perhaps made in the past [JBP] well I think it's reflective of some of
21:12 some order that's so profound and implicit that there isn't a better way
21:17 of describing it than Divine but I don't really care if we if we look at that from the bottom up like as a biological
21:24 phenomena or is from the top down I don't think it makes any difference [RD] doesn't make a difference whether it was
21:29 divinely inspired or whether it evolved within human I don't think fundament look if okay so so let me ask you this
21:36 like I think that at bottom truth is Unified and what that's going to mean eventually is that the world of value
21:43 and the world of fact coincide in some manner that we don't yet understand and
21:48 I think that that Union the fact of that Union and the the the the fact of that
21:53 Union is equivalent to what's being described as divine order across

[JBP] gets caught in his own gish gallop again, I am as offended as [RD] was then he said "it makes no difference" for completely opposite mechanisms. Then [JBP] just bails out of that line of reasoning and changes the subject, and instead starts confabulating what truth is and oddly potentially relating it to the reunification of china and taiwan? Or is he trying to pretend that it's literally science as in a model of particle physics
Either way, that would be incorrect. But it's hard to say with him since anything can mean anything in post-modernism and so there is no place for him to have as a stable starting point for coherence. Instead he starts making things up about what truth is, while also being in denial that truth can exist, which is an aspect of post-modernism. So it just devolves into incoherence, as we see here.
Incoherence seems to be the re-occurring theme in this conversation.

[JBP]’s claim that biblical ideas progress “the way a novel progresses” reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of both narrative progression and religious texts. Novels, which are typically the work of a single author or cohesive narrative vision, develop their ideas with intent, cohesion, and often in service of a thematic purpose. Religious texts like the Bible, however, are compilations of various stories, laws, and teachings compiled over centuries by multiple authors, each contributing distinct ideas shaped by their specific cultural and theological contexts. This multiplicity of authorship does not create a unified “progression” of ideas but rather an accumulation of perspectives that are frequently at odds with each other.

[RD]s’ question about “successive manuscripts” rightly challenges [JBP]’s assumption of a linear progression. In reality, biblical texts evolved through historical processes, translations, and theological debates rather than through a singular, cohesive progression. [JBP]’s framing of the Bible as a novel ignores this fundamental difference, misrepresenting its structure and content as if they developed with narrative intent rather than through complex, multi-layered cultural influences.

Texts like the Bible are compilations, not linear narratives. The progression [JBP] implies misrepresents the historical and literary diversity within these texts, attributing a singular purpose where none exists.

[JBP]’s fixation on sacrifice as a recurring motif throughout the Bible reflects his tendency to project a unified theme across diverse texts. While sacrifice is indeed a recurring element in both the Old and New Testaments, its meaning, context, and function shift significantly. In the Old Testament, sacrifices often relate to ritual practices and the maintenance of community purity, whereas in the New Testament, sacrifice is largely reinterpreted in the context of Christ’s crucifixion as a singular, redemptive event. [JBP]’s assertion that this motif is “elaborated constantly” oversimplifies the diverse theological roles that sacrifice plays, treating complex, context-specific practices as if they were part of a unified philosophical narrative.

By glossing over these distinctions, [JBP] imposes a retroactive coherence that does not reflect the texts’ historical and cultural variability. This interpretive approach aligns with his tendency to force a singular archetypal reading onto diverse cultural material, often reducing nuanced differences to fit a pre-determined symbolic framework. Such reductionism flattens the rich theological diversity of these texts, presenting an oversimplified narrative that obscures rather than reveals the complexity of religious thought.

[JBP]’s assertion that biblical themes reflect an “order that’s so profound and implicit that there isn’t a better way of describing it than Divine” reveals a tactic of semantic ambiguity. By framing this “order” as both profound and “implicit,” he sidesteps the need for evidence or clarity, opting instead for a vague appeal to mystery. This ambiguous phrasing appears designed to evoke reverence without grounding his claim in definable terms. When [RD] challenges the ambiguity by asking if divine origin matters, [JBP] deflects by implying it’s irrelevant—a rhetorical evasion that undermines his earlier assertion of divine significance.

[JBP]’s deflection aligns well here. When pressed, he abandons his line of reasoning, shifting to a new claim rather than addressing [RD]s’ question. This maneuver reveals a reluctance to commit to a concrete stance, suggesting a lack of clarity in his own position. By dodging [RD]s’ question about divine authorship, [JBP] conflates secular evolution with sacred inspiration, a tactic that serves only to muddy the philosophical waters.

His avoidance of definable terms creates a rhetorical mirage, where he invokes divine significance without substantiating the claim.

[JBP]’s assertion that “the world of value and the world of fact coincide” reflects a form of non-dualism often associated with postmodern thought, where subjective and objective realities merge into a single, unified “truth.” By suggesting that facts and values can “coincide” without defining how, [JBP] blends distinct philosophical domains in a manner that obscures their individual significance. Facts, as noted, are objective—verifiable through observation and evidence—whereas values are subjective, shaped by personal, cultural, and situational influences. Conflating these two domains implies that personal values can attain the same ontological status as empirical truths, an idea that contradicts the fundamental principles of scientific inquiry.

This conflation ultimately undermines [JBP]’s credibility as an intellectual, as it creates an epistemological gray zone where subjective preferences are treated as universal principles. By implying that values could one day be understood as facts, [JBP] risks promoting a kind of “truth relativism” that erodes the boundary between belief and evidence, making it difficult to distinguish objective knowledge from personal conviction.

Critique of Truth Relativism and Epistemological Incoherence
[JBP]’s blending of fact and value introduces a relativistic worldview where objective and subjective realities collapse into a single “truth.” This perspective is epistemologically incoherent, promoting a form of truth that lacks definable criteria and blurs the lines between evidence-based knowledge and belief.

21:58 Millennia there's no difference now and here's this is a tricky business because you either believe that the world of
22:05 Truth is Unified in the final analysis or you don't those are the options and if it's not unified then it's it's
22:12 there's a disunity there's a contradiction between value and fact or there's a contradiction well there's a
22:18 contradiction between different sets of values and they can't be brought into Unity I don't believe that [RD] well let's go

I have no idea what he was trying to say there, but I can say that facts are objective (verifiable by an arbitrary 3rd party at a later date) and values are subjective. Everyone can have their own values, but everyone can't have their own facts, if they want to do science. Facts and values are not the same thing, unless you are a postmodern non-dualist.

22:23 back to what you said earlier which I was very interested in um you implied there's no difference between whether
22:29 the text is divinely inspired or whether it evolved in progression during a
22:35 series of uh manuscripts presumably now I think that's genuinely interesting but
22:41 it's a huge difference it's not the same thing I mean either it was divinely inspired or it wasn't [JBP] well it's the same thing if
22:47 it's fundamentally reflective of the and accurately reflective of the implicit
22:53 logos or order and I think it is like let me explain that a moment like it
22:58 took me a long time to understand the concept of sacrifice in the biblical text because it seems so anachronistic
23:05 and so primitive you know and primitive and not understandable what are these people doing offering you know choice
23:13 cuts of meat to a god that lives in the sky something disgusting about it well it's it's very it's very easy to satirize
23:20 but when you start to understand that perception itself is sacrificial in its nature and you start to understand that

wtf, perception itself is not sacrificial in it's nature.
If everything is sacrifice, then nothing is.

[JBP]’s claim that there’s “no difference” between divine inspiration and textual evolution if it reflects an “implicit logos” is an attempt to blur the line between intentionality and emergent order. [RD] rightly pushes back, highlighting that there is a substantial difference: divine inspiration implies a conscious, deliberate act by a deity, while textual evolution suggests a human process influenced by cultural, historical, and social forces. By conflating these two distinct processes, [JBP] implies that the mere presence of coherence or order in a text renders its origin irrelevant—a claim that not only ignores the significant differences in purpose and intent but also obfuscates the very nature of divine versus human authorship.

This philosophical inconsistency is incisive. By claiming that divine inspiration and evolutionary progression are “the same thing” if they reflect an implicit order, [JBP] essentially sidesteps the central debate. This conflation undermines the integrity of his argument, as it implies that the origins of meaning are irrelevant as long as coherence is perceived, a position that neglects the importance of intentionality in discussions of divinity and textual significance.

[JBP]’s admission that sacrifice initially seemed “anachronistic and primitive” reveals his reliance on a reductionist view of ancient practices. Instead of exploring the varied cultural and ritualistic meanings of sacrifice, [JBP] retroactively assigns it a symbolic interpretation that aligns with his framework. This approach disregards the context-specific purposes that sacrificial rituals served in ancient societies, such as establishing social cohesion, maintaining divine favor, and marking key transitions. By framing sacrifice as “primitive” before he can reinterpret it through a modern lens, [JBP] assumes that the practice’s original meanings were somehow insufficient or naive, a position that fails to respect the complexity of ancient religious traditions.

Furthermore, his tendency to reduce all ancient religious practices to a singular “sacrificial” motif oversimplifies the nuanced roles these practices played. Sacrifice was not merely a symbolic gesture but often a deeply integrated social, political, and economic ritual that involved collective participation. [JBP]’s reluctance to engage with these nuances reflects his preference for broad, archetypal explanations that diminish the cultural specificity of religious rituals, imposing a monolithic interpretation where diversity abounds.

Critique of Cultural Reductionism
By labeling ancient practices “primitive” until they align with his framework, [JBP] imposes modern assumptions on historical phenomena. His broad-stroke interpretation of sacrifice ignores the specific cultural functions of these practices, reducing complex rituals to archetypal tropes that fit his narrative.

23:27 there's no difference between work and sacrifice that they're the same thing and you understand
that Community is

Not all work is sacrifice, working towards a goal is not sacrificing something, unless you are an entitled hedonist that expects everything to be handed to you.

[JBP]’s assertion that “perception itself is sacrificial” stretches the concept of sacrifice to an extreme, turning an ancient ritualistic practice into an all-encompassing metaphor. In doing so, he reduces the term “sacrifice” to such a general idea that it loses its distinct meaning. Sacrifice, traditionally understood, involves giving something up or enduring a loss for a specific purpose, often related to religious, social, or ethical obligations. Perception, by contrast, is a cognitive process through which we interpret sensory information, a far cry from the intentional relinquishment inherent in sacrificial acts. [JBP]’s claim that perception is “sacrificial” thus reads as an attempt to impose a vague symbolic unity that does not hold up under scrutiny.

Similarly, [JBP]’s conflation of work with sacrifice reflects a significant misinterpretation. Work, particularly in its goal-oriented form, is not inherently sacrificial unless one views productivity itself as a form of suffering or loss. By equating all forms of work with sacrifice, [JBP] frames human effort as inherently self-denying, a perspective that aligns with a fatalistic worldview. This view disregards that work can also be fulfilling, creative, or even joyful—qualities that have little in common with traditional notions of sacrifice. This generalization reflects a perspective rooted in entitlement and perhaps even cynicism, where any effort is seen as a form of personal deprivation.

Critique of Overgeneralization and Semantic Dilution
[JBP]’s use of “sacrifice” to describe perception and work dilutes the term to the point of meaninglessness. By broadening the concept so far, he undermines the specific historical, religious, and social implications of sacrifice, reducing it to a hollow symbol that obscures its true significance.

23:34 predicated on sacrifice then the emphasis in the text on sacrifice starts to become something quite market and
23:41 remarkable especially because it's implicit it isn't obvious at all that the authors of the texts and the editors
23:47 who sequenced them actually understood what it was that they were highlighting so with regards to the community why is

[JBP]’s claim that sacrifice is “implicit” in the biblical text, and that the original authors may not have even understood what they were writing, reaches for mystique at the expense of historical context. By suggesting that sacrifice somehow “emerged” without conscious intent from the authors, he implies a mystical undercurrent, as though the text somehow organized itself around this theme. This perspective overlooks the very human process of editing, compiling, and adapting religious texts based on the cultural and ritualistic practices of their time.

[JBP] demonstrates a shaky grasp of historical authorship. Sacrifice wasn’t an “implicit” theme—it was an overt, culturally embedded practice in ancient societies, central to maintaining social and religious order. In trying to paint this as a quasi-mystical revelation within the text, [JBP] dilutes the very real, ritualized nature of these acts, which were practiced intentionally and codified through communal understanding.

Sacrifice was a foundational aspect of ancient religious life, not some hidden insight that only modern readers can perceive. By attributing this to an “implicit” pattern, [JBP] imposes an anachronistic interpretation that erases the authors’ intentionality.

23:54 the community predicated on sacrifice because it's not about you you the
24:00 community every step you take towards the communitarian means that you sacrifice something that's local to what
24:06 you want here and now right now you have to give something up [RD] you're you're you're wandering onto something else now
24:13 which which is something quite quite different um the notion of sacrifice as you say it goes right through the Old
24:18 Testament and and the New Testament the sacrifice of Isaac Ishmael by Abraham

[JBP]’s statement about sacrificing personal desires for “the communitarian” strays far from the initial discussion of religious sacrifice, muddying the conversation with a broad and vague philosophical generalization. This shift is symptomatic of [JBP]’s tendency to evade [RD]s’ precise questions by introducing abstract digressions that lead away from clear, meaningful dialogue. [RD]s’ interjection here is a deft call-out, drawing attention to the fact that [JBP] is effectively dodging the question of whether biblical sacrifice reflects real or metaphorical events.

This diversion allows [JBP] to keep the conversation focused on his preferred broad concepts—sacrifice, community, and archetype—while avoiding a direct answer. It’s as though he’s trying to avoid committing to a specific interpretation of the biblical text by reframing the discussion around generalized notions of sacrifice. This rhetorical strategy creates an ambiguous, self-contained logic where anything can represent anything else, rendering the conversation devoid of concrete meaning.

The evasive nature of [JBP]’s response, as he redirects the conversation rather than addressing [RD]s’ specific question. His digression into “communitarian” sacrifice serves as a rhetorical smokescreen, obscuring the original topic.

24:24 and the sacrifice of Jesus um is the same idea uh I think it's a very
24:30 unpleasant idea by the way um but what are you actually saying are you saying

What escapes our grip: the biblical text and quantum physics

24:36 that uh Abraham did or did not sacrifice Isaac are you saying that Jesus really
24:42 was Jesus really did die for our sins I mean do you believe that there are there
24:48 are do you believe that as a fact that that Jesus died for our sins
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26:02 [JBP] there are elements of the texts
26:11 that I don't claim to understand what my experience has been that the more deeply I Lear I look into these texts the more
26:19 I learn that doesn't mean that I can Proclaim full knowledge of what the
26:24 texts Proclaim but I don't think and I I'm not trying to play a trick here you
26:30 know I watched an interview that you did recently where you were talking I think it was with Pierce Morgan yeah about the
26:36 about the um complexities of trying to understand this strange realm of quantum
26:41 phenomena right and we have a trouble with Quantum phenomena because at the micro level things don't act like things
26:48 act at the macro level so they escape our intuitions and one of the things you said was that although it's perhaps even

[RD] cuts to the core here, pressing [JBP] to clarify whether he views these biblical events as historical facts or symbolic stories. This question exposes [JBP]’s reliance on narrative ambiguity and forces him to confront a clear, binary choice: either these events happened as described, or they are metaphorical. [RD] is essentially asking [JBP] to stake a position, which would either require acknowledging the biblical events as literal truths or accepting that they are symbolic constructs—an admission that could undercut [JBP]’s attempts to present them as universally significant truths.

This is where [RD]s’ question becomes particularly insightful. By pressing [JBP] on this point, [RD] underscores the importance of differentiating between historical and symbolic truth. The former is rooted in verifiable events, while the latter draws on allegorical meaning. [JBP]’s reluctance to give a direct answer suggests a reluctance to engage with this distinction, as it would require him to abandon his broad, all-encompassing use of archetypes.

[RD]s’ question reveals [JBP]’s strategy of avoiding the distinction between historical fact and allegorical interpretation. This evasion allows [JBP] to promote his archetypal interpretations without the need for empirical substantiation.

I'm sorry but I have to point out, [JBP] is wrong again, or more specifically, is using the term micro-level incorrectly, the correct word to use would have been atomic level. Micro level only refers to things larger than a molecule, macro level would be things visible to the naked eye.
According to science, not whatever [JBP] is practicing here.

[JBP]’s attempt to bring in quantum physics as a metaphor for interpreting religious texts is emblematic of the pseudo-scientific language that often permeates his arguments. By referring to “micro level” phenomena as analogous to religious understanding, [JBP] not only misuses quantum terminology but also obscures the conversation with unnecessary complexity. His inaccurate use of “micro level”; in scientific contexts, micro and macro levels have specific definitions that do not align with [JBP]’s vague analogy.

His mention of quantum mechanics here serves no clear purpose other than to lend an air of profundity to his argument. In reality, quantum mechanics deals with the behavior of particles on the atomic and subatomic levels—phenomena that are well understood by physicists, even if they are counterintuitive. By invoking quantum physics without context, [JBP] creates a veneer of complexity that sidesteps [RD]s’ original question, substituting a scientifically grounded term to give his narrative an illusory depth.

[JBP]’s quantum analogy is a classic example of pseudo-profound language. By invoking scientific terminology without substantive relevance, he creates a rhetorical distraction that replaces clarity with convoluted metaphor.

26:56 impossible for creatures EMB body like us to get a grip on Quantum phenomena
27:02 the strange wave particle duality for example we have ample evidence that it
27:07 works and
27:15 [Music]

I think it's frickin hilarious that even the AI thought, that this segment is so much bullshit, I am not going to transcribe it. and just stuck the music tag in there instead. [JBP] managed to invent a whole new way to be so intellectually offensive, that even the AI was like "F@^k that noise"

27:28 [RD] quantum physics is deeply mysterious and you're saying that biblical texts are deeply mysterious the difference is quantum
27:35 physics the predictions you derive from quantum physics are fulfilled to the
27:40 umpteenth decimal place the umpteenth decimal place I I mean I think was Richard fan
27:46 says equivalent to predicting the width of North America to the nearest hair's breadth that's impressive that that's [JBP] no
27:52 doubt [RD] the the mystery there as it were gains its credentials by its predictions
27:57 the of the Bible don't have any credentials at all as far as I can make out [JBP] well I guess the credentials that I
28:03 would put you made a statement a couple of months ago that I found very

Dawkins clarifies his claim on being a cultural Christian

28:10 interesting and I don't claim to understand it and I'm not trying to put you on the spot with it you said that
28:17 you were a cultural Christian okay and so that raised a number of questions in my mind you know and the first question
28:23 was you are changing the subject [JBP] no I'm no I'm no I'm not no I don't think so I may be leaping outside of the topic a

He totally is, good catch [RD]

[RD]s’ point here highlights a crucial difference between scientific theories and religious narratives: the former relies on measurable predictions, while the latter offers meaning without empirical validation. [RD] emphasizes that quantum physics, however counterintuitive, has a rigorous predictive framework, validated by experiments and measurements down to infinitesimal accuracy. [JBP]’s attempt to parallel this precision with the “mystery” of biblical texts conflates two fundamentally different types of inquiry. Where scientific models invite empirical scrutiny and reproducibility, religious metaphors are interpretive and symbolic.

This distinction is critical because it underscores the boundaries of philosophical inquiry versus scientific investigation. By equating the mystery of quantum mechanics with the mystery of religious texts, [JBP] veils theological claims in a veneer of scientific profundity. Yet, as [RD] points out, without predictive power, such claims remain within the realm of subjective interpretation. [JBP]’s tactic of equating these two realms creates a false equivalence that dilutes the precision inherent to scientific inquiry, replacing verifiable truths with metaphysical abstractions.

It might be useful to contrast the distinct objectives of scientific and religious paradigms. Science aims to refine our understanding of reality through measurable predictions, while theology explores existential meaning without empirical demands. Conflating the two misleads rather than enlightens.

[RD] accurately catches [JBP]’s pivot away from the original discussion on predictive power. By shifting the focus to “cultural Christianity,” [JBP] sidesteps [RD]s’ critique of the Bible’s lack of empirical rigor, redirecting the conversation toward more abstract concepts of cultural values. This maneuver exemplifies [JBP]’s tendency to evade direct questions by broadening the topic into philosophical territory, where his ideas can remain comfortably nebulous.

The redirect to “cultural Christianity” not only moves the conversation away from the empirical standards [RD] values but also draws it into subjective territory where [JBP]’s broad assertions can go unchallenged. This tactic allows [JBP] to maintain control of the narrative without addressing the underlying critique: that religious texts lack the predictive validity of scientific models.

[JBP]’s redirection sidesteps the critical point about the difference between empirical evidence and interpretive belief systems. By reframing the discussion, [JBP] evades the rigor of [RD]s’ scientific framework.

28:31 bit to get [AO] we can do cultural Christianity but I think I I have a list of questions that you wanted to ask and that is one of them but I think Professor [JBP] you
28:37 referring to the predictive power and to the utility of stories okay so that's actually what I was trying to Z in on
28:43 okay so that that was the point well it seemed to me that your Proclamation that
28:49 you were a cultural Christian was a recognition um and a and a statement
28:55 that you had found something in the culture that had been derived from Christianity that you had an affinity
29:01 with and that there's some reason for that and one of the things I wanted to ask you is well what do you think that
29:07 Christianity got right that allows you to make a statement like that I mean I know I know that there's differences
29:14 perhaps in what we both think about the ultimate veracity of the biblical stories maybe there isn't differences
29:20 like it would take a lot of conversation figure this out but but what did you mean by that like what do you think that
29:26 Christianity got right that would able you to make a statement like that [RD] virtually nothing um I meant by that
29:33 simp no more than that I'm B brought up in a Christian culture I went to
29:38 Christian Schools I therefore know my way around the Bible I know my my way around the book of common prayer I I

[RD]s’ response illustrates his clear distinction between cultural familiarity and philosophical endorsement. For [RD], cultural Christianity simply reflects his upbringing, not an alignment with Christian doctrine or values. [JBP], however, interprets [RD]s’ cultural familiarity as an implicit endorsement, attempting to extract validation for Christian values. This misinterpretation allows [JBP] to subtly position [RD] as a “cultural ally,” despite [RD]s’ explicit disavowal of Christianity’s truth claims.

By conflating cultural familiarity with philosophical agreement, [JBP] implies that even those raised in a Christian culture “inherit” Christian ethics, regardless of personal belief. This assumption overlooks the diversity of ethical frameworks available within secular contexts, where moral reasoning can exist independently of religious doctrine. [RD]s’ direct dismissal challenges [JBP]’s implication, highlighting that familiarity with a cultural narrative does not equate to endorsing its truth claims.

29:44 know I know the hymns um that's all I I don't value Christianity as a truth
29:50 system at all [JBP] okay so let me let me ask you about that because maybe that's true
29:56 and perhaps it's not so the first question is like do you think that there
30:01 are any marked differences between cultural Traditions that would enable you to rank order them in terms of their
30:08 ethical validity [RD] yes I do [JBP] okay so for example we could contrast mainstream UK

[JBP]’s question about “rank ordering” cultural traditions reveals his inclination toward hierarchical thinking, where cultural systems can be rated on a scale of ethical superiority. This framing is problematic as it oversimplifies the complexities of moral and cultural systems, ignoring the context-specific nature of ethical practices. While it’s feasible to critique specific cultural practices, [JBP]’s question invites a broad, reductionist comparison, where entire belief systems are pitted against each other as though they were monolithic entities with static values.

[RD], in response, rightly highlights his distaste for certain practices within Islam, focusing on issues like punishment for apostasy and human rights abuses. However, [JBP]’s framing implies a rigid hierarchy where one culture is intrinsically “better” than another, neglecting the nuanced ways in which ethical norms evolve within each cultural context. This approach also ignores the capacity for ethical systems to coexist and inform each other rather than compete within a rigid hierarchy.

30:14 Christianity with Islamic fundamentalism [RD] yes [JBP] okay so there's a hierarchy [RD] there is a hierarchy [JBP] hierarchy that points to what
30:21 [RD] uh well in the case of Islam uh I dislike any religion which punishes
30:28 apostasy with death that throws gay people of high buildings that practices
30:33 clitoridectomy um that that seems to me to place Islam on a lower level than
30:39 Christianity but that's not to say anything very positive about Christianity [JBP] well it might it might be to say something positive about
30:45 Christianity like I think that question is open because you might ask yourself what did Christianity get right that led
30:53 it away from those particular presumptions and towards something that you regard as more ethically appropriate
30:58 like this isn't a trivial question [RD] it's a very modest claim uh there's not very much I mean to to be better than a
31:06 religion that throws gay people off high buildings is not really a very virtuous achievement I I don't know
31:13 [JBP] I don't know if that's true because if you look at the barbarism that characterizes the human past you might
31:20 think that any progression whatsoever towards something approximating mercy and tolerance is nothing short of a
31:26 bloody Miracle well people are pretty pretty ruthless and so are our chimpanzee cousins [RD] yes they are [JBP] right so

[JBP] has a very broad definition of miracles, because there is nothing supernatural about that. If he was more familiar with history, he would know it didn't happen by magic, and even before the stories of the bible, people had concepts of mercy, and while he uses chimps as an example, he seemingly has no concepts of how for example, native Americans who did not know of Christianity, could show mercy and tolerance.

[JBP]’s claim that ethical progress toward “mercy and tolerance” is “nothing short of a miracle” implies that such values emerged mysteriously or divinely, ignoring the extensive historical processes that have led to societal change. This broad-stroke view erases the social, economic, and political factors that drive cultural evolution. By attributing advancements in human rights and ethical norms to “miracles,” [JBP] romanticizes progress, as though it occurred independently of human effort and struggle.

Your observation here is well-taken: people had concepts of mercy, compassion, and community well before Christianity, as evidenced by countless ancient cultures. Indigenous cultures, Eastern philosophies, and pre-Christian societies all possessed ethical frameworks that included compassion and communal responsibility. By framing these qualities as miraculous, [JBP] imposes a narrative that elevates Catholic religious traditions above others, erasing the contributions of diverse cultures to the development of human ethics.

Concepts of mercy, tolerance, and compassion have emerged through diverse cultures and philosophies, not as supernatural interventions.

31:33 so we move forward into the light with great difficulty and the fact that we can take that for granted now and that
31:39 it seems self-evident and deserving of faint praise it's not so clear to me
31:44 that that's that that's a reasonable proposition [RD] okay let's let's Grant the the faint praise but that has nothing to
31:51 do with the truth value and what I care about is the truth value I see no no truth value in the claims of

Expanded Analysis of Truth Value vs. Symbolic Appreciation

[RD] emphasizes a key distinction here: while one may appreciate the symbolic or cultural role of religious stories, this does not equate to an endorsement of their truth claims. [JBP], however, conflates the two, implying that because some moral progress aligns with Christian principles, this somehow validates the metaphysical claims of Christianity. [RD]s’ question directly challenges [JBP] to clarify whether he subscribes to the literal truth of Christian doctrines—such as the Virgin birth and the Resurrection—or views them merely as symbols.

This challenge exposes the gap between [RD]s' commitment to objective, evidence-based truth and [JBP]'s reliance on symbolic, interpretive narratives. By avoiding a direct answer, [JBP] sidesteps the core of [RD]s’ critique: that symbolic meaning, while culturally significant, does not fulfill the criteria of empirical truth. [JBP]’s conflation of symbolic value with truth value is a recurring issue, as he frequently treats allegorical insights as though they validate literal beliefs. This tendency dilutes the rigor of truth as a philosophical and empirical concept, turning it into an interpretive free-for-all.

The symbolic meaning and truth value are distinct. Symbols, while meaningful within specific cultural frameworks, do not establish objective truths. [RD]s’ critique challenges [JBP] to separate appreciation of metaphor from belief in empirical facts.

31:57 Christianity the Virgin birth the Resurrection The Miracles do you believe in any of
32:02 those do you believe Jesus was born a
32:08 virgin [JBP] as I said before there are elements of the text that I don't feel qualified to comment on my experience
32:15 has been that the more like I know from a metaphorical perspective and from a Mythic perspective what the story of the
32:21 Virgin birth means and I accept that I know for example that any culture that
32:26 doesn't hold image of the woman and infant sacred
32:32 dies and I don't know how that needs to be expressed in a form though [RD] is it true though [AO]do you mean that you don't know [JBP] well let let me

[RD]s’ question is a challenge to [JBP]’s intellectual consistency: is [JBP] willing to assert a belief in Christian miracles as literal truths, or does he see them as purely symbolic? By evading this, [JBP] appears to want it both ways—acknowledging the power of religious symbols without committing to their factual reality. This ambiguity allows him to appeal to both religious and secular audiences without risking his credibility with either, a tactic that ultimately muddies the conversation and avoids the clarity that [RD] is seeking.

[JBP]’s unwillingness to answer directly reflects a broader pattern in his rhetoric. By treating miracles as metaphor, he straddles a line that allows him to avoid accountability to either literal or symbolic interpretations.

It's interesting that [JBP] starts pointing at [RD] after he emphasizes "dies" which I think could be construed as a threat. I think [RD] is showing a remarkably level of restraint, in the face of [JBP]s narcissistic injury of being critisizes and backed into a corner which might cause him to say something which his fundamentalist financiers won't like, while trying to appeal to the largest groups of people possible, trying to play both sides of being a rationalist intellectual like [RD], and also a fundamentalist christian, like his new found financial backers of the last year or so, the elements of the Trump regime.

[JBP]’s assertion that cultures must hold the “woman and infant” sacred to survive generalizes an idea that is both historically inaccurate and philosophically problematic. Numerous cultures have flourished without emphasizing the sanctity of mother-child imagery in the same way that Christian iconography does. His claim here attempts to universalize a particular cultural image as essential to human survival, ignoring the diverse ways societies have expressed family and reproductive values.

This notion also implies a threat—that those who do not align with this archetype are doomed to cultural extinction. This oversimplified narrative not only erases cultural diversity but reinforces an Abrahamic view that equates moral and cultural progress with adherence to specific religious icons. By presenting mother-and-child imagery as universally necessary, [JBP] fails to recognize the wide array of family structures, gender roles, and parenting practices that have sustained societies outside of this narrow framework.

[JBP]’s assumption of the “sacred virgin woman and infant” archetype as universal is both reductionist, misandrist and culturally exclusionary. By framing this image as essential, he implies a moral hierarchy that disregards diverse familial and societal structures.

32:38 let me ask you about that because truth this is something I talked with Sam Harris about too truth as we know is a

Truth claims in fiction, both sexes carry the image of God

32:44 tricky business do you think there are differences in the truth claims between different writers of

No, truth is actually not a tricky business. It's the opposite of tricky business. The ways that [JBP] tries to distort the definition of truth, and the arrogance of a post-modernist trying to make claims about truth, while simultaneously believing objective truth does not exist, only narratives exist. That requires a tremendous amount of arrogance, and lack of knowledge of philosophy.

32:50 fiction like is Dostoevsky more profound than [RD] no well I wouldn't call fiction truth
32:56 claims anyway I mean he's a [JBP] then on what grounds do we rank order the the fiction in terms of quality like

and here we go again with [JBP] being ignorant. He seems to somehow be ignorant of the difference between fiction and non-fiction writing.
Hint: IT'S THE TRUTH CLAIMS

[JBP]’s insistence that “truth is a tricky business” reflects his postmodern leanings, where truth is seen as malleable rather than stable or verifiable. This stance is problematic in a discussion with [RD], who maintains a clear distinction between fiction and truth claims. For [RD], fiction does not make truth claims—it conveys narratives and themes without asserting factual accuracy. [JBP]’s failure to recognize this difference highlights a key weakness in his approach, as he consistently blurs the boundaries between narrative meaning and objective truth.

This conflation has philosophical consequences. By suggesting that fiction operates within a realm of truth claims, [JBP] implies that any narrative can serve as a “truth,” regardless of its factual accuracy. This position ultimately diminishes the rigor of empirical truth, where facts are validated independently of interpretation or belief. [RD]s’ resistance to this idea underscores the importance of keeping fiction and truth distinct, as blurring these lines leads to intellectual relativism, where all narratives are treated as equally valid “truths.”

33:02 Dostoevsky is a profound purveyor of fiction on the philosophical front unbelievably
33:08 deep and profound there's something true about what he's writing about [RD] it's it's nothing to do with the truth the truth
33:15 that science is concerned with the truth of science is the truth that gets us to the Moon I mean this has nothing to do
33:21 with um whether one writer of fiction has a sort of insight into human nature
33:27 that goes without saying I accept that [JBP] okay so how do we deal with the notion that on the on the purely factual side

[JBP] here seems to be ignorant of what philosophy is. It's not science, as [RD] points out.
What [JBP] is calling truth, are philosophical narratives, they might be METAPHORICALLY true, which is something that differentiates philosophy from pure fiction, but that doesn't make something factually or objectively true, 'true' and 'metaphorically true' are not the same thing. For somethign to be true requires experimentation with real objects in the real world, and not purely thought experiments. Dostoevsky does some interesting thought experiments, however those are not generalizable truths, they are highly contextually dependent thought experiments which are at best anecdotes.
The Plural of Anecdote is not data.

[JBP]’s attempt to frame Dostoevsky’s philosophical explorations as “truth” misses the nuance between metaphorical insight and empirical knowledge. Dostoevsky’s work offers profound narratives on the human condition, examining psychological and existential struggles. However, as [RD] rightly points out, these are not truths in the scientific sense. They do not undergo empirical testing or verification, nor do they adhere to objective standards of truth. Dostoevsky’s observations may resonate with readers, offering what one might call “metaphorical truth,” but they remain subjective interpretations rather than universally applicable truths.

This distinction is crucial because, while philosophical insights may inform personal growth or ethical frameworks, they do not serve as factual claims about the world. By conflating metaphor with empirical truth, [JBP] dilutes the specificity of each. The philosophical narrative adds richness to human experience, yet it does not operate within the same paradigm as scientific inquiry. [RD]s’ retort clarifies this by emphasizing that science is concerned with truths that can be tested, measured, and reproduced, rather than interpretive musings.

33:34 how do we deal with the idea let's take the no you you talked about clitoridectomy let's talk about the
33:39 oppression of women yes we make a scientific case that that's inappropriate or is it a case that we're
33:45 making on some other grounds like I see in the judeo-christian tradition one of the earliest pronouncement is that both
33:51 men and women carry the image of God both and that sets a certain tone to
33:58 everything that follows and it is a remarkable Proclamation given its radical age that both men and women are
34:05 carry the carry the image of God and are to be treated as something with intrinsic value outside of the domain of

Buddhism did this first. So it's not unique to Christianity. More likely Christianity got this from Buddhism (because Buddhism predates Christianity), also it ignores that in the old testament,
the second story of creation names [Adam and Eve] as the first man and the first woman; in the narrative, Adam was created first, and Eve from Adam's rib, women were second class citizens that were made from a part of a man, and the equality of men and women didn't arise until the New testament.

[JBP]’s invocation of the “image of God” as a radical declaration of equality overlooks both historical context and theological inconsistencies. His claim that Judeo-Christian doctrine inherently values men and women equally ignores centuries of gender inequality embedded within religious texts and traditions. Buddhism and other spiritual frameworks predate Christianity with teachings that promote compassion and intrinsic human dignity. The Old Testament, however, portrays Eve as created from Adam’s rib, implicitly placing men as primary and women as derivative, hardly a vision of intrinsic equality.

By framing this as a uniquely Christian insight, [JBP] engages in historical revisionism, ignoring the rich ethical teachings of other traditions that promote human equality and compassion. Furthermore, he simplifies a complex religious narrative, retroactively projecting values onto early Christianity that only emerged in later theological interpretations.

[JBP]’s assertion of Judeo-Christian uniqueness in promoting equality is a selective reading. Other cultural and religious systems also advocated human dignity, and many ethical advancements attributed to Christianity have roots in earlier philosophies and religions.

34:12 power and politics and it isn't obvious me it isn't obvious to me having thought about this a lot how we deal with that
34:19 in the pure realm of fact because one of the facts is if I can oppress you why the hell shouldn't I [AO] yeah my job is to

Many of the people following [JBP] DO oppress other people. I am pretty sure that is a large part of the reason the economy is a mess. The "why the hell shouldn't I" was the fucking around part, and also a large part of the bigotry I experienced in my childhood, and what is going on now in the economy, is the finding out part.

It's also why I am neoBuddhist and not christian, despite how many christian agree with my teachings and even [JBP] tried to co-opt me and the communities that are familiar with me, during this election season, in an attempt to be an election spoiler. Lots of bait-and-switching, which he and pageau have in common, which I think is a form of narcissistic triangulation that they have been trying to do, between neoBuddhism and Christianity. But it has only brought us closer together, right PVK ?

It's pretty funny that [JBP]s attempts at triangulation resulted in bringing Catholics and Protestants together, in dislike of him and fundamentalist christian nationalism.

[JBP]’s rhetorical question, “If I can oppress you, why shouldn’t I?” is a troubling oversimplification that implies ethical relativism in the absence of religious doctrine. This perspective reveals an underlying assumption: that without religious morality, individuals lack compelling reasons to avoid harming others. Yet ethical systems, both religious and secular, provide numerous justifications for valuing mutual respect, empathy, and cooperation. By ignoring these, [JBP] inadvertently endorses a Hobbesian view of humanity as fundamentally self-interested and brutish, needing religious constraints to avoid cruelty.

Moreover, [JBP]’s question reflects a straw man argument, as though secular morality has no mechanism for discouraging harm. Secular ethics, grounded in human rights, empathy, and societal well-being, offers numerous reasons to refrain from oppression. [JBP]’s framing ignores the countless secular societies and ethical philosophies that promote compassion without reliance on Hell as punishment. By suggesting that oppression is inevitable without religious morality, he not only disregards these alternative frameworks but also paints a bleak and inaccurate picture of human nature. It also fails to take into account the large amount of crimes carried out by people professing a christian faith, often financial.

Ethical behavior does not necessitate religious belief; many people with religious beliefs perpetrate unethical behavior.

The virgin birth and the absolute need for a value hierarchy

34:25 keep things on track here I think there are a number of questions question which Professor Dawkins has asked quite directly that we still haven't really
34:31 heard an answer for okay okay and Professor Dawkin asking about the Virgin birth you started talking about metaphor
34:36 you started talking about myth I think anybody listening to this conversation will understand that maybe a society
34:42 that doesn't believe in the virgin birth won't work maybe that's the predictive power that you're talking about but I I
34:48 think you must understand that when Professor Dawkins is asking you do you believe that Jesus was born of a virgin
34:54 he means something like a biological fact and and by the way saying I don't know or saying you know I'm not qualified to
35:00 comment is an answer to that question but is that your answer that you that you don't know [JBP] I said earlier and and I
35:06 I would hold to this is that there are elements of the text that I don't know how
35:11 to that I'm incapable of fully accounting for I can't account for for
35:17 what the what the fundamental reality and significance of the notion of the Resurrection is my my knowledge just
35:23 ends [AO] sure but [JBP] I know that whatever happened whatever happened as a consequence of the origination and the
35:30 promotion of the Christian story was powerful enough to bring Rome to its knees and demolish the Pagan Enterprise

CHRISTIANITY DID NOT DESTROY ROME. Though I think it's a bit funny that Rome collapsed after becoming christian as Christianity became the state religion in 380CE and Rome collapsed around 476CE. At worst that could suggest some pretty significant mismanagement by Christianity, not a rebellion by Christians. I would like to know how the person who can't understand how the Resurrection of Jesus is significant. (facepalm certainly has nothing to do with divinity or anything /sarcasm)
could somehow figure that Christianity "brought Rome to its knees" in some way other than incompetence. Which is the opposite of being intellectually powerful.

Though I guess it could have been like Carl Sagan warned "A combustible mixture of power and ignorance" much like [JBP] is displaying here.

[JBP]’s assertion that Christianity “brought Rome to its knees” oversimplifies a complex historical process. As noted, Christianity became the state religion of Rome in 380 CE, with the Empire collapsing nearly a century later. Far from overthrowing Rome, Christianity became part of its institutional framework, blending with existing power structures rather than dismantling them. This was hardly an “intellectual rebellion” against the Empire but rather an alignment with it, resulting in a religion-state merger that transformed Christian doctrine into a vehicle for political participation.

Moreover, [JBP]’s idea that Christianity held “powerful enough” ideas to destabilize an empire misrepresents the real causes of Rome’s decline, which historians attribute to a combination of internal corruption, economic instability, military overextension, and external invasions. By attributing Rome’s fall to Christian ideas, [JBP] inadvertently attributes a destructive influence to Christianity—a notion that undermines his intended praise. This romanticized retelling of history ignores the practical factors behind Rome’s collapse, emphasizing narrative over historical accuracy.

35:36 so there's some power in that story that's remarkable [RD]let's stick to the Virgin birth well the Virgin birth
35:43 results from a mistranslation of Isaiah you know that [JBP] I'm it like these sorts of
35:51 questions it's what would you say they don't they don't strike me as they're not getting to the point has
35:59 a purpose well and look I understand that there's there's perfect reasons to debate this I I know that and I know
36:06 that your question is more than valid but it's beside the issue as far as I'm concerned and and it's it's partly
36:12 because well when we started this conversation I said for example that it
36:17 it appears to be the case that a description of the structure through which we see the world is a
36:23 story we see the world through a story and so that's a remarkable thing that's
36:29 a remarkable Discovery and it's emerged probably in the last 16 year 60 years in multiple disciplines because we have to

A reminder that what [JBP] is referring to here, is post-modernism where narratives are the only thing that exists which is directly contrary to all philosophy prior to that.

[RD] points out a well-documented historical error: the Virgin birth doctrine is based on a mistranslation of the Hebrew word “almah,” meaning “young woman,” to the Greek “parthenos,” meaning “virgin.” This mistranslation influenced later Christian doctrine, shaping the idea of Jesus’ Virgin birth as a foundational belief. [JBP]’s dismissal of [RD]s’ point as irrelevant overlooks the fact that many Christian doctrines hinge on interpretive accuracy. By implying that [RD]s’ historical critique “misses the point,” [JBP] sidesteps a fundamental issue of scriptural integrity and implies that interpretive mistakes don’t impact religious truth.

This maneuver reflects a recurring theme in [JBP]’s rhetoric: disregarding factual inaccuracies to uphold symbolic narratives. Yet, for doctrines as central as the Virgin birth, accuracy matters. [RD]s’ point that this foundational doctrine emerged from mistranslation challenges [JBP] to address the implications of historical error in sacred texts. Instead of engaging, [JBP] trivializes [RD]s’ inquiry, which exposes a lack of rigor in his approach to scripture.

[JBP]’s assertion that “we see the world through a story” reflects postmodern relativism, which posits that narratives, rather than objective facts, shape human understanding. This concept—rooted in postmodernism—reframes truth as narrative coherence, prioritizing perception over empirical reality. Yet, [JBP]’s failure to clarify his allegiance to this view creates a philosophical inconsistency: he invokes “truth” in a manner that implies both objective reality and interpretive narrative without acknowledging the distinction.

[RD]s’ frustration stems from [JBP]’s evasiveness. By treating “truth” as a narrative lens, [JBP] undermines [RD]s’ commitment to empirical rigor, where truth exists independently of perception. This relativism allows [JBP] to sidestep factual accuracy, reducing truth to a function of coherence within cultural stories. While storytelling is integral to human meaning-making, it does not replace the need for empirical truth. [JBP]’s reliance on the narrative lens thus serves as a rhetorical escape, avoiding the factual scrutiny that [RD] demands.

36:35 prioritize our facts and so we prioritize them according to a particular pattern and there are

I don't see how [JBP] can prioritize facts when he doesn't know what facts are.

36:41 patterns that seem to work and to propagate themselves properly and to orient cultures towards life abundant
36:46 and there are other patterns the pattern of Cain for example that lead to Absolute bloody Devastation and I don't
36:53 know exactly how to construe that sort of truth but we talked about the oppression of women for example it's
36:58 like how do you make a case on Purely factual grounds that women should be treated as
37:03 equals it's a moral question and I know that's exactly I I was dealing with a

wow, that was one hell of a gish gallop. He combined both moving the goal posts and several topic changes. Which [RD] was happy to go along with because he just pointed out that most of the books [JBP] slaps his name on, were ghost written and [JBP] himself knows very little about christian theology.

[JBP] opens with a burst of vague, abstract language about “patterns,” linking cultural success or failure to ideas that either “orient toward life” or “devastation.” This statement is neither empirically grounded nor tied to any specific historical or philosophical example. [RD] asked a straightforward question: did the Virgin birth happen? Instead of answering, [JBP] launches into what’s known as a Gish Gallop—introducing multiple, loosely related ideas at once to create a rhetorical smokescreen.

This approach is utilized by [JBP] to evade [RD]s’ challenge by distracting the audience with philosophically empty claims about “patterns.” By introducing concepts like “life abundant” and “bloody devastation,” [JBP] implies that deeply held beliefs justify their own truthfulness. Yet, [RD]s’ question about the Virgin birth concerns factual accuracy, not narrative function. [JBP]’s inability to engage directly with the factual nature of [RD]s’ question exposes his tendency to use abstraction as a form of rhetorical defense, rather than as an avenue to clarity.

37:09 factual question which is did Jesus have a father and and you won't answer it [JBP] Jesus father and a Heavenly Father like
37:17 almost all mythological Heroes [RD] so he wasn't the born of a virgin then so you so you're saying that Jesus was not born
37:23 of a virgin I I said first of all that I don't I don't know how to mediate the
37:29 fact value dichotomy in that case I said the same thing about the resurrection [RD] it's not a value it's it's a simple fact
37:35 I mean did did did a man have intercourse with with Mary and produce
37:40 Jesus that's that's a factual question it's not a value
37:47 question [AO] you must understand what we're being asked here that that even if you think that say the author of the
37:53 biblical texts intended much more significance than a simple scientific analysis of events Professor Dawkins is
38:00 interested in scientific truth that's the kind of truth that he's interested in and even if you think it's irrelevant to the point of what the the gospel
38:06 authors were getting at that first needs to be clarified before you can then begin actually uncovering what the
38:12 stories are about so I think Professor Dawkins is asking from a scientific perspective and maybe you think that that scientific approach is wrong but if
38:19 you just take it for a moment maybe this is how we find out that it is wrong let's take a scientific approach ask the

I think [AO] just figured out what [RD] was getting at, in regards to the shallowness of [JBP]s theological understanding, or virtue signalling his religious credentials rather than deeply held beliefs.

[RD] presses [JBP] to clarify his stance on the Virgin birth as a literal event, framing it as a “factual question.” [JBP]’s response, invoking the “fact-value dichotomy,” only underscores his evasiveness. The fact-value distinction, a central concept in philosophy, differentiates between objective facts about the world and subjective value judgments. However, the Virgin birth is not a matter of values but of historical claim—it is either an empirical reality or a myth. [JBP]’s invocation of this dichotomy reveals a misunderstanding of [RD]s’ inquiry and of the dichotomy itself.

By conflating fact with value, [JBP] sidesteps the empirical question [RD] raised, using philosophical jargon to imply that the truth of the Virgin birth lies beyond empirical reach. Yet the Virgin birth, as a theological claim, demands either empirical affirmation or symbolic acceptance. [RD]s’ insistence on factual clarity is a reasonable expectation in intellectual discourse, while [JBP]’s deflection demonstrates his reluctance to confront theological claims through empirical standards.

Emphasizing the fact-value misinterpretation can underscore [JBP]’s misuse of philosophical terms as a means of evasion, particularly when confronted with basic empirical inquiries.

38:25 question did this occur [JBP]I think that it's inappropriate to use a question
38:30 like that to attempt to under undermine the validity of the entire what would you say deep mythological Enterprise [AO] we
38:37 weren't doing suppose we were asking out of Interest suppose that we were all here devout Christians maybe even Jungian Christians and we thought this is
38:43 interesting over dinner do you think it really happened like scientifically would your answer just be I don't know
38:50 [JBP] yes [AO] and you wouldn't consider it I mean it's not an inappropriate question to ask just on a point of Interest [JBP]right
38:56 [AO] did this really occur and I think so often people are asking you that and and especially given the context of this
39:01 conversation we've we've heard everything that you're you're saying about metaphor and myths and but because
39:07 the question is still then being asked did it really happen you know that that's what you're being asked and the way you just so easily said yes I wonder
39:14 why you struggle to do that in so many other circumstances [JBP] I think because I don't look at the situation the same the the
39:21 way that Dr Dawkins and I look at the situation are really quite different and at many many many levels you know so
39:28 even on the meme question for example you know like I know the literature on
39:33 the history of religious ideas I see how these ideas have battled across Millennia in a manner that is very
39:40 reminiscent to me of the same sort of claim that do Dawkins is putting forward with regards to meme I know that
39:46 literature Dr Dawkins doesn't know that literature and it's very difficult for me to communicate from within the
39:52 confines of that literature because it's extensive and deep and and we're de de with things that we don't understand the

I'm calling bullshit on that. [RD] is clearly more familiar with the literature, and [JBP] clearly is NOT familiar with the history of religious ideas, he barely grasps the current beliefs, let alone the historical ones or how they have changed over time.

This is a classic example of Psychological projection where he accuses [RD] of what he is himself guilty of, which in this case, is unfamiliarity with the literature.

[JBP] suggests that questioning the Virgin birth undermines the “deep mythological enterprise,” implying that historical accuracy is irrelevant to the moral and symbolic value of religious narratives. This argument conflates faith with historical fact, positing that challenging a single doctrinal claim somehow destabilizes the entire structure of Christianity (it does not). [RD], however, seeks clarity on a specific doctrine, not a wholesale dismissal of mythology.

[JBP]’s claim that [RD]s’ question somehow threatens the integrity of mythological narratives is a red herring. While religious stories offer symbolic and cultural value, this value does not immunize them from factual scrutiny. By presenting [RD]s’ inquiry as an attack on mythology, [JBP] sidesteps the factual implications of doctrinal claims, thus avoiding accountability for his position on the Virgin birth.

[JBP]’s “appeal to mythology” tactic can clarify how he sidesteps factual questions by implying that empirical scrutiny undermines the entire religious tradition, and negating the value of metaphor and allegory in religious traditions, which is what differentiates them from science in a useful way, rather than addressing the question on its own terms.

[JBP]’s response here reveals a recurring theme in his rhetoric: the notion that [RD]s’ worldview and his own are “fundamentally different.” This framing suggests that their perspectives are so disparate that communication on shared terms is impossible. [JBP] uses this argument to claim that [RD]s’ empiricism is inherently incompatible with his own viewpoint, allowing him to sidestep [RD]s’ straightforward questions about literal belief. However, because [RD]s’ empiricism is based on reality, then [JBP] is implicitly stating that his views are incompatible with empirical reality.

Intellectual honesty demands that, even with differing worldviews, individuals can address straightforward empirical questions with clarity, if they share the same reality. [JBP]’s approach here effectively reduces any substantive discussion to an exercise in subjective interpretation, rendering truth claims moot. By suggesting that [RD]s’ scientific inquiries cannot intersect with his own “deep” understanding of mythology, [JBP] attempts to create an impenetrable wall of subjective difference to evade direct engagement.

[JBP]’s assertion that [RD] lacks knowledge of religious literature is both ironic and revealing. [RD] is a well-known scholar of religious studies, particularly as it intersects with evolutionary biology, while [JBP]’s own religious understanding has repeatedly shown itself to be both superficial and selective. By projecting his own deficiencies onto [RD], [JBP] attempts to undermine [RD]s’ credibility while deflecting attention from his own lack of expertise.

This tactic, known as psychological projection, allows [JBP] to position himself as a knowledgeable authority without actually demonstrating that knowledge. His implication that [RD]s’ scientific approach lacks depth is especially ironic given [JBP]’s reliance on rhetorical ambiguity to obscure the weaknesses in his own arguments. This projection functions as a smokescreen, casting doubt on [RD]s’ intellectual rigor without providing substantive evidence of [JBP]’s own.

[JBP]’s projection highlights his tactic of undermining his opponent’s credibility by attributing his own knowledge gaps to them, rather than addressing the substance of their arguments.

40:00 relationship between metaphoric truth and value predicated truth and factual truth we don't understand that it's a
40:07 big problem we cannot there's no evidence whatsoever from the scientific perspective that we can Orient ourself

[JBP] here is asserting that because he doesn't understand something that no one does, or "we don't understand that" when he means "I don't understand that"

Most serious philosophers DO understand that, it's why we don't pretend that everything is truth or true. And we have terms like "metaphorically true" which is different from factual truth. The term "value predicated truth" is something he just made up. He is clearly unfamiliar with the formal definition of Truth Which is:
Truth is the property of being in accord with fact or reality. In everyday language, it is typically ascribed to things that aim to represent reality or otherwise correspond to it.

[JBP]’s phrase “metaphoric truth and value-predicated truth and factual truth” attempts to establish a spectrum of truth types, yet the distinctions are both artificial and misleading. Philosophers have long recognized the importance of defining truth in precise terms—truth as it pertains to factual accuracy, metaphorical resonance, and subjective interpretation. “Metaphoric truth” is a well-recognized concept, where metaphors can hold abstract or symbolic or thematic significance without claiming objective reality. However, [JBP]’s invention of “value-predicated truth” lacks philosophical grounding and appears to be an ad hoc term he uses to create an aura of intellectual depth.

By introducing terms without clarification or precedent, [JBP] complicates rather than clarifies. The concept of truth traditionally involves correspondence with reality, as noted, and introducing ambiguous terms like “value-predicated truth” only muddies the discussion. His reliance on vague definitions reveals a lack of precision that philosophers find indispensable when discussing truth. [JBP]’s attempt to generalize from subjective values to objective truth sidesteps the rigor necessary to differentiate personal belief from universal truth.

40:13 in the world merely in consequence of the facts sure and that's a fact and it's a fact that's been detailed out in
40:20 great detail in the last 60 years by people from a variety of different disciplines we have to prioritize the
40:25 facts that's a value hierarchy there may be true and false ways of prioritizing
40:31 facts but you can't determine the truth or falsehood of the way that you prioritize facts by making reference to

I think the problem here, is that [JBP] doesn't know what facts are, on top of constantly conflating subjective value with facts. Probably if he didn't conflate all terms with each other, he would not be so mystified.

I also like how there are no specific references to people or ideas. It's just "a variety" of disciplines and people, when really, it's just post modernism for entitled punters who couldn't be arsed to learn philosophy. That is a single discipline, not a variety of disciplines, and post-modernism is just an extension of Nihilism. Which we know he believes in, but he doesn't seem to understand why everyone else makes fun of Nihilism.

He certainty doesn't suspect it has something to do with the other philosophical disciplines having these answers which he claims no one knows.

[JBP]’s claim that “we cannot orient ourselves in the world merely in consequence of the facts” reflects a misunderstanding of how factual knowledge shapes decision-making and orientation. Facts provide a grounding framework—objective realities upon which values and actions are often based. While it is true that values inform our prioritization of facts, [JBP]’s assertion here implies that facts alone lack orientation power, as if facts and values exist in entirely separate realms. In reality, orientation arises from a synthesis of factual understanding and subjective interpretation, with facts providing the foundational layer.

By discounting the role of facts in guiding orientation, [JBP] presents a false dichotomy between facts and values, assuming that facts cannot inherently carry weight without subjective prioritization. Yet, in disciplines like science and ethics, facts serve as the bedrock upon which values are assessed and hierarchies established. This disregard for the role of facts in shaping orientation reflects a deeper issue: [JBP]’s tendency to inflate the importance of subjective value while downplaying the objective structure facts provide.

[JBP]’s reference to “prioritizing facts” as creating a “value hierarchy” misinterprets the nature of factual prioritization. When faced with a multitude of facts, humans naturally prioritize based on relevance, context, or urgency, but this prioritization does not constitute a “value hierarchy” in the philosophical sense. A value hierarchy pertains to the ordering of values or ethical principles, not the contextual relevance of empirical facts. By labeling this process a “value hierarchy,” [JBP] creates an unnecessary conflation between subjective values and objective facts.

In philosophical discourse, a hierarchy of values is distinct from factual relevance. While factual prioritization might influence decision-making, it remains distinct from ethical or moral values. [JBP]’s attempt to cast factual prioritization as value-based distorts the practical distinctions between empirical observation and ethical judgment. This blurring serves to obscure rather than illuminate, casting objective processes of prioritization as inherently subjective, which undermines the clarity essential for philosophical rigor.

[JBP]’s assertion that “you can’t determine the truth or falsehood of…prioritizing facts” suggests an inherent incompatibility between factual accuracy and value judgment. This assertion is both unfounded and logically non-sequential, as prioritization often involves evaluating both relevance and accuracy, rather than an either/or distinction. The accuracy of facts—assessed through empirical observation—plays a crucial role in prioritization, particularly when practical outcomes depend on correct information.

[JBP]’s phrasing implies that prioritization exists in a vacuum, devoid of objective standards of truth or relevance. However, effective prioritization frequently depends on a thorough understanding of factual accuracy, meaning that truth and prioritization are not incompatible but interdependent. By positioning them as mutually exclusive, [JBP] undermines the practical and philosophical foundations of rational decision-making, creating an unnecessary barrier between fact and value that is both artificial and counterproductive.

40:38 the facts that's a big problem [AO] okay let's let's let's talk about that as perhaps uh a slight detour here because
40:44 I think we do need to come back to this Christ Resurrection thing but Professor Dawkins would you say that underlying
40:50 the scientific scientific Enterprise is a fundamentally unscientific assumption
40:55 you can you can make scientific investigations in the world but in order to do so you need to choose what to
41:01 prioritize you need to choose what to investigate you also need to um value the truth you need to have a value and a
41:08 motivation for doing it in the first place those kinds of things cannot themselves be scientifically Justified
41:14 and so does the scientif scientific Enterprise have an unscientific assumption at its base [RD] I suppose it does I mean I I I think we I think that

[AO] poses a question that seems intended to provoke reflection on the philosophical underpinnings of science, not to imply that science itself lacks rigor. Scientific inquiry operates from foundational assumptions like consistency, coherence, and observability in natural laws, which could be considered preconditions for discovery. However, these assumptions aren’t “unscientific” in any derogatory sense but are pragmatic frameworks developed over centuries to ensure robust and replicable knowledge. This isn’t unique to science; every philosophical system has fundamental tenets—consider logic’s reliance on the law of non-contradiction.

[AO]’s framing is astute in opening up a philosophical inquiry. Yet [JBP]’s response—misunderstanding these assumptions as religious axioms—reflects a fundamental misreading of science’s secular, methodological roots. The drive to seek “truth” in science doesn’t stem from a religious imperative but from a practical goal to understand and interact predictably with the world.

41:22 maybe just be Jordan and Richard but by the way um um I think that
41:27 prioritizes myth and I prioritize fact and
41:33 um I think myth is kind of vaguely interesting but is not the be on end all
41:39 of my life I think it's it's somewhat secondary to scientific fact sort of
41:44 facts that that tell us how old the universe is how old the world is um the
41:51 history of Life the um engineering achievements of Landing a a a a
41:58 spacecraft on on a comet the these are the things that science can do and as I
42:05 said the predictions of quantum theory to come back to that but predictions of quantum theory which are verified to a
42:12 sufficient number of decimal places that it's equivalent to predicting the width of North America to one hair's breadth
42:18 now that is however difficult Quantum theory is to understand that is what you
42:24 can get from quantum theory now the mysteries of the Bible if they are Mysteries aren't in the same league I
42:31 mean they they just don't cut it
42:36 -- ADVERTISEMENT --
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The preconditions for the scientific enterprise

43:21 axioms that need to be accepted I don't
43:26 want to put put words in your mouth because I want to get this right before the Scientific Enterprise can begin so I've
43:32 tried to think those [JBP] let me lay out a couple of them this is partly what I've done while trying to make the case
43:37 for example that you're more of a Christian than you think you are so for example I think that the scient
43:43 scientific enterpris is motivated by the axiomatic presumption that truth tends
43:48 towards a Unity I think that it's predicated on the notion that there is a
43:54 logical order that's intrinsic to the cosmo that that fundamental order is good that
44:00 it's intelligible to human beings and that discovering that order and aligning
44:05 ourselves with it makes for life more abundant I think that the scientific
44:10 Enterprise is also predicated on the idea that the truth will set you free and I think all of those axioms are
44:16 religious and derived from the judeo-christian tradition and if you don't believe that you have to account
44:22 for why science emerged in Europe and nowhere else in the entire history of humanity for example ex Le and why it's

wow, where to even start. First, none of those things are scientific axioms. How the F$#& "truth tends towards a Unity" is scientific I have no idea. The only thing that he was even remotely close to being correct in associating with axioms of science is intelligiblity to human beings. Everything else was wrong things that he just made up and not written in any book about science.

His claim of "the truth will set you free" is especially hilarious when considering Galileo and how other intellectuals have been treated by the church historically.

[JBP]'s interpretation of scientific principles is strikingly off-base. None of the “axioms” he lists—“truth tends towards a Unity,” “fundamental order is good,” or “truth will set you free”—are remotely related to science’s actual guiding assumptions. These are abstract values he’s projecting onto science, not foundational tenets.

Truth Tending Towards Unity: The idea of unity in truth is more theological or metaphysical than scientific. Science doesn’t aim to create a unified “truth” but instead seeks accurate descriptions of phenomena based on evidence. Theories in science are provisional and subject to revision; they are not assumed to fit into a singular “truth.”
Order as Intrinsically Good: The moral evaluation of “good” does not factor into scientific inquiry. Science is a value-neutral process. Values only come into play when we decide how to use scientific knowledge. [JBP] is conflating ethical philosophy with empirical methodology here, a significant error.
Truth as Liberating: “The truth will set you free” is a religious or philosophical aphorism with no grounding in the scientific enterprise. Scientific truth can be liberating in a practical sense, but its objective is knowledge, not moral or spiritual freedom. The alignment of science with such statements reflects [JBP]’s tendency to impose religious ideals onto secular practices, which neither fits nor respects the integrity of scientific work.

But when he said "science emerged in Europe and nowhere else" I was floored. That is some grade A racism. It's clearly obvious he knows literally nothing about the history of science, or where the numbers used in science came from. He clearly thinks that math was invented in Europe, even though Europe was invented IN THE LAST 80 YEARS. This is amazingly ignorant, even for him.

his statement is historically inaccurate, dismissive of entire civilizations’ contributions, and verges on Eurocentric exceptionalism. Scientific inquiry did not “emerge in Europe” alone; it has rich, ancient roots worldwide. Here are just a few examples:

Mathematics: The foundations of arithmetic, algebra, and geometry were extensively developed by civilizations across Mesopotamia, Egypt, and India. Zero as a number, for example, originated in India—a concept fundamental to modern mathematics.
Astronomy and Medicine: Chinese, Persian, Egyptian, and Indian scholars made substantial contributions to astronomy, medicine, and physics well before these fields gained prominence in Europe. The Islamic Golden Age, in particular, was marked by immense advancements in scientific knowledge that Europe later absorbed and built upon.
Empirical Methodology: The scientific method, as we recognize it today, has roots in various traditions, from the detailed observational techniques of Chinese astronomers to the experimental work of Alhazen in optics in the Islamic world. Europe’s development of science as an institutional enterprise does not negate these contributions but rather benefited significantly from them.

By attributing science solely to European origins, [JBP] perpetuates a historically inaccurate narrative that ignores centuries of intercultural knowledge transfer. Scientific evolution is a testament to shared human endeavor, not the intellectual monopoly of one culture.

It’s essential to challenge the myth of European exclusivity in the development of science. This notion neglects the contributions of non-European civilizations and reinforces a false hierarchy.

44:29 also why it's under assault from like all quarters now as that underlying metaphysic disappear it's like you don't
44:36 have you haven't had to be concerned with the mythological substrate in your lifetime in some sense because it was
44:42 intact and so the universities could flourish and you had your freedom remarkable freedom to pursue your
44:49 scientific Enterprise wherever you wanted and people lauded you for it like that time is that time is threatened and
44:56 serious ly so and I think it's partly because these metaphysical assumptions
45:01 have now become questionable and that's part of the reason that I'm attending to them it's not because I don't admire the
45:07 accuracy of quantum prediction for example or celebrate what musk is doing with his capability of sending Rockets

I think he let his crypto-fascism slip with a salute there. Also eastern Europe is under attack from Russia, not metaphysical assumptions. He is confusing Europe and the US here. They are not having quite as dumb a culture war led by entitled useful idiots. They have actual war on their borders.
Of course there might not be a difference between those things for someone confusing social media for reality. I think he forgets that [RD] is from the UK, which currently is technically not a part of the European Union.

[JBP] is "attending to these metaphysical assumptions" like a neglectful pet owner, considering he doesn't know anything or have any answers, other than "go to church" because that way, he can just dump all the difficult parts of community and sacrifice on someone else.

That means people like you PVK, and me. But hey, at least he is "teaching the controversy"

Let’s be clear: [JBP] is claiming that a vaguely defined “metaphysical substrate” (or “mythological substrate,” as he sometimes calls it) is under attack, leading to a disintegration of Western culture. This is an unfocused and almost conspiratorial narrative with little grounding in reality. The so-called “assault” is not on metaphysical assumptions; it’s on outdated systems, ideologies, and misinformation that fail to address modern ethical and scientific complexities.

He’s framing this as if society is experiencing a moral collapse due to the loss of these mythological foundations, which he vaguely attributes to a Judeo-Christian tradition. Yet, what he is referencing here is essentially a decline in the dominance of traditional, hierarchical structures that have not adapted to contemporary needs and knowledge. This is not an “assault” so much as a cultural evolution and re-examination.

[JBP]’s portrayal of academia here is completely disconnected from the actual challenges and dynamics at play. The supposed “metaphysical crisis” he speaks of is a misinterpretation of the natural evolution of intellectual discourse. Universities have always been sites for questioning and challenging established norms, including religious and mythological assumptions. The rise of interdisciplinary studies, scientific exploration, and secular philosophy isn’t a sign of academia under threat—it’s a sign of academia fulfilling its purpose: pursuing knowledge across the spectrum.

The notion that “metaphysical assumptions have become questionable” is also hardly groundbreaking. This is a centuries-old process that began with Enlightenment philosophers questioning religious dogma and has continued through existentialist and postmodern thought. His choice to frame this intellectual growth as a “threat” rather than a progression reveals a deep discomfort with critical thinking and a penchant for nostalgic moralizing.

[JBP]’s use of “quantum prediction” here as a throwaway line about scientific marvels is telling. He invokes quantum theory, Musk’s SpaceX, and technological achievements only when it’s convenient to bolster his narrative. Yet, he avoids engaging with the rigorous epistemology and skepticism that are central to these scientific endeavors. Science isn’t about confirming metaphysical beliefs.

[JBP]’s attempt to praise science’s achievements—such as Musk’s rockets—is inconsistent with his skepticism toward science’s secular nature. It’s as though he’s cherry-picking which scientific accomplishments to praise and which to dismiss, depending on whether they can be twisted to support his narrative.

45:15 to Mars it's like more power to the technological Enterprise but you know what's happening in the universities
45:21 it's awful and that's that's not a scientific problem it's under [RD] okay I
45:26 agree that okay um I think it's an interesting question why science emerged
45:31 in Europe I mean and I'm not enough of historian to know it is even possible
45:37 that Christianity did have something to do with that and I I wouldn't categorically deny that but that
45:44 doesn't in any way increase my trust in the validity of
45:49 Christian propositions like the Resurrection The Virgin birth and miracles and Jesus is the son of God um
45:56 Christianity may have had some kind of historical uh facilitating effect that led to the
46:05 uh Renaissance that led to to the Scientific Revolution and and that would be a very interesting historical
46:11 analysis but it doesn't bear upon the truth of the propositions of the
46:18 Christian religion [JBP] okay let let's concentrate on the resurrection for a moment now unfortunately see this is

The Resurrection and the bronze serpent

46:24 part of the problem part of the problem with discussions like this is that the mode of approach that's taken by the
46:30 mythological tends to Circle and wander like it doesn't because you have to
46:36 shine light on the problem from multiple perspectives that's why it's often encoded in image for example or in drama
46:42 it's not the same tack as a purely propositional and logical argument so
46:47 it's more difficult to make but let me tell you a story that I believe Bears on the res Resurrection you tell me what
46:53 you think about it because I don't this is a very difficult story to account for it's going to take me about 5 minutes
46:59 because it's it's complicated but there's no way around it I don't think so there's a strange scene in the
47:05 gospels where Christ tells his followers that unless he's lifted up like the bronze serpent in there can be no hope
47:11 for the Redemption of mankind unless he's lifted up like the bronze serpent in the desert okay this is a very
47:18 strange thing for someone to say so you need to know what the story of The Bronze serpent in the desert was and
47:24 what it signifies and I think we can understand it psychologically I really do believe this and so and the
47:31 concordance of that story which was generated Millennia before with Christ utterance is something I just cannot
47:38 imagine how anyone put those two things together especially given the lack of explicit understanding about the
47:44 relationship so let let me detail it so there's a scene in Exodus in The Exodus story where the Israelites are doing
47:51 their usual fractious foolishness and whining about the fact that they're lost and bemoaning the loss of their
47:56 privileges under the Pharaoh and complaining about the power dynamics of their leadership and just generally
48:01 being followers of Cain let's say and God the cruel God that you refer to
48:09 decides to send among his suffering subjects poisonous snakes to bite them
48:14 which seems a little over the top you might say but in response to that I would say there's no situation so
48:20 terrible that some damn fool can't make it infinitely worse and so that's what happens to the Israelites so they're
48:28 being bitten by these poisonous snakes and the leaders of the people who've wandered from God go to Moses and they
48:33 sayl we know you've got a pipeline to God and you know there's a lot of snakes and they're doing a lot of biting and
48:39 maybe you could just ask him to you know call off the serpents and so Moses who's
48:45 not very happy with the Israelites either decides that he'll go talk to God and God says something very strange he
48:52 doesn't say to hell with the Israelites more snakes is what they need and he doesn't say well I produce the snake so
48:58 I'll get rid of them he says something very very peculiar he says have the
49:03 Israelites gathered together all their bronze and make a giant steak and put a serpent on it a bronze serpent which is
49:10 the symbol of healing by the way that even the Greeks use that is symbol of asclepius it's a very old symbol very
49:16 widespread it's still used by physicians today and then he says put it up where the Israelites can see it and if they go
49:23 look at it then the Serpent's poison won't harm them and I read that and I thought
49:30 that's exactly what psychotherapists discovered as they all converged in the 20th century on the utility of exposure
49:37 therapy as Curative and that's the pharmacon a little of the poison that

First, that is not the story of the bronze serpent Numbers 21:4–9, and 2nd Exposure therapy only works for anxiety. You don't solve someones fear of car accidents, by causing more car accidents. That would be the pharma con. This seems more like an excuse to try Pavlovian conditioning on people. It's like trying to solve someones anxiety of racism, by being more racist to them. It's easy for quack psychologists to fuck up. The solution to toxic relationships? more toxic relationships!
It only works for things where the fears are unfounded, dumbass.

I think I am beginning to see why they took his psychologist licence, and also why the mental health crisis keeps growing in the richest country in the world, rather than shrinking.

1. Misrepresentation of the Bronze Serpent Story
[JBP]’s retelling of the bronze serpent story diverges significantly from its original biblical context in Numbers 21:4–9. According to the text, God does indeed send serpents among the Israelites, and when they repent, Moses is instructed to craft a bronze serpent as a means of salvation, not as an object lesson in psychological resilience or "exposure therapy." The biblical narrative frames it as a divinely given remedy, not as an early model of psychological conditioning or exposure.

[JBP]’s attempt to repurpose this as a proto-psychotherapy experiment misses the actual intent of the story, which is one of repentance and obedience. To equate it with exposure therapy—a method effective for anxiety, not universally for all psychological issues—is a leap unsupported by the historical or psychological record.

2. Flawed Comparison: Exposure Therapy and the Bronze Serpent

"That's exactly what psychotherapists discovered as they all converged in the 20th century on the utility of exposure therapy as Curative…"

[JBP]’s analogy between the bronze serpent and exposure therapy disregards the key fact that exposure therapy applies to specific phobias or anxieties where avoidance is the issue. Exposure therapy works by gradually confronting irrational fears in a controlled environment. However, the story of the bronze serpent isn’t about helping the Israelites confront a phobia but is portrayed as divine intervention for their repentance and healing.

To suggest that healing through “exposure” is the principle at work here also dangerously oversimplifies psychological treatment. Following this logic, one might claim that immersing individuals in toxic situations is curative—which is not only misleading but can also be psychologically damaging. In fact, if the goal were to reduce trauma or fear, exposing individuals to repeated trauma would have precisely the opposite effect, often worsening psychological distress rather than resolving it.

4. Overextension of “Pharmakon” Concept
[JBP]’s mention of "pharmakon," which traditionally means both "remedy" and "poison" in Greek, doesn’t translate here. Exposure therapy is not an application of “pharmakon” because it doesn’t use the “poison” itself but addresses the avoidance behaviors that stem from the phobia. His claim also misunderstands the fundamental mechanism of exposure therapy, which seeks to desensitize through incremental and safe exposure, not through direct or repeated confrontation with the feared object in an uncontrolled or harmful way.

49:42 hurts you cures you it's the same principle that's used for vaccines by the way so what we saw in Psychotherapy

That is definitely not how modern vaccines work. Now we are getting anti-vax propaganda, awesome.

The comparison [JBP] makes to vaccines—"a little of the poison that hurts you cures you"—grossly mischaracterizes how vaccines work. Modern vaccines generally contain inactivated or attenuated pathogens (or just fragments) that stimulate the immune system without causing disease, unlike the "pharmakon" idea of using a small amount of actual poison. His misinterpretation suggests a rudimentary, almost homeopathic misunderstanding of immunology, promoting a view that could lead listeners astray regarding vaccine science.

49:49 is that if you get people to voluntarily confront the things that are poisoning them so to speak that hurt their life
49:55 that en them and disgust them they become braver and more well adapted it

Confronting problems and exposure therapy are entirely different things.

[JBP]’s premise that “confronting problems” equates to “exposure therapy” is misleading. Exposure therapy is a structured, evidence-based practice tailored specifically for anxiety-related disorders, where gradual and controlled exposure diminishes irrational fears. Facing general life difficulties—such as social, economic, or personal issues—is not exposure therapy, nor does it offer the same mechanism for overcoming them.

Furthermore, equating all problem-solving with exposure therapy dilutes the latter’s specific therapeutic purpose. People often confront complex, non-irrational challenges that don’t benefit from the desensitization process; these require diverse strategies such as problem-solving, resilience-building, and seeking support—not a simple “face your fear” approach.

50:02 isn't that they become less afraid because that's been very carefully tested it's that they learn by watching
50:08 themselves expose themselves to the things that they once fleed from that there's more to them than they think and
50:14 that that generalizes across situations and it's the same mechanism that underlies learning as such because
50:21 children when they learn put themselves on the edge of ragged disaster and that's where they advance and so what

I wonder how many people [JBP] has screwed up with these ill conceived intuitive theories.
So you know, the best way to deal with food poisoning, is just adding a little more salmonella to every meal I guess. /sarcasm

2. Overextending “Generalization Across Situations”

"they learn by watching themselves expose themselves… and that generalizes across situations"
[JBP]'s notion that facing one fear teaches people to face all fears is, unfortunately, unsupported by psychological research. Generalization in psychological resilience typically does not occur through passive exposure alone. Facing one specific fear or challenge does not universally equip a person to handle unrelated fears. Even in exposure therapy, there’s no evidence that reducing fear in one area, like social anxiety, will enable a person to overcome a different fear, such as arachnophobia, without specific interventions.

3. Romanticizing “Ragged Disaster” as a Learning Condition

“children when they learn put themselves on the edge of ragged disaster…”
Here, [JBP] portrays learning as something that must be inherently risky, even perilous—a perspective that is simply inaccurate. Real-world education, particularly for children, thrives on supportive and structured environments. While challenges and minor risks can be productive, research consistently shows that secure and nurturing settings are more conducive to sustained learning than high-stress or chaotic ones.

For many students, environments resembling “the edge of ragged disaster”—whether due to socioeconomic instability, lack of resources, or unsafe surroundings—can impair focus, cognitive development, and emotional well-being. Learning, particularly in formal education, is most effective when curiosity, not fear, is the driving force.

4. Questionable Intuition-Based Theories on Learning and Bravery
[JBP]’s take veers into oversimplified “tough love” theories, which mistakenly assume that extreme adversity or disaster conditions foster resilience. Decades of educational psychology research illustrate that children learn best through curiosity-driven engagement, constructive feedback, and minimal stress—not “disaster edge” conditions. The assumption that bravery or resilience can be extrapolated from overcoming external disasters is a dangerous path in psychological practice, especially if applied carelessly in therapeutic settings.

5. Misplaced Sarcasm in Conflating Exposure with Harm

“the best way to deal with food poisoning, is just adding a little more salmonella”
The sarcasm here actually underscores a critical point. [JBP]’s view dangerously resembles this “poison cure” logic, implying that more exposure to “poisonous” elements or dangers toughens people up universally. However, in psychology, exposing someone to genuine harm doesn’t cure them but rather deepens trauma, mistrust, or avoidance behaviors. Constructive confrontation in therapy and life challenges should address specific goals, not recklessly endanger individuals under the guise of “building resilience.”

[JBP]’s assertions here aren’t merely flawed; they border on harmful. His misrepresentation of exposure therapy, lack of psychological nuance, and his glamorization of adversity show a stark detachment from evidence-based practices and a misapplication of resilience theory. True psychological growth does not come from throwing oneself or others into “ragged disaster,” and equating general life hardships with therapeutic exposure betrays a lack of understanding of both science and effective therapeutic practice. Clinically speaking of course.

50:27 God tells the Israelites essentially in this dramatic um en Endeavor is that
50:34 it's better for them to face the Terrors that confront them than to have than to be shielded from the Terrors or for them
50:40 to hide from them that there'll be better people if they face what's right in front of them even if it's poisonous
50:46 and so it's like okay that's pretty damn interesting and quite remarkable and then that symbol is used for example by
50:52 the Greeks to symbolize medicine as such but then there's this additional weird twist which is Christ identifies with
50:59 that bronze serpent you think okay that's a very peculiar thing for anyone to do what is exactly what exactly does
51:06 that mean well so then you might say well what's the most poisonous thing
51:11 that you could possibly face if you if you dramatized the idea of poison
51:18 itself if you wanted people to face what was worst so that they could become strongest and the answer to that is the
51:25 most unjust possible painful death and the ultimate confrontation with malevolence and that's what's dramatized
51:32 in the passion story now does that redeem everyone maybe maybe maybe the idea is that if we
51:40 were courageous enough to look death in the face unflinchingly and if we spent
51:45 our time putting our finger on the source of evil itself it would revital us Revitalize ourselves to a degree that
51:53 would be unimaginable now as a biologist you know you think about this too because I don't remember the philosopher
51:59 said it I think it was Whitehead but that might be wrong we let our ideas die instead of us right so human beings have
52:06 evolved so that we can undergo these deaths of our own ideas and the Rejuvenation that emerges in a in
52:12 consequence of that that seems to be something like Evolution towards what
52:19 towards the the process of sacrificial logos as the thing that redeems human
52:25 beings and that makes is biologically unique too cuz we can die in idation and
52:30 Imagination instead of dying in actuality does that fundamentally redeem us does that Deliver us from death and

Does any of this make any sense? Maybe. My attention started to wane at this point. I feel I have already spent too many hours on this already.

Inaccurate Analogies between Poison and Growth

"It's better for them to face the Terrors that confront them than to… hide from them…"
Here, [JBP] again oversimplifies. Facing fears can be constructive—but only under specific, controlled conditions. Exposure to genuine “poison” doesn’t create resilience; it causes harm. Even if we allow his interpretation as “facing hardship builds strength,” the concept doesn’t universally apply and should not be equated with any automatic or biological “truth.”

Bronze Serpent as a Symbol for Medicine and Christ
[JBP] equates Christ’s sacrificial role with the “poison as cure” philosophy, but this connection is tenuous. The symbol of the bronze serpent—used in medicine—was adopted much later and across cultures, not as some archetypal symbol of sacrifice but simply as a visual for healing. Trying to attach this to the crucifixion is an interpretative leap.
Misconstruing Intellectual Evolution as Biological Evolution

"We let our ideas die instead of us…"
He’s now venturing into a metaphor that mistakes intellectual growth for biological evolution. We “let ideas die” not because it’s an innate biological imperative but because, intellectually, we update our understanding. This isn’t “dying” or sacrificing our ideas for survival, and it’s certainly not a form of biological evolution.

The Exhausting Gish Gallop

"…evolution towards the process of sacrificial logos…"
This is a whirlwind of half-formed ideas. His phrase “sacrificial logos” is especially telling; it’s a grandiose, somewhat meaningless term meant to sound profound without truly conveying anything coherent. Logos, as understood in philosophy, is about rational order, not a “sacrificial process.”

In Summary: [JBP] strings together mythological elements, psychological tropes, and pseudo-biology to create what appears deep but ultimately collapses under scrutiny. And perhaps our own waning interest in picking apart this section reflects that natural response to intellectual inconsistency.

maybe maybe maybe

52:38 evil maybe like the job isn't done obviously [AO] Richard the story that we've just heard
52:45 the Old Testament bronze serpent it's it's it's rhyming with the with the New
52:50 Testament uh Christ depicting himself is that bronze serpent I think from Jordan if I may as Richard suggests
52:57 um from what I've heard you say before on this same story there's something about that um that Harmony between that
53:05 New Testament Jesus and that Old Testament story which is so profound and so impressive that it's difficult to
53:11 imagine it having sort of naive human authorship what do you make of that story and of that assertion [RD] well it
53:18 doesn't impress me I mean I I don't understand why you would say that has I don't think Jordan
53:24 actually said it had divine inspiration maybe he did um [AO] not divine
53:30 inspiration necessarily but more than just as I say naive human authorship not like someone just sat [JBP] at minimum it's a
53:36 it's a staggeringly brilliant literary move especially given the fact that that
53:42 relationship hasn't been explicated before [AO] do you think for example if you were looking in scripture for something
53:49 which would identify this as a as a god-given text maybe you as a scientist would look for some scientific
53:55 information it might have told you the shape of DNA or something like that but do you think Jord actually thinks yeah
54:00 we can perhaps get on to that but do you think that a literary uh Brilliance of a similar kind or a similar intensity that
54:08 if the Bible is not a scientific text you might be looking for something which some scientific fact which it couldn't have Otherwise Known is it possible that
54:14 some kind of Genius moral move or literary move could also indicate that this is this is something more
54:20 impressive [RD] you more or less ask me whether what what would impress me and and and I'm a naive literalist and so I
54:26 would say um if if any Prophet had said something
54:31 like um the the world is just one object
54:36 in um rotating around the Sun something like that they never do I mean it's it's always there some kind of moral lesson
54:43 which leaves me cold [AO] well why is it that there is no I mean they say that God
54:48 meets you where you're at right and there are some people who just care about scientific truth that's that's
54:54 what they know that's their profession why is there not anything in the Bible for them [JBP] oh I think the idea that
55:00 sacrifice is the basis of the community is a remarkable uh and scientifically
55:05 valid hypothesis I think that it's precisely akin to the uh what would you
55:11 say to the process of cortical maturation I think they're the same thing because as we mature we move
55:18 farther away from the immediate gratification of our of our
55:24 self-centered emotional and motivational needs to a ethos of care that brings our
55:31 future self into the picture and a wider and wider array of other people and I
55:37 think that's associated with cortical maturation in fact I think the purpose of the cortex the purpose a purpose of
55:45 the cortex is to bring the Dynamics of the shortsighted underlying motivational
55:52 and emotional systems into the kind of Harmony that allows for communal existence and the protection of the
55:59 future at the same time that the present is what would you say cared for and and
56:05 attended to that there's a kind of Harmony there there's also a pattern there it's not arbitrary at all and I
56:10 think we know this biologically is that the number of ways and I think we already alluded to this the number of
56:17 ways that a society can organize itself so that each individual can harmonize
56:23 their own future with the present and do that simultaneous with many other people that's a very there's a very limited
56:29 Universe of possibilities there very limited Universe [AO] Richard asked you before about the difference between a

The divine and the mundane, the biological reality of dragons

56:35 story or an idea naturally evolving over the course of numerous manuscripts and throughout
56:41 human history and the idea of it being divinely inspired and you were seeming to imply that these are almost
56:46 interchangeable Concepts now if that's the case when you say that this this
56:53 Divine Spirit behind the Bible is actually just the way that it has evolved throughout the human history
56:59 throughout the different manuscripts that we've had then saying that that is what Divinity is I think for you may
57:06 drag the mundane up into the realm of divinity but I think for people like Richard and for many people listening
57:11 what it doesn't said is drags the Divine down to the realm of the mundane [RD] very well put
57:17 yes
57:24 --- SO MANY ADS ---
57:29 --- SO MANY ADS ---
57:35 --- SO MANY ADS ---
57:42 --- SO MANY ADS ---
57:49 --- SO MANY ADS --- The real reason [JBP] tries to be controversial.
57:55 --- SO MANY ADS ---
58:01 --- SO MANY ADS ---
58:07 --- SO MANY ADS ---
58:13 --- SO MANY ADS ---
58:20 --- SO MANY ADS ---
58:27 well I don't know why it would drag the the Divine down into the realm of the mundane if we're speaking of something
58:34 like a the straight narrow path of Harmony between
58:41 multiple multiple modes of being I don't think it doesn't make any difference to me whether it's the material reaching
58:47 upward or the Divine descending downward I don't think there's any difference between those two things [RD] you don't that's exactly right that's the problem
58:54 I don't you don't see the difference [JBP] look look look at it this way so for example in in this conversation you you
59:00 you know this to be the case like there's various ways that this conversation could go sideways right
59:05 seriously like we could either of us could try to win either of us could try
59:10 to demonstrate our intellectual superiority right each of us could misrepresent the other or we could both
59:18 try and I do think we are in fact trying that and I think Alex is helping along with that just just fine we could try to
59:25 follow the thread of the exploratory truth and see if we could get somewhere now I don't think there is any
59:31 difference between that by the way and what's expressed in the biblical text as the spirit of the logos that's why we
59:37 have dialogue [RD] I'm very interested in the possibility that truths emerge through
59:44 evolving manuscripts now that's a very interesting idea and it's totally different from divine inspiration and I
59:51 I want to pursue it because I don't believe in divine inspiration but I would be prepared to believe in evolving
59:58 manuscript [JBP] well I would say well I would say this is why I had uh set forward the
1:00:05 possibility of taking a look particularly at merer alata because that's where you'd find the best work
1:00:11 he's a he's brilliant the history of I believe that if you study the history of
1:00:17 religious ideas it's a three volume manuscript or the sacred in the profane which is probably his single best work
1:00:22 that you'd see profound analogies between the manner in which you've been construing the world biologically
1:00:29 including the trains of thought that led you to the development of the idea of the meme I really believe that [RD] well
1:00:35 analogies is one thing but but is it the same thing [JBP] I think it's the same I do I think look I don't know that's why I'd
1:00:42 like your opinion on it you know well seriously like it's a complicated question I've talked
1:00:48 to it's a complicated question most people don't know both literatures there's not a lot of people to discuss
1:00:55 this sort of thing with P I talked to Camille P about this she studied the work of a man named Eric noyman noyman
1:01:02 wrote a book called the history Origins and history of Consciousness which is a work of genius and also another book
1:01:07 called the great mother which is study of the symbolism of the feminine it's a great book Pia told me that she believed
1:01:13 that if the academy would have turned to Eric nyman who's a student of jung
1:01:19 although the greatest student of jung and maybe one who surpassed him that the entire culture War that's torn the
1:01:25 universities apart wouldn't have happened people don't know this literature and it's it's it's let let
1:01:32 let me give you an example this you tell me what you think about this okay so I I spent a fair bit of time studying
1:01:39 the psychophysiology of the hypothalamus okay so the hypothalamus is set up it's it's got two halves basically one half
1:01:47 deals with fundamental motivated States hunger thirst defensive aggression sexuality and so forth and when those
1:01:55 areas are dominated the biologically relevant goal is activated and perceptions are
1:02:01 oriented towards that goal okay so now then you might ask yourself well what happens if all those biologically
1:02:07 motivated states are satiated and the answer seems to be is that the other
1:02:13 half of the hypothalamus kicks in and it mediates exploratory behavior and so the
1:02:19 default structure of the mamalian nervous system is if satiated or in
1:02:26 doubt explore and gather new information there's no difference between that and
1:02:31 hero mythology they are the same thing they're the same thing the the dragon fight for example which is the oldest
1:02:37 story we have it's it's coded in the Mesopotamian mythology the dragon fight
1:02:42 story is explore the dangerous unknown discover the treasure that revitalizes
1:02:48 the community there's no difference between that and the science that you practice they're the same thing [AO] what do

Well this is super annoying, first those are not the functions of the Hypothalamus(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hypothalamus) in the brain, all of his biological explanations for behavior are incorrect, and he is doing that very annoying non-duality thing of pretending everything is the same thing. It's interesting how agitated he gets, but it's not dissimilar from a confidence man trying to convince people with the force of his emphasis via bodylanguage.

I guess since everything is the same thing, that Marduk, the offspring of Enki and Damgalnunna, is also Jesus. why not? if everything is the same thing. Why can't Jesus be a Mesopotamian dragon ?

Peterson’s “Dragon Fight” as Biological Heroism “…the dragon fight story is…explore the dangerous unknown, discover the treasure that revitalizes the community. There’s no difference between that and the science you practice…”
The hypothalamus does indeed help with basic survival functions (hunger, thirst, fight/flight, etc.), but it’s nowhere near as mythically inclined as [JBP] implies. By suggesting that these survival mechanisms equate to “heroic exploration,” [JBP] commits one of his usual errors: mistaking a cognitive process for a grand moral or mythological one. Fighting a literal or metaphorical “dragon” might inspire a good story, but it’s not the brain’s raison d'être.
Equating Hypothalamus Functions to Hero Narratives “…when those biologically relevant goals are activated and perceptions are oriented towards that goal…”
In the biological world, these “motivated states” [JBP] talks about are purely functional. Survival doesn’t carry an implicit “hero’s journey” as he claims. He’s romanticizing the hypothalamus’s role, creating a laughable anthropomorphizing of brain functions.
Conflating Mythology with Neuroscience “There’s no difference between myth and the science that you practice; they are the same thing.”
Here, [JBP] takes a leap from metaphor to non-duality, a classic trick of deflecting real inquiry by saying that all things, in their essence, are “the same.” This dismissal of essential distinctions between fields like neuroscience, cultural studies, and mythology gives him the rhetorical freedom to suggest that he’s making deep points. But in reality, he’s just blending unrelated ideas with a narrative sleight of hand.
Blurring Cultural Lines by Enlisting Marduk and Jesus [JBP]'s “anything-is-everything” thesis could theoretically equate Jesus with Marduk. If everything is the “same” mythologically speaking, why not draw from any cultural hero or god-figure, blending Mesopotamian mythology with Christian iconography?
The Oversimplified Hero’s Journey
> “The dragon fight story is…revitalizes the community…”
[JBP] is universalizing the “hero’s journey” without regard for cultural specificity or historical context. This flattening effect makes every struggle, from existential philosophy to everyday challenges, a kind of “mythic battle.” It’s reductive, to say the least. Campbell’s “hero’s journey” model was never meant to be a biological roadmap but a storytelling framework. Yet [JBP] uses it as if it were an unchanging, “biological” truth.

In the end, [JBP] seems determined to squash all layers of myth, psychology, and neurobiology into a single, dramatic view. It’s like mythic relativism—an excuse to over-interpret, to play fast and loose with biology, neuroscience, and history. And when challenged, he defaults to abstract vagaries about harmony and “Divine order” as though the rhetoric itself were truth.

By the time we’ve waded through this quagmire of grandiose assertions, it’s clear why [RD] was unimpressed. None of these assertions withstand genuine scrutiny. It’s fascinating in its performative insistence but ultimately devoid of grounding in either scientific or philosophical integrity.

Sometimes a dragon is just a dragon, and sometimes, misinterpreting myth as science does not make for a hero’s journey. Rather, it’s intellectual drag.

1:02:54 you think the same story [RD] I don't know what to make of that I mean um you say they they're the same story
1:03:01 you you you analogized the the dragon fight to [JBP] how many dragons have you
1:03:06 overcome in your life [RD] I'm not interested in Dragons I'm interested in real in reality [JBP] okay so let's let's Okay so I I
1:03:14 read a book a while back that described the described the uh the biological
1:03:21 reality of the dragon say well there's no such thing as a dragon it's like okay it's is there such a thing as a predator
1:03:27 [RD] of course [JBP] well that's that's a meta category what's the category of Predator
1:03:34 bear eagle if you're a primate fire is fire a predator [RD] no [JBP] well it's complicated
1:03:41 because a fire kills you okay so is there a worse Predator than Serpentine
1:03:47 flying fire breathing reptile is that not the imagistic equivalent of Predator
1:03:54 so is so in what way if Predator is real in what way isn't dragon real doesn't take that much imagination to to see the

ok, I am pretty sure [JBP] has lost it. Because he just said, that dragons exist, because the category of predator exists.
So if the abstract category of predatory animals exists, therefore dragons exist.
I don't think it's possible to be more unscientific than that. That's not just an offence to science, it's an offence to logic itself.

Peterson’s “Biological Reality of Dragons”

“...so is there a worse Predator than a Serpentine flying fire-breathing reptile...”
Here, we see [JBP] going down a rabbit hole—or rather, into a dragon’s lair—where he argues that dragons must exist because the category “predator” exists. This is a direct affront to scientific logic and one of the most imaginative examples of category conflation I’ve seen. If anything with claws or sharp teeth evokes a “dragon,” then language has truly lost its meaning in his world.

[JBP] seems to have forgotten that categories like “predator” are built to help us understand real-world taxonomy, not to morph imaginary creatures into biological facts. The reality check? Dragons are entirely symbolic. We don’t need dragons to understand “predator,” just like we don’t need unicorns to understand the idea of a horse.

Abstract Categories vs. Literal Existence
> “…so in what way, if ‘predator’ is real, in what way isn’t dragon real?”

[JBP]’s reasoning here is like saying that because “war” exists, then “orcs” and “goblins” must also exist because they fit within the category of antagonistic forces. It’s a dazzling failure to grasp basic semantics and logic: categories like “predator” or “danger” are abstractions. They help us group real things (like lions or storms) rather than conjure mythic creatures into reality.

1:04:02 identity and then wouldn't the fundamental task of edible primates be
1:04:07 to figure out how to overcome the dragon forever [RD] I don't know why you say dragon I mean we have L we have tigers we have
1:04:13 Sabertooth we have why not out there right but why not abstract because it's
1:04:18 for the same reason that we have the term Predator like we have the term bear lion comodo dragon well you make an
1:04:26 amalgamation you saywell the the relevant set of features is an image
1:04:31 well what's the image Predator as such what's the image of that the dragon that
1:04:37 never disappears and then there's a Twist on that which is so cool it's so interesting because you can imagine
1:04:43 rabbit mythology which would be something like Predator appears freeze

Rabbits run when they see predators, they don't freeze. But that doesn't really matter because none of this makes any sense.
THIS IS WHAT HAPPENS WHEN YOU DON'T KNOW WHAT TRUTH OR FACTS ARE.
Then suddenly, flying dragons are real because animals exist! everything is the same!
I wonder if this could be termed "non-dual derangement"

The Rabbit-Freezes vs. Human-Hunts Dichotomy
> “…you can imagine rabbit mythology… Predator appears, freeze, but that’s not the human story.”

As pointed out, rabbits don’t simply “freeze”—they often flee when a predator appears. [JBP]’s portrayal here suggests he’s just ad-libbing animal behavior to fit his analogy. And his leap to “the human story” being about hunting predators for treasure is pure fantasy.

Humans as a species were driven by survival instincts, not mythic quests for treasure. The idea that every predator confrontation has some hidden treasure is a reach—our ancestors hunted out of necessity, not for some valorous quest [JBP] seems to envision. Most hunting was about survival, not overcoming an inner dragon or searching for a mythical gold hoard.

1:04:48 but that's not the human Story the human story is predator appears there's a treasure
1:04:54 somewhere right that's completely that's a completely different pathway of of
1:04:59 evolutionary significance like the way that we construe The World Isn't freeze like Predator it's like oh there's a
1:05:05 predator maybe there's something valuable lurking in our conflict with it
1:05:10 you know our sticks in our Spears that enable our fragile bodies to stand up against the dragons of the world so a

So remember kids, if a Komodo dragon starts chasing you and trying to eat you, it's time to look for it's treasure! because Komodo dragons are often hiding pots of gold I guess. Leprachauns, dragons, ITS THE SAME THING! /sarcasm

Is this a Dragon?

Confusing Evolutionary Significance with Narrative Tropes
> “…there’s a predator, maybe there’s something valuable lurking in our conflict with it…”

This line of thought confuses the pragmatics of early human survival with fantastical hero narratives. Humans didn’t evolve “to face dragons” for treasure; they developed strategies to survive actual threats, like lions or harsh environments, to avoid extinction. Realistically, people saw threats as obstacles to be avoided, not invitations to go treasure-hunting in caves.

“Non-Dual Derangement” [JBP]’s whole riff here could indeed be seen as “non-dual derangement”—where distinctions dissolve to the point that real-world categories blend nonsensically with mythological creatures. By ignoring the boundaries of metaphor, he creates a world where symbols overtake reality, leaving us adrift in his imagination.

In the end, [JBP]’s desperate attempts to make mythology biologically and psychologically real create a whirlpool of contradiction. He’s taken the concept of symbolic “dragons” in our lives—challenges, fears, trials—and reified them as biologically real entities. This segment is such a hilarious break from logic that it’s like he’s cut his last anchor to reality.

1:05:17 [AO] dragon is a pictoral representation of the abstracted concept of a predator yes
1:05:22 as you say we already have the term predator and so it be useful in art in narrative to I mean you can't paint an
1:05:29 abstraction [JBP] we had the image way before we had the word [AO] sure okay no [JBP] but but that's a seriously important thing to

How the heck could you have the image of the dragon before the word of the dragon, IF NO ONE HAS ACTUALLY SEEN A DRAGON IN REAL LIFE. There is a reason they are called mythical beasts. The myth had to exist before the image, the image could not have preceded the description of something which does not exist.

This is an extraordinary misstep in logic. How does one imagine a dragon, a creature that has never existed, without first hearing or reading descriptions that lead to such a visualization? The concept of “dragon” emerged from ancient myth, folklore, and descriptions from storytellers—not as some archetypal premonition our ancestors encountered in the wild! This reversal of idea-before-image defies all reason; it’s as if he’s trying to say that mythology spontaneously manifested itself without language. Even myths have to be transmitted with words, after all!

1:05:36 understand [AO] but now we have the word we have the word predator and maybe if we were doing art maybe if we were all going to sort of draw a picture or tell
1:05:42 a story we wanted to invent a story to give our children a good moral message we might invent this dragon or use this
1:05:48 dragon as [JBP] well we do always we do it continually we do it with Harry Potter we do it with the Lord of the Rings we
1:05:54 do it with the avengers [AO] when you say [JBP] escaping from [AO] but when you say the biology of a
1:06:01 dragon you must understand how that can be misleading as to as to the the Enterprise that you're engaging in
1:06:06 because we're talking here about narrative we're talking here about art we're talking here about uh representations in literature [JBP] I don't
1:06:12 think the category of dragon is any less valid than the category of lion [AO] any less
1:06:17 biological [JBP] well it depends on your level of analysis we have the term Predator which implies that all predators have
1:06:24 something in common because otherwise we wouldn't have the term it's like there's no reason to assume ontological priority
1:06:30 for the category of lion over the category of Predator like it it depends on you all that would determine which of
1:06:37 those terms should be used is the purpose towards which the conceptualization is being directed if
1:06:42 you want to identify a particular class of Predator well then lion is a good term you would say that lions are an
1:06:49 instantiation of this bracket term of Predator [JBP] well I would also say [AO] would you
1:06:54 therefore say that a lion is an instantiation of the Bracket term of dragon
1:07:00 [JBP] yes yes because see because we're not only fact oriented creatures right it
1:07:07 actually matters to us whether we get eaten like there's it's one thing to lay out the nomenclature of the animal
1:07:13 kingdom it's another thing to remember that Predators can eat you and then it's another thing and this is very interesting and it's relevant to that

I think [JBP] is trying to cause peoples brains to explode because of how little sense this makes, lions are defintely not a type of dragon, even according to mythology. And yet, it's only the beginning of a remarkably nonsensical gish gallop, let's see where he takes it.

The absurdity is almost comical here. Categories like “lion” are based on biological taxonomy, observable anatomy, and the actual experience of encountering a lion. Dragons, on the other hand, are mythological constructs, stories without empirical evidence. Lions exist within a scientific classification; dragons exist in stories. Equating the two is, simply put, a categorical error of mythic proportions.

The Incoherent Gish Gallop into “Bracket Terms”
> “There’s no reason to assume ontological priority for the category of lion over the category of predator.”

[JBP] is spiraling into a gish gallop here, trying to justify the abstraction by muddying basic categorization logic. “Predator” is a functional term for animals that hunt, not a metaphysical equalizer where lions and dragons can be swapped at will. Saying a lion is a "subset" of dragon defies not only biology but rationality. He’s effectively arguing that since both have predatory qualities, they’re categorically interchangeable—a feat of linguistic gymnastics that serves only to confound.

“Dragons Are Instantiations of Predators”
> “Would you say that a lion is an instantiation of the Bracket term of dragon?” “Yes, yes…”

[JBP] here endorses the ridiculous claim that a lion is a subset of “dragon.” This takes his earlier assertion to a new level of absurdity. He’s implying that the mythical dragon is some grand archetype of predation, rather than a fantastic creature inspired by cultural fears and curiosities. This is like saying that because all cars have wheels, Formula 1 cars and bicycles must be categorically interchangeable!

The "Dragons Can Eat You" Non Sequitur
> “Predators can eat you… so dragons are relevant because we need to remember predators can eat you.”

This argument sounds like a riddle concocted by a trickster philosopher. He’s conflating an imaginary predator’s function with a real predator’s behavior, as if the fear of being eaten by a dragon somehow impacts our understanding of the natural world. It’s like suggesting that if you can drown, the Loch Ness Monster must be real—because they’re both associated with bodies of water!

This is one of [JBP]’s more baffling mental contortions. By stretching myth into biology, he ends up in a place where words no longer mean anything. Dragons aren’t “the ultimate predator archetype”—they’re mythological embodiments of human fears and fantasies, created by cultures to explain mysteries, but they certainly don’t occupy the same reality as lions or bears.

1:07:20 story of The Bronze serpent it's like what do we want to teach our children well to identify ify Predators obviously
1:07:27 well what do we want to teach them more profoundly What attitude they should take towards the Eternal fact of the
1:07:34 predator and the attitude they should take is something like the courage to voluntarily confront and not to run away
1:07:40 and not to hide and not to freeze and not to casually demonize but to assume
1:07:46 that in the combat with the Eternal Predator an eternal treasure might be found that's exactly what you do whether
1:07:52 you know it or not when you teach a child to be courageous and that and we know from the psychological literature
1:07:58 that generalizes and I do think it's identical with the mechanism of learning in human beings because kids us we
1:08:06 always learn on the edge you know and in your own life I know and I don't want to
1:08:12 be presumptuous but no doubt there have been situations
1:08:17 where you've been battling to have your ideas distributed even to modify your
1:08:23 own conceptions when you had something new to learn that's a sacrifice you have to kill your stupidity so that you can
1:08:30 move forward that's what happens in the story of Abraham by the way when he makes sequential sacrifices so in in the
1:08:36 story of Abraham you tell me what you think about this because it staggered me when I understood it Abraham is a
1:08:43 protected person he doesn't have to lift a finger he lives in the Socialist Utopia he's got everything delivered
1:08:49 hand to mouth he's at home till he's 70 and God comes to him as the voice of Adventure which is something remarkable
1:08:56 to see and says you leave your zone of comfort and go out into the world have your terrible adventure and Abraham says
1:09:03 yes and then a series of cataclysms occurs around him just like it does in
1:09:09 every adventurous life and every time an episode concludes he makes a sacrifice
1:09:15 why to get rid of what's stupid and old about him so that he can progress and
1:09:20 transform and that happens to such a degree that he gets a new name which means he's changed so dramatically he's
1:09:26 not even the person he used to be and that's a consequence of following that adventurous pathway and that's all coded
1:09:33 in the story [RD] I think we just have to agree that we have different kinds of minds and you're interested in symbols
1:09:40 and I'm interested in facts I mean let me let's take Predators I mean Predators I'm fascinated by predators predators
1:09:46 are the relationship between predators and prey is an arms race an evolutionary
1:09:51 arms race and whenever you see a really complicated beautifully designed piece
1:09:58 of biology what um Hume I think uh one
1:10:03 one of hum's characters called things that ravish in into admiration all who contemplate them this is almost
1:10:10 certainly the result of an arms race probably between predators and prey could be between parasites and and hosts
1:10:16 and so um if we are talking about adaptations to just the climate Wooly
1:10:24 rhinoceros es grow hair because it's getting cold that's relatively boring
1:10:30 but when it's an adaptation to a predator then you get an escalation of
1:10:36 adaptations by prey which are counted by Predators which are counted by prey counted by so you get a gradual
1:10:42 escalation now that's interesting that that that explains why you have animals
1:10:48 that run fast why they have keen sense organs why they have teeth why they have sharp teeth why they have have um
1:10:56 Behavior patterns that that either protect them from predators or if they're Predators help them to catch
1:11:02 prey the the idea of the arms race is the thing that grabs me the arms race
1:11:08 between nothing to do with dragons and [JBP] so okay so fair enough right and and I

I am glad [RD] stopped the crazy train and just decided to shovel all that under the rubric of obsession with symbolism. Though to me, it seems the problems are deeper than that. To the point where he would have difficulty understanding causal relationships within reality. Lost in narratives, disconnected from reality.

“The Courage to Confront the Eternal Predator”
> “What attitude they should take towards the Eternal fact of the predator…”

This language is fascinatingly ominous. By turning “predators” into this monolithic, capitalized “Eternal Predator,” he’s not just over-dramatizing; he’s effectively creating a bogeyman—a mythic figure rather than a real threat. This “eternal predator” language transforms the everyday adaptive behaviors seen in nature into something that sounds more like a cosmic adversary. It’s no surprise this resonates with him; it sounds grandiose and all-consuming. But for anyone grounded in reality, this shifts way off-base, more appropriate for a fantasy novel than for serious discussion of how we or other species interact with predators.

The Abraham Story as Socialist Critique?
> “Abraham is a protected person… he lives in the Socialist Utopia… God comes to him as the voice of Adventure…”

This take is… wild, to say the least. [JBP] is somehow conflating the journey of a biblical figure with a critique of socialism, as if Abraham’s story is a parable about leaving “comfort zones” and venturing into some capitalist adventure. But biblically speaking, Abraham isn’t some proto-capitalist yearning to flee a cushy socialist life; he’s a figure called by God to test his faith. The equation of this ancient narrative with modern political constructs feels more like he’s forcing a square peg into a round hole for ideological reasons rather than offering genuine insight.

RD’s Timely Interjection: Symbolism vs. Reality
> “I think we just have to agree that we have different kinds of minds… you’re interested in symbols, and I’m interested in facts.”

[RD] has pinpointed a critical issue: [JBP]’s entire approach is symbolic to a fault. By relying on symbols for everything, he obscures the actual facts with philosophical narratives that don’t necessarily reflect reality. [RD] highlights that this symbolic thinking has limits, especially when it leads one to see mythical dragons as embodiments of real predators, rather than as mythological constructs.

The Absurdity of “Meme Battles” and “Classes of Predators”
> “We transformed the battle with the Predator into a meme battle… with the class of all possible Predators.”

Here, we have peak [JBP]: turning a biological reality into a "meta-ethic" by framing it as a “meme battle.” This approach reduces the real-world understanding of predation to a cerebral exercise, abstracting actual threats to a point where they’re no longer relevant to lived experience. By his logic, even discussing actual predators becomes unnecessary since they’re now grouped into this mythical “class.” This might sound academic but actually depersonalizes and diminishes real threats by turning them into theoretical bogeymen.

“The Class of All Possible Predators” as Potentially Dangerous Rhetoric
> “The appropriate way to deal with the class of all possible Predators is something like a meta-ethic…”

[JBP]’s idea of needing an “appropriate way to deal” with this broad category of “all possible predators” feels dangerously close to an “us vs. them” mindset. Reducing complexity into oversimplified binaries is what mythologizing does, and it’s disquieting that he suggests we might need a “solution” for the “class of all possible Predators.” His language risks reinforcing an us-against-the-other mentality, whether he’s aware of it or not.

1:11:15 share your appreciation for that remarkable what what the remarkable
1:11:21 phenomena that emerge in consequence of that okay so let's take the idea of arms race all right so we here's how I would
1:11:29 construe what I said in what I think might be your terms okay all right we transformed the battle with the Predator
1:11:37 into a meme battle we abstracted it so that we could figure out how to deal not
1:11:43 with a predator but with the class of all possible Predators right exactly and
1:11:49 the appropriate way to deal with the class of all possible Predators is something like a meta ethic it's a
1:11:54 stance that let let me give you an example of this we actually know something about this psychophysiologically and you can look
1:12:00 at it spiritually or physically and it doesn't matter so for example if you take people in

Clearly nothing matters at this point, because the class of "all possible predators" would include humans, and [JBP] is advocating for to find "an appropriate way to deal with the class of all possible Predators" which sounds like he might be heading into "final solution" territory … but hey, it's okay, because he is using large words like psychophysiologically, so you know this is "scientific" even though he seems to have something against science, and he started with dragons.

The Invocation of “Psychophysiologically”
> “We actually know something about this psychophysiologically, and you can look at it spiritually or physically, and it doesn’t matter.”

When [JBP] invokes “psychophysiology” here, it comes across as an empty appeal to scientific authority. Inserting terms like “psychophysiologically” or “meta-ethic” doesn’t make his ideas more grounded—it only obfuscates. Saying it “doesn’t matter” whether we examine these things “spiritually or physically” is a way to sidestep the actual need for scientific rigor or philosophical clarity, dressing up vague ideas with academic jargon.

This entire passage could almost serve as a case study in “non-dual derangement” as coined, where categories dissolve until words lose meaning. By conflating myth with biology, using philosophical terms without precise meaning, and painting abstraction as if it’s scientific, [JBP] has reduced genuine human experience to a detached, overly theoretical mess.

1:12:07 Psychotherapy and they're accidentally exposed to something they're afraid of they they have a stress response that's
1:12:14 damaging if it's sustained and they become more frightened but if you expose them to exactly the same stressor and
1:12:22 they do it voluntarily they manifest it an entirely different pattern of psychophysiological activation okay and
1:12:29 it's it's a it's a it's a stance of challenge right and not of fear all
1:12:34 right and so what are the things that you're doing in Psychotherapy when you get people to expose themselves to you
1:12:40 could say Predators because that's an accurate way of dealing with it is that you get them to shift into a mode of

So if someone is afraid of the dark, the way to deal with it, is by treating darkness as a predator. /sarcasm

Here, he tries to extend his obsession with “predators” into the realm of psychotherapy, which is bizarre. Treating anxiety, phobias, or even PTSD is not about identifying a “predator” and summoning bravery. In legitimate psychotherapy, effective treatments like Cognitive Behavioral Therapy (CBT) rely on rethinking patterns and responses, not categorizing abstract threats as beasts to slay.

1:12:46 voluntary confrontation instead of pray like apprehension and Retreat and what
1:12:51 they learn from that is that they can embody that pattern which I would call a spirit metaphysically they can embody
1:12:57 that they can practice it it's also the case there's some evidence that there's epigenetic consequences of that if you
1:13:04 practice that process of voluntary confrontation with the terrible unknown
1:13:09 it can catalyze Transformations that reach all the way down into the cellular and so we we abstracted the
1:13:18 fight with The Predator into the imaginal space we play out various
1:13:23 tactics some of them are conserved and transmitted they adapt themselves to the
1:13:28 structure of human memory and they make the foundation for our most fundamental narratives look you know the the the
1:13:36 reference I made to Harry Potter the reference I made to the Lord of the Rings and to The Avengers these aren't
1:13:41 casual references you know we spend most of our computational high-end
1:13:47 computational power generating fictional worlds where we can portray meme battles
1:13:54 so that everyone can observe them [AO]yes so lion as genetic dragon as memetic Richard

No, not everything is social media. Those of us who are not idiots, spend most of our computational high-end computational power doing something philosophical, or science. Not everyone wastes all their time in culture war meme battles on social media, nor does that take high-end computational power, unless you are referring to using AI to generate memes. But I know he is trying to refer to the pudding between his ears that oozed out these various lines of nonsense. That is low end computation.

The invocation of “epigenetic consequences” here is jaw-droppingly ungrounded. True, experiences can affect gene expression, but that’s a far cry from saying imagined battles with dragons have cellular impacts. This is pseudoscience, dressed up in jargon that sounds “sciency” but lacks actual substance or basis in medical research.

[JBP]’s claim that we dedicate “high-end computational power” to fictional narratives like Harry Potter or The Avengers reflects a troubling disconnect. He’s casting all intellectual work as culture war theater—“meme battles” for the masses, which distorts the value of real science and philosophy. This worldview limits everything to popular culture, as if the most significant use of human thought is just abstract mythic conflict.

1:14:01 the this concept of the dragon as the abstracted Predator as a
1:14:07 whole can we talk meaningfully about the truth in these stories where instead of
1:14:13 talking about a predator or this predator or that Predator we're talking about the concept of Predator meme yes
1:14:19 [JBP] dragon's a meme [RD]yeah [JBP] it's a deep meme [RD]well it it doesn't get me doesn't
1:14:26 impress me I mean I I like reality and and um um it obviously impresses Jordan

To recap, dragons are both lions and memes, and lions are memes I guess, and all of these things exist because the abstract category of predators exists. therefore we need to poison people little by little to make them stronger. /sarcasm

I have to say, I was skeptical of [RD] using the term mind virus at the very beginning, but there isn't a better description of what [JBP] is putting out here.

Declaring “dragon” as a “deep meme” is a creative way to legitimize the concept in modern language, but it’s ultimately meaningless. Memes are ideas or behaviors that spread, but they are rooted in social or cultural contexts, not fundamental truths. By framing the dragon as a meme, [JBP] is trying to elevate a fictional archetype to the level of universal symbol with real-world impact, which again, is only impressive until one remembers dragons are mythical.

[RD] brings it all back to earth, highlighting the crux of this entire exchange: [JBP] is in love with abstractions, while [RD] stays grounded in evidence-based reality. [JBP]’s attempts to dress myth in pseudo-scientific language don’t fool anyone who values fact over fiction.

This observation is spot-on. [JBP]’s arguments veer into the absurd, weaving pseudophilosophy with myth as though doing so makes it profound. Ironically, he embodies what [RD] originally critiqued as a “mind virus”—not a genuine belief system but a catch-all abstraction that invites only confusion and warped meaning.

Different kinds of minds, the logical extension of memes

1:14:32 and that's fine it it just we have a different kind of mind I think [JBP] well I I had a comment about that too you know
1:14:37 because I actually think that's true so there's a psychological trait openness
1:14:44 and openness fractionates into two types one type of mind is associated with deep
1:14:49 interest in ideas people like that tend to prefer non-fiction a variant of that is openness proper and it's associated
1:14:57 with a much deeper orientation towards the fictional and metaphorical I do think we have different kinds of minds

[JBP] introduces this “openness” dichotomy to suggest that his approach is simply a more metaphorically inclined mind versus [RD]s' fact-based mind. But it’s a cop-out; what he’s essentially doing is sidestepping [RD]s’ demand for factual grounding. [JBP] misuses “openness” as if being drawn to fictional abstraction is equivalent to scientific inquiry. It’s not a matter of differing cognitive styles but of adherence to reality.

1:15:03 but but if we accept the presumption that there is a Unity of knowledge and I
1:15:09 don't I don't know if that's a presumption that you entertain or or presume or share because we could

He never actually describes what "unity of knowledge" means or is. He just likes using the term unity. The closest thing to that is Unity of Science which would exclude everything he has said, because everything he has said, is non-scientific. So it can't be that. Because he is specifically ignoring the evidence requirement aspects and thinks he can substitute those things with narrative, at which point it stops being science, and thus cannot be the unity of science. That specifically depends on coherence and non-contradiction. Pretending everything is the same thing using a non-dual method, is not the unity of knowledge.

Without defining what he means by “unity of knowledge,” [JBP] creates another smoke screen. Real “unity of knowledge” (like the philosophy of science approach) depends on coherence and consistency across facts, observations, and theories. But [JBP] seems to treat it as a melting pot where all ideas, however speculative, deserve equal footing—a distinctly postmodern move that, as you note, ignores evidence requirements and prioritizes narrative over truth.

1:15:15 discuss the alternative my sense is that those two Pathways have to unify now I
1:15:21 don't think we know how to unify them in the west that's why there is this conflict between the scientific and the religious it's not like I know how to
1:15:27 rectify that the best I can say is this is what I've learned from studying those stories but but I would also say because
1:15:33 I've studied your work I do believe that that idea that you formulated of meme is
1:15:38 exactly the same thing that merer Elliot is detailing out in his work and I think the reason that he's not attended to by
1:15:45 the university is because he's passe in the history of religious ideas is because everything he says demolishes the
1:15:52 postmodern marxists demolishes them which is something that seriously needs to be done and so I keep think I keep
1:15:58 hoping I think God it would be such a remarkable thing for Dr Dawkins to know especially iliad's work although Eric
1:16:05 neyman would be a close second because it takes the notion of meme which
1:16:12 is what was the recreation of the world in imaginal space and the transmission
1:16:17 of those Recreations and their potential battles that's what you specified and it
1:16:23 expands it out into something that ends across Millennia it's The Logical extension of your idea and it's not like
1:16:30 people know this because there aren't people who know both literatures [AO] so this idea of lion as me
1:16:39 lion as Gene dragon as meme I I I think in so
1:16:46 many words that that it sounds like that's sort of a summary of what you're getting at and I get the impression Richard that you might agree with the
1:16:52 idea that the dragon is an effective uh memetic abstraction of the concept of
1:16:58 individual Predators but it's just not that impressive [RD] yes [JBP]it's just not that impressive be impressive at the

This is a strawman dressed in academic regalia. [JBP] is consistently invoking “postmodern Marxists” as his unseen adversaries, yet Eliade’s work on myths doesn’t “demolish” postmodernism or Marxism—these are completely different realms of thought. [RD]s’ “meme” theory, too, was meant to describe the spread of cultural ideas, not act as some ideological sword against postmodernism. His insertion of political undertones here not only clouds the intellectual discussion but also hints at ideological signaling rather than substance.

> _“...lion as gene, dragon as meme…”_

This analogy is so clumsy it barely needs refutation. Genes are not analogous to lions any more than memes are to dragons. Lions are not “an abstraction of genetics”; they are simply species. Similarly, memes are broad cultural units, not stand-ins for mythical beasts. The analogies are entirely mismatched, and as [AO] suggests, it’s far from impressive. [JBP]’s attempts to elevate “dragon” to an essential cultural meme ignore the fact that its symbolism varies wildly across cultures—dragons have a distinct meaning in Chinese versus Western contexts, for instance, which [JBP] overlooks entirely.

I think [AO] is just trying to be a good lad and giving [JBP] a way to save face, because he defined dragons in so many different and incoherent ways, including biologically, and as various animals. There is already a term for predators, it's predators. Why there would be a need to invent a new term I have no idea, maybe it's a dog whistle thing.

[AO] gives [JBP] a face-saving out here, offering an olive branch by implying the abstraction of the dragon as a memetic stand-in is understandable yet unremarkable. [RD] agrees: there’s nothing inherently groundbreaking about abstracting predators into mythical figures or saying that “dragons represent all predators.” [RD]s’ patience here is admirable, pointing out that abstract metaphors don’t carry inherent truth just because they sound grandiose.

The dragon analogy could be a dog whistle isn’t unfounded, as [JBP] often couches socio-political ideas in metaphor. Here, “dragons” might indeed be a way of broadly labeling threats or enemies, allowing for a veiled criticism without specificity. It’s a linguistic trick often employed in populist rhetoric, creating villains that feel tangible yet remain abstract enough to dodge direct confrontation. The “dragon” then becomes a flexible symbol, easily applied to any perceived threat—just not in any scientifically or philosophically rigorous way.

1:17:05 same time that you are compelled and interested by the
1:17:10 idea of meme I mean let let me ask you a psychological question if you don't mind you're obviously welcome not to answer
1:17:17 it but there's a reason that the idea of meme gripped you and there's a reason it's spread it's because you put your
1:17:23 finger on something so can I can I ask you how that idea emerged and why it attracted you [RD] as a darwinian I'm
1:17:30 interested in the process of natural selection natural selection is the differential survival of replicating
1:17:38 entities DNA is a very excellent replicating entity which is whose
1:17:44 replication and selection has given rise to the whole of life on Earth I wanted to make the point that DNA is not the
1:17:53 only possible replication you could imagine uh there might be on other there
1:17:59 probably is on other planets um a different kind of replicator not DNA and
1:18:04 then I thought maybe we don't have to go to other planets maybe there's another replicator staring Us in the face the
1:18:12 virus of the mind um something that spreads not by DNA replication but by
1:18:19 imitation from mind to mind so it could be a fashion in clothes it could be a musical sty it could be an accent a
1:18:26 speech accent it could be um a a children's game that spread through
1:18:33 school all all these things are replicators which spread by a non-
1:18:38 gentic means and might therefore potentially be the basis for a form of
1:18:44 darwinian selection yep that darwinian selection would be popularity uh the the spreadability of
1:18:51 an idea the longevity of an idea yes vity of an of an idea the spread the
1:18:56 spreadability the Fidelity of it of the idea um [JBP] how about the grip of Motivation
1:19:02 by the idea like would you expect [RD] okay that that's that's a possibility uh and
1:19:09 I would even concede that that an an archetype might be a one way in which certain memes might spread more than
1:19:15 others it might be compatible with a with a with a with a jungian archetype so
1:19:22 that that's my answer to the to the question it was coming at it as a darwinian and wanting to make the point
1:19:28 that DNA probably having spent the whole rest of the book stressing the gene as
1:19:33 the unit of selection I want to make the point that it may not be the only [JBP] one okay okay so so that's what I understood

[RD], true to form, gives a lucid explanation of memes as cultural replicators. His focus is purely on observable spread patterns, like language accents or popular music—memes that propagate without a genetic mechanism. [JBP], however, keeps trying to force the Jungian archetype lens over this Darwinian concept, hoping to imbue [RD]s’ clear and secular meme theory with a quasi-spiritual undercurrent. By inserting “the grip of motivation,” [JBP] tries to imply that certain memes are somehow innately archetypal or universally powerful, without evidence or specificity.

I would also point out there is Group Selection and Multi-level selection which is why homosexuality exists, because sexual reproduction is not the only mechanism.
https://www.pnas.org/doi/10.1073/pnas.2218222120

In short, the gene is like having instructions to build ikea furniture, while the epigenetic process is the actual building of the funiture. Even with the same instruction, people often get different results. But I think it's obvious that there is a large difference between the instructions to build funiture, and the finished product. It's also good to point out that the DNA of every human is 99.9% similar, so the genes for every single variation, from dark skin to light skin and every single regional and ethnic variation, are in every human, the difference in how they are expressed, is epigenetic and not a difference in the genes that everyone "has" only differences in the genes that are expressed. Everyone has the genes to be homosexual, but they are only expressed in a small portion of the population. Everyone has the genes for dark skin, but only expressed in some of the population. The same goes for every other variation which might be considered genetic.

1:19:39 from your work so it is on that grounds that I saw the concordance between what
1:19:45 you were doing and what eliotti was doing in his investigation into the spread of religious ideas I like what
1:19:51 you described is what I understood okay so let let me ask you let me ask you another question about that okay so

The Baldwin effect applied to memes: a fundamental concordance

1:19:59 could you imagine a scenario where a meme had sufficient functional adaptive
1:20:07 significance so that the individuals who acted it out gained a reproductive Edge
1:20:14 yes okay so then you could imagine a situation where there was I think I've got this right a Baldwin effect between
1:20:20 the meme and the genome okay so then could you imagine effect where the
1:20:27 heroic Hunters of the past who decided to cease acting like prey animals maybe
1:20:33 when they got rocks or sticks were acting under the impulse
1:20:38 that facing down the Predator was the appropriate strategy because I was thinking about this reproductively like
1:20:43 you know that women are hypergamous they like men cross culturally about four
1:20:49 years older than they are the most fundamental female pornographic fantasy
1:20:56 involves vampires werewolves Pirates surgeons and billionaires dominant men

I would remind people these are WEIRD assertions and would not make sense outside of western culture. So it's false to claim these are the most common or fundamental female fantasies.
Also stone age people were shit hunters and if it wasn't for gathering and scavenging, they would have gone extinct. Most hunts failed, and they typically hunted much smaller animals, not larger predators, to which they were mostly prey. The humans that survived were the ones that avoided predators, not the ones that tried to fight them, as those often died, because they did not have the structural privileges that WEIRD people have in the west in the modern era.

Here, [JBP] gets tangled in jargon without understanding the Baldwin effect's actual relevance. The Baldwin effect describes learned behaviors becoming genetically reinforced over time if they aid survival, but there’s no evidence linking meme transmission to any kind of direct genetic selection. [RD] rightly limits his meme theory to cultural propagation, with no genetic component. [JBP]’s introduction of “heroic hunters” as a test case also shows his struggle to connect disparate theories, perhaps hoping that using evolutionary language will lend credence to his point. It’s an impressive effort to create pseudo-scientific complexity, but it doesn’t hold up.

> _“The most fundamental female pornographic fantasy involves vampires, werewolves, pirates, surgeons, and billionaires…”_

This assertion is startlingly baseless and reflects [JBP]’s cultural myopia. The notion that all women share the same “fundamental” fantasies is rooted in WEIRD (Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic) assumptions, disregarding the profound diversity in gender norms, fantasies, and social structures worldwide. His fixation on power-dominant male archetypes as universal fantasy figures doesn’t align with real anthropological findings but instead reveals [JBP]’s own narrow cultural view.

[JBP]’s romanticized view of ancient humans as predator-fighting warriors ignores historical realities. Early humans primarily hunted smaller, manageable prey and scavenged kills left by actual predators. Large predator encounters were often fatal, and survival relied more on avoidance and resourcefulness than bravery against beasts. His projection of modern hyper-masculine ideals onto ancient societies is entirely unsupported and illustrates a tendency to view history through an anachronistic, modern lens.

[JBP]’s casual use of “hypergamy” (dating up) as a universal truth is misleading. It’s a favorite term in certain social psychology circles but lacks anthropological backing as a cross-cultural constant. His attempts to frame this as evolutionary science fail, especially when applied to ancient human societies, where survival needs overrode modern notions of hypergamy. Diverse human cultures have shown countless relationship structures, often shaped more by survival, kinship, and community than by age or dominance hierarchies.

Using Jargon as Smoke and Mirrors [JBP]’s reliance on specialized language—like invoking the Baldwin effect or hypergamy—serves as a veneer to give authority to his arguments, even when they lack scientific grounding. Instead of enhancing clarity, these references create confusion, suggesting an intellectual depth that isn’t actually present. It’s a classic case of “If you can’t dazzle them with brilliance, baffle them with… metaphors.”

[JBP]’s method here illustrates an intellectual Ouroboros: invoking the language of science without its rigor, blending evolutionary theory with postmodern narrative trickery to dress up ideologies as if they were scientific truths.

1:21:03 who are capable of standing up to Predators who can be brought into an individual relationship okay so that's
1:21:09 that's the fundamental reproductive Story meme that seems to drive women it's allied with the hero myth there
1:21:16 there there are the the different variants of the same story the different
1:21:21 sexual variants of the same story and it seems to me it's not unreasonable to
1:21:26 note that that's the fundamental story of humanity and so I don't understand why you're not impressed by that [RD] talking

[JBP]’s claim that women are biologically driven to seek men who “stand up to predators” essentially glorifies hyper-masculine traits as universally desirable, especially to women. He implies that this mindset is hard-wired, ignoring that many women actively avoid hyper-dominant “hero” types due to their tendency to engage in abusive or controlling behaviors. His interpretation reinforces stereotypes and seems divorced from the reality of how diverse traits contribute to sustainable relationships.

So [JBP] does have one point here, which is, using this logic, is how so many women get into toxic and abusive relationships, because their culture is anti-intellectual, and so these have ridiculous myths like this, that predispose them to get into relationships with violent men, who pretend to be heroes. They mimck the stories they see in fiction and hollywood, only figuring out too late, how dysfunctional those stories actually are. That is what happens when you conflate fact and fiction, as [JBP] has been doing, for this whole conversation.

[JBP]’s generalization overlooks how these narratives of “heroic” males are largely culturally constructed rather than universally or biologically intrinsic. While “heroic” figures appear across mythologies, different cultures have valued traits like wisdom, patience, or compassion alongside physical prowess. It’s a highly WEIRD (Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic) notion to frame these traits as the only “fundamental story of humanity,” when they simply reflect certain cultural ideals.

This claim grossly simplifies the Baldwin Effect, which describes the incorporation of learned behaviors into evolutionary processes over generations—not the direct link between a single “heroic” behavior and reproductive success. The men [JBP] describes may reproduce, but the aggression and dominance associated with this archetype do not translate universally into success. In fact, societies that value community, empathy, and cooperative behavior often have stronger, more stable relationships.

1:21:32 about the Baldwin effect and and suddenly we got into women what what women like I mean well the men who act
1:21:39 out the hero of meme are much more likely to reproduce [RD] it's an example but but perhaps we need to explain what the

acting out the hero meme also makes them most likely to be entitled assholes that try to manifest destiny everyone, and that arrogance is a large part of the reason we have so much conflict. Stupid conflicts, and "culture wars" instead of meaningful philosophical debates.

Encouraging men to “act out” a hero fantasy in real life often leads to entitlement, arrogance, and a tendency to “rescue” women or people in distress, not from genuine empathy but as a means to reinforce their own egos. This is precisely the issue with creating a culture where young men are taught that they are entitled to be “heroes” in a narrative that often dehumanizes others. This dynamic underpins much of the toxic “white savior” complex and leads to the exact “culture wars” [JBP] claims to oppose.

> _“This conversation was not a meaningful philosophical debate.”_

The irony is that [JBP]’s method here, filled with hero archetype rhetoric, fails to engage in a true dialectic where ideas meet and refine each other. It’s more about asserting and rehearsing personal biases under the guise of “debate.” Even though this exchange is devoid of overt hostility, the lack of mutual intellectual engagement highlights a missed opportunity.

To note, this conversation was not a meaningful philosophical debate. But at least they were not hurling insults and pretending to be so much better than each other while inanely exchanging talking points without actually addressing the responses of the other people in the debate.

1:21:44 B [AO] I was going to say that totally help [JBP] yes that would be useful okay [RD] um it it
1:21:50 was suggested by Baldwin um I think in the late 19th century uh it's a kind of genetic assimilation
1:21:57 of a cultural or a learned idea so the
1:22:03 idea is that certain animals learn things learn a clever trick it might be
1:22:10 nut cracking by chimpanzees for example or potato washing by Japanese maacs or
1:22:16 opening milk bottles by English tits um and they perhaps it perhaps spread as
1:22:23 mimetically as an epidemic of of of copying and that that's known to have happened with the with the blue tits and
1:22:29 great tits in Britain now C certain individuals are likely to learn it
1:22:35 faster than others and there may be genetic variation in the speed with which they learn it and as the
1:22:42 generations go by natural selection would have favored speed of learning the new
1:22:47 trick and eventually they would have learned the new trick so fast they didn't need to learn it at all it
1:22:53 becomes genetically assimilated into the genome that that's the Ballwin effect [JBP] okay that I would say that that's
1:22:59 essentially the same pattern of archetype Evolution that's implicit in the Jungian theoretic [RD] well that's very
1:23:06 interesting because that's that suggests that that Jungian archetypes might be genetically assimilated via the Baldwin
1:23:13 effect that's a fascinating idea [JBP] yes yes yes yes yes okay so now [AO] I know we're

Jungian archetypes are not genetically inherited. The behaviors are too complex and arbitrary and it would also result in people outside the west developing the same archetypes without the culture. Evolution does not happen on scales that small and fast. I think [RD] knows this, but also just wants the conversation to end at this point.

1:23:19 coming to the end of our time soon anyway it's it's nice to end on a on a
1:23:24 shared point of Interest which is the Baldwin effect and the archetypes potential origin in in the Baldwin
1:23:30 effect do you think that that is something that is is worth exploring further is that is that something that we can
1:23:37 [JBP] crucial well it speaks of the potential relationship between the spread of memes
1:23:42 and the alteration of of the genetic process by SEL by I would say it
1:23:48 probably happens fastest by sexual selection so what right so imagine that
1:23:53 imagine that a Meme okay so imagine a meme that a meme develops a
1:23:59 representation imaginal and the people who embodied are more effective in dealing with predators and then imagine
1:24:06 that there's a concordance between that and the attractiveness of those males to women seems highly probable well then
1:24:12 you can see that that because sexual selection is a pretty rapid mechanism that that Baldwin effect could get SP I
1:24:18 totally agree with that I've even suggested actually slightly way out suggestion that the habit of standing on
1:24:25 our hind legs might have been sexually selected and then genetically assimilated via the Baldwin effect um
1:24:32 chimpunes do sometimes walk on their hind legs now if for memetic reasons
1:24:37 that was sexually attractive in our in our ancestors uh so it spread as an as an
1:24:43 epidemic of of of sexual display then natural selection could have savored
1:24:49 those individuals who were best at standing on their hind legs Genetically speaking and then would become
1:24:55 genetically assimilated this sexually selected mimetic effect could have been
1:25:00 genetically assimilated and given rise to the genetic tendency to to walk on our hind legs [JBP] so so I remember what I

While [RD] may be toying with [JBP] or exploring a wildly speculative notion, there’s no substantial evidence that bipedalism evolved as a sexual display. The consensus in anthropology points to practical evolutionary pressures: for early hominins on open savannas, upright walking likely offered survival advantages, such as spotting predators over tall grass, carrying food, and using tools—highly advantageous for survival but not primarily for attracting mates.

The Baldwin effect refers to learned behaviors that eventually influence genetic selection when they improve survival or reproduction chances. Applying it to “heroic” or “predator-facing” traits as if they’re biologically inherited archetypes, however, isn’t feasible. The Baldwin effect operates on more immediate, survival-related adaptations rather than the complex social archetypes found in Jungian theory. Traits like standing upright or tool use make sense, but culturally contingent ideas like “heroic masculinity” do not transfer generationally through genetic adaptation.

Sexual selection can indeed shape traits relatively quickly, but [JBP]’s notion that sexual selection swiftly integrates complex social memes (like heroic behaviors or predator-confronting postures) into genetic inheritance overlooks a major issue: genetic assimilation typically involves straightforward survival skills rather than abstract social roles. The idea that meme-based behaviors would be biologically encoded ignores how much more complex and culturally bound these behaviors are.

[JBP]’s framing once again merges cultural constructs with biological evolution without evidence. While certain traits may have been favored due to survival benefits, linking abstract, archetypal constructs like the “hero” directly to sexual selection is more fantasy than evolutionary science. Traits that were selected for survival reasons, such as adaptability and tool use, might have incidentally influenced social perceptions, but they are not memes transmitted through genetics.

In short, this is a tangle of loosely connected ideas that sidesteps the rigorous criteria required for biological and cultural adaptation to be scientifically valid. The assertions here reveal more about the speculative nature of myth-making than anything substantiated by evolutionary science.

1:25:08 was I was going to ask you about this so imagine you have a situation in the biblical narratives where the idea of
1:25:15 sacrifice is dramatized and ritualized so it's acted out it's not exactly
1:25:20 understood it's dramatized and acted out well there's a I believe there's a
1:25:25 concordance between the probability that that sacrifice would be offered and the
1:25:31 ability of someone to forego gratification or to work towards a future end they're the same thing and
1:25:38 the ability to forego gratification which is associated with uh cortical development is a great predictor of
1:25:45 future success let's say future because we know for example that trait conscientiousness which is something
1:25:51 like the ability to delay gratification is the best predictor that isn't cognitive of long-term future success
1:25:57 the ability to sacrifice the present for the future is a Hallmark of a strategy
1:26:03 of adaptation that's going to propagate down the generations [RD] that's interesting as a Canadian you probably know about
1:26:08 the Potlatch phenomenon yes where so a great sacrifice is is a social display
1:26:16 um destruction of one's own property as a which which is a form of sacrifice
1:26:22 destruction of one's own property is a a mark of prestige [JBP] right well it indicates
1:26:27 your it indicates at know those communities it indicates two things your willingness to distribute generously to
1:26:34 the community because you're a big man if you can do that but also your faith in the process by which
1:26:41 that wealth was generated I'm so good at see I think women use wealth as a marker
1:26:46 of sexual attractiveness not because they're interested in wealth but because wealth is the best single predictor of
1:26:53 the ability to generate wealth and the Potlatch is that kind of manifestation it's like yes I have all this stuff I
1:27:00 can give it away and burn it and I can make it again because it isn't the wealth it's the capacity to generate the
1:27:06 wealth right it's a process or a spirit you could say if you wanted to get metaphorical about it so there's this
1:27:12 remarkable concordance between your work and these these works that I've been investigating like I said no one knows
1:27:19 the two literatures and so it's very frustrating in a sense because I I
1:27:25 understood your concept of meme I would say in exactly the way that you just laid it out and I thought this is this
1:27:30 is exactly what I've been studying there's these fundamental narratives and the people who embodied them look the
1:27:38 heroes in in the theater they're actors of a narrative meme they're obviously
1:27:45 Attractive people flock to watch them they you know that among if you take
1:27:50 verites and you show them pictures of the other vervet in their troops they spontaneously gaze longer at the higher
1:27:57 status verit right it's exact so imagine this in the human society is you have people who act out the appropriate meme
1:28:04 let's say which is something like a meta strategy for dealing with predation it's something like that you can approximate
1:28:11 that to a greater or lesser degree the more you approximate that the higher you are on the sexual
1:28:16 selection in the sexual selection hierarchy and I think that's clear like it's a bit more complicated than that
1:28:22 because women's seem to be the the pornographic literature that women
1:28:28 prefer is both the capacity to stand up against predation and maybe even to be a predator but that has to be brought into
1:28:34 alliance with the ability to make a intimate relationship and share so it's like half monster
1:28:41 half Cooperative distributor Cooperative generous distributor it's something like that you can see that's a real knife's
1:28:48 Edge evolutionarily because you want someone who can keep the real monsters at Bay but if they're such a monster
1:28:55 that they don't share and aren't generous and can't take their care of their children they're just another bloody Predator [AO] so Richard the baldwin
1:29:01 effect applied not so much just to the memetic preference for people who stand up
1:29:07 for example but something like a dragon the abstracted Predator is is there any kind of bold when effect implication of
1:29:14 of this kind of [RD] I think there could be I mean I I think it's it's an interesting idea that that jungian archetypes could
1:29:20 be Baldwin IED um memes [AO] and perhaps the
1:29:25 uh the dragon could be one of those [JBP] well you have that terminology even the Baldwin effect terminology but that
1:29:32 notion is implicit in his writings like he he was struggling he also didn't
1:29:37 precisely understand sexual selection let's say so the idea lurks implicitly
1:29:43 in his work there's never a statement like that but you can see clear indications of his struggling towards
1:29:50 something like a Baldwin effect explanation [AO] chaps I'm afraid that we are just about out of time uh but we will be having a
1:29:57 secondary conversation on dailywire plus which we'll be doing in just a moment so people listening if they're interested
1:30:04 in more can go and find more there but for at least this part of the conversation hopefully we've landed on a point of somewhat agreement between
1:30:11 Richard Dawkins and Jordan [JBP] which I think is a is a is is a pretty um significant success I would say in
1:30:18 many ways [JBP] well I think we also established part of the reason that there's a difference

Is Richard Dawkins more interested in things or people?

1:30:24 like I do think that your temperamental Tack and my temperamental tack are are
1:30:30 different [RD] they're utterly different [JBP] you know are you more interested in things or people would you
1:30:36 say because that's a fundamental dimension of differ say in in terms of Interest it [RD] I don't think I admit the
1:30:44 question really [JBP] okay okay well the reason I asked is because the proclivity
1:30:49 to prefer non-fiction which is more of a masculine proclivity is associated with
1:30:55 a tilt of Interest towards the domain of things rather than the domain of people
1:31:00 so [RD] I'm interested in in Eternal things I'm interested in things that were true before there were any humans and will be
1:31:06 true long after humans are extinct which sort kind of lets out all symbolism and
1:31:11 metaphor and stuff like that [JBP] maybe depends on the Baldwin effect [RD] yes okay
1:31:17 [JBP] thank you sir I'm I'm very happy that I have theun to talk to you today and thank you very much Alex for for hosting
1:31:22 this and for everybody who is watching and listening as Alex pointed out we're going to turn to the Daily wire side
1:31:29 right away and if you want to join us for another 30 minutes of this conversation then you'd be more than
1:31:34 welcome to do that um and so thank you one way or another for your time and attention today thank you to the film
1:31:41 crew here in Scottsdale for spending the time and energy necessary to make this I
1:31:47 hope a raving success I certainly was interested in the conversation and so um thanks to you guys as well
1:31:53 [Music]

Sacrifice as Delayed Gratification:
> “the ability to sacrifice the present for the future is a Hallmark of a strategy of adaptation that’s going to propagate down the generations”

[JBP]’s assertion that sacrifice equates to the concept of delayed gratification is tenuous at best. The Potlatch ceremony he and [RD] briefly discuss isn’t necessarily about delayed gratification but rather a complex social ritual with elements of social standing, wealth redistribution, and community responsibility. Sacrifice in such rituals often serves more immediate community benefits, not just long-term personal rewards. [JBP]’s need to shoehorn everything into a model of self-sacrifice overlooks the Potlatch’s more collective motivations.

Sacrifice as a Predictor of Success:
> “Trait conscientiousness, which is something like the ability to delay gratification, is the best predictor that isn’t cognitive of long-term future success”

While conscientiousness may predict certain kinds of success, equating this with religious sacrifice is oversimplification. Success is influenced by various factors—education, resources, social capital—yet [JBP] implies that ancient rituals of sacrifice were a form of conscious strategic success-building, a far leap from the way pre-modern societies viewed and practiced sacrifice.

Confusion of Memes with Evolutionary Selection:
> “You can see clear indications of Jung struggling towards something like a Baldwin effect explanation”

Trying to fit Jungian archetypes into the Baldwin effect just doesn’t work. Jung’s archetypes are not genetic traits but cultural templates, shaped by collective human experiences rather than biological inheritance. [JBP]’s suggestion that the Baldwin effect could assimilate archetypes into the genome presumes a direct link between complex, learned cultural behaviors and genetic transmission, a wildly speculative claim not grounded in evolutionary science.

Dragon as a “Meta-Predator” Meme:
> “…women’s preferences lean towards men who are capable of standing up to Predators”

This idea of women “choosing” mates who embody “predator-facing” or even “predatory” traits is a stretch. Evolutionary science does not support the notion that women are universally attracted to hyper-dominant figures or men who engage in combat with “dragons” (read: predators or hardships). This narrow view of female mate preference as “half monster, half Cooperative distributor” ignores the vast diversity of relationships that thrive on cooperation, mutual respect, and shared goals, rather than dominance or conflict.

Fact vs. Symbolism in Human Interests:
> “Are you more interested in things or people?”

Here, [JBP] attempts to impose a binary: non-fiction as “masculine,” fiction and metaphor as “feminine.” But [RD] wisely resists this bait, clarifying that his interests lie in things that are universally true, transcending human constructs like symbols. [RD] remains rooted in scientific exploration, while [JBP] continues circling around “unity of knowledge,” attempting to force a fusion of fact and metaphor as though one depends on the other.

The Baldwin Effect as a Catch-All:
> “It depends on the Baldwin effect.”

[JBP]’s final remark reduces the Baldwin effect to a convenient crutch—an “explanation” for nearly any concept he can’t otherwise justify. Throughout this conversation, [JBP] invoked the Baldwin effect, metaphor, dragons, and sacrifice without offering concrete evidence or coherent arguments, leaving the entire discourse tangled in non-dualistic generalities.

Overall Impression

The discussion in this segment circles [JBP]’s favorite ideas, but rarely progresses. His insistence on viewing human behavior as an archetypal struggle ignores critical nuances and biological realities, leaving [RD] mostly unengaged, maintaining his factual stance against [JBP]’s symbolic labyrinth. This conversation is the intellectual Ouroboros at its finest, where ideas chase their own tails without ever achieving coherence.

In the end, perhaps the most fitting takeaway is [RD]’s closing remark: the fascination with eternal truths unclouded by symbolism and metaphor—a realm where dragons, at least, remain safely in the world of fiction.

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A critique of Dawkins vs Peterson, Memes & Archetypes | Alex O’Connor Moderates